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 This study seeks to understand how local and national newspaper articles and African 
American residents frame obstacles to returning to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. It 
explores how recovery planning processes and policy changes influenced the decision-making 
processes of African Americans displaced to Houston through a content analysis of the media 
and qualitative interviews with displaced and returned residents. The study shows the media and 
participants framed disaster recovery policies as creating opportunities and gaps in assistance 
that varied by location. Participants described how policy decisions that created gaps in 
assistance compounded the difficulty of returning for working- and middle-class African 
Americans. The findings suggest planners and policy makers need to consider how disaster 
recovery policy changes may intersect to create obstacles that impede residents' ability to return 
and rebuild after disasters.  
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 “The struggle by Black people to obtain freedom, justice, and 
dignity is as old as this nation. At times, great and inspiring leaders 
rose out of desperate situations to give confidence and feelings of 
empowerment to the Black community. Most of these leaders 
urged their people to strive for racial equality. They were firmly 
wedded to the idea that the courts and judiciary were the vehicle to 
better the social position of Blacks. In spite of dramatic civil rights 
movements and periodic victories in the legislatures, Black 
Americans by no means are equal to whites” (Bell, 1992/1995, 
p. 302, emphasis added).  
 
Twenty-five years later, Bell’s words continue to ring true for people of color in the United 
States. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina showed the world the danger racial inequality presented for 
New Orleans’s African American community, especially for those that were poor, elderly, or 
female. Over a decade later, the recovery of the city exemplifies the persistence of racial 
inequality within American society as many displaced and returned African American residents 
continue to struggle to place Hurricane Katrina into the past.  
Homes, businesses, schools, and hospitals in eighty percent of New Orleans flooded 
when the levees failed after Hurricane Katrina. Social institutions and support networks washed 
away as neoliberal recovery strategies reshaped housing, employment, education, and healthcare 
policies in post-Katrina New Orleans (Gotham, 2014; 2015; Tierney, 2015). Neoliberal 
ideologies favor decreased government regulation and oversight, individual versus collective 
rights, privatization of public resources through public-private partnerships, and decentralized 
power structures, which emphasize local control (Brash, 2011; Gotham, 2015; Hackworth, 2007; 
Harvey, 2005). While scholars such as Hackworth (2007) and Brash (2011) indicate that 
neoliberal policies benefit the upper levels of society more so than other segments, Harvey 
(2005) characterizes neoliberalism as conscious class warfare in response to the Keynesian 
welfare state that emerged after the Great Depression of the 1930s.  
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Following Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans’s leadership implemented policies that 
affected multiple aspects of life (Gotham, 2014; 2015; Tierney, 2015). The city privatized public 
housing as well as public education. Although developments such as Lafitte and Iberville 
received relatively minor damages, the City Council voted to demolish all public housing 
developments in New Orleans two years after the storm. All but four public schools became 
charter schools run by private boards or the Recovery School District, with many schools not 
slated to open until 2015. Charity Hospital closed permanently when city officials decided to 
construct a medical district elsewhere. Not all decisions were local. The federal government 
chose to revoke policies that required companies with federal contracts to pay workers prevailing 
wages and that ensured minority contractors received an equitable share of government 
contracts. The city enacted these changes although many residents, scholars, and activists 
questioned the impact these policies would have on Katrina’s most vulnerable victims.  
A Congressional Research Service Report for Congress on the human impact of 
Hurricane Katrina identified poor, elderly, and African American residents of New Orleans as 
the most affected by Hurricane Katrina across the Gulf Coast (Cutter & Emrich, 2006; Gabe, 
Falk, McCarty, & Mason, 2005). African Americans made up seventy-three to eighty percent of 
the population in flood-affected areas although the city's population was only sixty-seven percent 
African American (Brookings Institution, 2005; Gabe et al., 2005). Gabe et al. (2005) reported 
thirty-four percent of African Americans displaced by Hurricane Katrina lived in poverty before 
the disaster. Media reporters found a lack of data on displaced residents initially after the disaster 
and over time (Mekelburg, 2015; Patterson, 2011; Rocheleau, 2017; Turner 2015). Reports 
estimated the flooding displaced 150,000 to 250,000 New Orleans residents to Houston of which 
an estimated 90,000 to 40,000 remain (Mekelburg, 2015; Morris, 2016; Patterson, 2011; 
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Rocheleau, 2017; Turner 2015). Drawing upon Harvey’s (2005) contention that neoliberalism 
represents conscious class warfare, this study seeks to understand how post-disaster policy 
changes influenced the recovery trajectory of African Americans displaced from New Orleans by 
flooding and how African Americans created new networks and strategies to survive.  
Different theoretical frameworks exist to analyze the causes and impacts of disasters. The 
normative view frames the causes of disasters as uncontrollable ‘natural’ forces, which limits the 
role of human agency in causing disasters (Furedi, 2007; Kroll-Smith & Couch, 1991; 
Quarantelli, 2000). Within this limited scope, the proper means to mitigate the impact of 
disasters is through developing technologies capable of earlier, more accurate prediction and 
engineering safer environments, such as constructing levee systems (Fara, 2001; Phillips, 
Thomas, Fothergill, & Blinn-Pike, 2010). As disaster research shifted from natural disasters to 
technological disasters, an ecological-symbolic framework emerged that recognized the social 
construction of disasters as well as ecological vulnerabilities that exacerbated the impact of 
various events (Furedi, 2007; Kroll-Smith & Couch, 1991). Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, and Davis 
(2004) carried the vulnerability concept further by emphasizing how differences in power among 
social groups determines which strata of society live in environmentally hazardous locations 
without the resources to respond to hazardous events. This initiated a social vulnerability 
framework that sees disasters as a result of social vulnerabilities, such as race, class, gender, and 
age, which stratify resources within most societies (Phillips et al., 2010). Scholars argue the shift 
in framing the cause of disasters necessitates a change in mitigation strategies to address social 
vulnerabilities and social inequality in the status quo (Bullard & Wright, 2012; Phillips et al., 
2010; Gotham, 2014).  
4 
 
Largely, disaster scholars indicate that post-disaster recovery policies tend to exacerbate 
social inequalities rather than decrease social vulnerabilities (Chhotray & Few, 2012; Christoplos 
et al., 2010; Ingram, Franco, Rumbaitis-del Rio, & Khazai, 2006; Le Masson, 2015; Mainka & 
McNeely, 2011; Pais & Elliot, 2008). The recovery policies in New Orleans favored neoliberal 
strategies based on decentralizing and privatizing public services through private-public 
partnerships (Gotham, 2014; Tierney, 2015). Gotham (2014) revealed how colorblind disaster 
assistance programs perpetuated historic trends of racial discrimination in housing. Pais and 
Elliot (2008) adapted Logan and Molotch’s (2007) growth machine theory to make sense of the 
processes whereby powerful social forces direct recovery to maximize personal profits and 
maintain social power dynamics and inequalities. In New Orleans this manifested in planning 
processes that viewed citizen participation as token appeasement to build public support for 
recovery plans (Nelson, Ehrenfeucht, & Laska, 2007; Williamson, 2007).  
Bullard and Wright (2012) contend the government response to Hurricane Katrina 
mirrored the previous eighty years of governmental response to African American communities 
affected by natural and technological disasters. Reminiscent of Bell (1992/1995), the phrase, 
“All communities are not created equal. Some communities are more equal than others, ” echoes 
throughout their book (Bullard & Wright, 2012; p. 3). Their cases illustrate the disparate 
treatment African American communities receive in relation to white communities. The study 
shows how Black communities receive less compensation for similar losses, increased risk and 
exposure to toxic contamination, longer timeframes for official recognition, notification, and 
clean up of environmental health hazards, and smaller penalties imposed for polluting their 
communities (2012). They conclude, “Race maps closely with pollution, vulnerability, and 
unequal protection”, which leads people of color to have high levels of distrust in the 
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government’s willingness to protect and compensate their communities in times of disaster 
(Bullard & Wright, 2012, p. 232).  
In the absence of government assistance and adequate personal resources, African 
Americans and other vulnerable populations rely on social networks to survive and recover from 
disasters. Stack’s (1974) ethnographic account of poor, African Americans’ survival mechanisms 
revealed complex, highly organized networks of real and fictive kin based on resource sharing 
and reciprocity that enabled households to survive on incomes drastically below the poverty line. 
Recent scholarship suggests families rely less on the networks Stack (1974) studied because 
those networks require a high level of reciprocity that many of today's poor households cannot 
provide due to chronic poverty (Desmond, 2012; Domínguez & Watkins, 2003; Miller-Cribbs & 
Farber, 2008; Sarkisian & Gerstel, 2004). Examining social networks in the context Hurricane 
Katrina and the recovery of New Orleans, Elliot, Haney, and Sams-Abiodun (2010), Fussell 
(2012), and Litt, Skinner, and Robinson (2012) found that social networks varied in the capacity 
to provide resources and support during disasters.  
Although Hurricane Katrina and the levee failure influenced all facets of life at the same 
time, most social scientists examined the effects of the storm and the recovery process on a 
single area of interest, such as: housing, domestic violence, education, or healthcare. While 
studying individual topics, scholars reported the interrelatedness of issues, such as doctors that 
needed housing and schools for their families in addition to office space and clients to facilitate 
return (Berggren & Curiel, 2006). However, the current literature fails to incorporate 
intersectional analyses of the obstacles to return and fails to allow residents to define those 
obstacles. A plan to return to a stable life in New Orleans requires residents to overcome many 
obstacles at once (Litt et al., 2012).  
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To fill the gap in the literature and to understand the recovery process for African 
American residents of New Orleans, this study uses multiple theoretical frameworks influenced 
by Marxism in addition to the social vulnerability framework of disaster. This project combines 
critical theory, feminist standpoint theory, critical race theory, and intersectionality to examine 
the lived experiences of African Americans confronted by neoliberal policy changes after 
Hurricane Katrina. Critical theory and its offshoot, critical race theory, examine how social 
structures perpetuate inequality as well as how common rhetoric serves to reinforce and 
normalize social inequalities. Standpoint theory stresses the unique insight forged through the 
political struggle of marginalized populations. Intersectionality theory emphasizes the ways 
different identities and political structures overlap to create unique experiences at different 
intersections (Crenshaw, 1991; Harding, 2004). Using these theories, this project assumes 
African Americans displaced from New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina and the federal levee 
failure possess privileged vantage points of and unique experiences with the recovery strategies 
used after the disaster.  
The purpose of this qualitative case study is to explore how African Americans frame 
obstacles to return to post-Katrina New Orleans. The participants are limited to African 
American residents of New Orleans because the literature agrees that they were 
disproportionately affected by the storm and represent the majority of those who faced long-term 
or permanent displacement (Cutter & Emrich, 2006; Gabe et al., 2005). This study will provide 
insight into the experience of a subset recognized as having fewer resources to respond to 
disaster situations. It highlights cases in which disaster response and government assistance are 
most necessary to mitigate the effects of disaster and facilitate equitable long-term recovery. 
Through understanding the experiences and obstacles encountered after Hurricane Katrina by 
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African Americans, policy makers can better understand how post-disaster policy decisions 
affect marginalized populations and their decision-making processes. In addition, this study 
seeks to be an exploratory pilot study to direct future research and attract funding and attention to 





“Theories provide complex and comprehensive conceptual 
understandings of things that cannot be pinned down: how 
societies work, how organisations operate, why people interact in 
certain ways. Theories give researchers different "lenses" through 
which to look at complicated problems and social issues, focusing 
their attention on different aspects of the data and providing a 
framework within which to conduct their analysis. Just as there is 
no one way to understand why, for instance, a culture has formed 
in a certain way, many lenses can be applied to a problem, each 
focusing on a different aspect of it” (Reeves, Albert, Kuper, & 
Hodges, 2008).  
 
To examine how African Americans made the decision to return to New Orleans or to stay 
displaced in Houston, this study uses multiple theoretical perspectives. The following section 
details the history and formation of key theoretical concepts in critical theory, feminist 
standpoint theory, critical race theory, intersectionality theory, and disaster theory as well as how 
these concepts apply to the post-Katrina decision-making context of African American survivors. 
First, a brief overview of Marxism is provided to serve as a foundation for the theoretical 
discussion that follows.  
A Brief Overview of Marxist Philosophy 
 Karl Marx offered a new approach to understand history and social relations. He viewed 
capitalism as inherently exploitive and oppressive. As a dialectical materialist, Marx differed 
from Hegel in that he viewed the infrastructure of society as creating the structure and the 
superstructure of society; whereas Hegel advanced the opposite. This means that the material 
conditions of life determine social institutions, which then determine social ideologies and values 
rather than ideologies determining material conditions. Dialectical refers to the process by which 
society advances through addressing tensions in society. Hegel believed that there were inherent 
tensions in society and that it was through wrestling with these tensions that society advanced as 
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it found answers. Marx located the source of these tensions in capitalism and the struggle over 
ownership of the means of production.  
 To Marx, the main tension in society exists between two classes: the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat. The members of the bourgeoisie own the means of production and extract the surplus 
value of the proletariat's labor for their own personal gain. Because the members of the 
proletariat do not own the means of production, they are forced to sell their labor on the open 
market. This process reduces humans to commodities and leads to the alienation of labor.  
 Alienation is a result of the division of labor. To describe the process of alienation, Marx 
wrote,  
“Labor produces not only commodity; it produces itself and the 
worker as a commodity - and does so in the proportion in which it 
produces commodities generally. This fact expresses merely that 
the object which labor produces-labor's product-confronts it as 
something alien as a power independent of the producer. The 
product of labor is labor which has been congealed in an object, 
which has become material: is the objectification of labor. . . . In 
the conditions dealt with by political economy this realization of 
labor appears as loss of reality for the workers; objectification as 
loss of the object and object-bondage: appropriation as 
estrangement, as alienation.” (Tucker, 1974, p. 71, emphasis in 
original).  
Capitalism leads to the alienation of labor because the objects that the worker produces do not 
belong to the worker. The manifestation of labor instead belongs to the owner of the means of 
production. Both the labor and the worker are reduced to objects in the production process.  
 Marx also discussed the idea of false consciousness in the maintenance of the status quo. 
The bourgeoisie use their power and wealth to ensure the dominant social ideologies, 
rationalizations, and narratives support their class interests and maintain power relations. This 
creates a false consciousness among the proletariat, where they fail to see how they are 
manipulated and exploited as a class. False consciousness often leads workers to act against their 
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self-interests by upholding the dominant view of society. In this way, false consciousness blocks 
the formation of a class consciousness among the proletariat, an enlightened awareness where the 
proletariat sees itself as a unified, exploited class with a common oppressor. Marx predicted that 
workers would unite first within countries and then internationally to seize control of the means 
of production (Tucker, 1974). The rise in consciousness through political action would lead the 
workers to revolt and take possession of the means of production, and thereby, own and control 
the product of their labors. This shift in material conditions brings about the next stage in social 
evolution, which, according to Marx, is communism. However, the workers’ revolution in the 
early twentieth century did not bring about the change Marx foresaw. Instead of liberation, 
fascism and totalitarianism followed the workers’ revolution. Critical theorists critiqued 
Marxism for failing to grasp the importance of culture and politics in subverting the 
consciousness of the masses in order to maintain the status quo (Bronner, 2011).  
History & Origin of Critical Theory 
 Critical theory developed in the early twentieth century as a critique of traditional 
philosophy and Western society (Bronner, 2011; Held, 1980; How, 2003; Sudarsan, 1998). 
Theorists at the University of Frankfort’s Institute for Social Research began developing critical 
theory in the 1920’s and 1930's (Bronner, 2011). Commonly referred to as the Frankfort School, 
the most prominent scholars include: Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, 
Georg Lukacs, and Jürgen Habermas (Bronner, 2011; Held, 1980; How, 2003; Sudarsan, 1998). 
Sudarsan (1998, p. 250) conceptualizes critical theory as, “more a movement than a concrete 
philosophical and systematized theory.” Bronner (2011, p. 4) states, “Critical theory was 
intended as an alternative” to establishmentarian philosophies, particularly phenomenology and 
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positivism. Critical theorists attacked phenomenology and positivism “for treating society in 
ahistorical terms and eliminating genuine subjectivity” (Bronner, 2011, p. 4).  
The ideas of the Frankfort School, which relied heavily upon Marxist philosophies, also 
critiqued Marxism (Bronner, 2011; Held, 1980; How, 2003; Sudarsan, 1998). Operating in the 
space between World War I and World War II, the Frankfort School scholars watched the 
workers’ movement in Europe culminate in the rise of fascism and totalitarianism (Bronner, 
2011; Sudarsan, 1998). This disproved Marx’s belief that socialism would follow capitalism in 
the evolution of political economies once the proletariat rose up to take control of the means of 
production from the bourgeoisie (Tucker, 1974). To reconcile Marxist theories with the world 
around them, the Frankfort School formulated a Western version of Marxism as a methodology 
to critically examine and transform society (Bronner, 2011; Sudarsan, 1998). Focused on 
society’s political and cultural superstructure, the Frankfort School dismissed economic 
determinism and the social evolutionist claims of Marx (Bronner, 2011). To form their critique 
of post-World War I capitalist society, the Frankfort theorists adopted Marx’s concepts of false 
consciousness, alienation, reification, and class exploitation (Bronner, 2011; How, 2003; 
Sudarsan, 1998).  
Horkheimer and Adorno critiqued Marx’s failure to integrate the role of politics and 
culture into his theories of economic domination (Bronner, 2011; Sudarsan, 1998). They argued 
that politics and culture create and sustain a false worldview that supports the continued 
submission of the proletariat to an exploitive economic system. In Dialectics of Enlightenment, 
Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/1997) undertook a Marxist critique of the culture industry as an 
example of how the market permeates all institutions to ensure the maintenance of the status quo. 
Through commodification, art loses its authenticity and revolutionary form (1944/1997). In 
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advanced capitalism, art becomes entertainment and distraction from the physical suffering and 
exploitation inherent in the social structure (1944/1997).  
Adorno (1966/1973) took his critique further. In Negative Dialectics, Adorno 
(1966/1973) moved beyond Hegel’s theory of positive dialectics, whereby self-reflexive thought 
moves through social contradictions to arrive at a point of positive growth. Adorno (1966/1973) 
rejects the assumption that dialectical movement through contradictions always results in a 
positive conclusion. For Adorno, dialectical movement can result in social regression, such as 
that which led to Auschwitz (Bronner, 2011). All subjects and objects have multiple identities, or 
ways in which they can be categorized, as well as non-identities, the part of each subject or 
object that defies categorization (Cook, 2008). He criticizes philosophy for emphasizing thought 
to the detriment of objects that defy categorization according to the existing concepts (Bronner 
2011; Cook, 2008). Adorno stresses the recognition of the limited ability of a concept to define 
an object as the path to move beyond the current philosophical limitations in thinking (Cook, 
2008). To Adorno, the role of theory and self-reflexive thought is to identify inherent 
contradictions in the experience of the social world.  
Representing a turn in critical theory in the 1960s, Jurgen Habermas focused on language 
and discourse as the means to transform society through critical reflection (Bronner, 2011; 
Seidman & Alexander, 2008; Sudarsan 1998). To Habermas, changing society required using 
undistorted discourse to challenge and change laws, which would then change social relations 
(Seidman & Alexander, 2008). He developed the concept of the public sphere as the space where 
mass consciousness could be formed through “liberating discourse” and “political action” 
(Bronner, 2011, p. 85). Other critical theorists remained skeptical of his ideas because they 
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rejected the premise that politics could result in anything other than distortion and the 
perpetuation of false consciousness (2011).  
Feminist Standpoint Theory  
 Feminist standpoint theory also owes its theoretical origins to Hegel and Marx. Hegel 
first put forth the concept that the oppressed, by virtue of the inherent contradictions within the 
oppressor/oppressed relationship, possessed a unique view of reality that contains less distortion 
of social relationships than the perspective of the oppressor (Bowell, n.d.; Cockburn, 2015; 
Hartsock, 1983/2004). From this foundation, Marx viewed the class-consciousness of the 
proletariat as the proper vantage point to critique and change society as opposed to the standpoint 
of the dominant class, the bourgeoisie (Bowell, n.d.; Cockburn, 2015). Feminists drew women 
into the Marxist framework of oppression, whereby women become the oppressed objects of 
patriarchy (Cockburn, 2015; Donovan, 2000; Hartsock, 1983/2004; Hekman, 1997). Second-
wave feminists continued to build upon these ideas and, led by Patricia Hill Collins, Dorothy 
Smith, and Nancy Hartsock, created feminist standpoint theory as a method of analysis to 
understand, challenge, and change patriarchy and the material conditions of women’s lives 
(Brooks, 2007; Cockburn, 2015; Donovan, 2000; Harding, 1997/2004; Hekman, 1997).  
According to Hartsock (1981 as quoted in Hekman, 1997, p. 344-3) “At bottom feminism 
is a mode of analysis, a method of approaching life and politics, rather than a set of political 
conclusions about the oppression of women” and offers the ability to “connect everyday life with 
the analysis of the social institutions that shape that life” (Hekman, 1997, p. 343). Within a 
Marxist framework, Hartsock (1983) argues material conditions determine and restrict 
knowledge about social relations and differences in material conditions result in different 
perceptions of reality (Donovan, 2000; Hekman, 1997). The dominant class uses its power to 
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structure the material conditions within society and to define its perspective as the correct view 
(Cockburn, 2015; Hekman, 1997). To Hartsock (1983/2004) and Smith (1972/2004), the 
dominant perspective is partial and distorted while the vantage point of the oppressed reveals the 
actual social relations that structure society and offer the best starting point at which to undertake 
scientific investigation into the nature of social relationships. This is because “the discourse of 
the ruling class is ideological, that of the oppressed is not: it reflects the concrete reality of their 
lives” (Hekman, 1997, p. 346). However, it is only through collective political action that the 
consciousness, or standpoint of an oppressed group emerges (Cockburn, 2015; Hekman, 1997; 
Hartsock, 1983/2004; Smith, 1972/2004).  
 Feminist standpoint theory faced several criticisms. Critics attacked standpoint theory 
because it assumes all knowledge is socially and historically situated but gives primacy to the 
standpoint of women as a privileged position that reveals true social relationships (Bowell, n.d.; 
Haraway, 1988/2004; Harding, 2004; Hartsock, 1983/2004; Hekman, 1997). It is accused of both 
slipping into relevatism and advancing a monolithic feminist standpoint (Harding, 1993/2004; 
2004; Hekman, 1997). Harding (1993/2004) and Haraway (1988/2004) respond to these 
challenges by emphasizing the misinterpretations and false dichotomies created by critics when 
interpreting standpoint theory. Recognizing that all knowledge is historically situated and partial 
and rejecting a universal knowledge base does not equate to embracing relativism, where all 
knowledge claims are equal (Haraway, 1988/2004; Harding, 1993/2004). Instead, Harding 
(1993/2004, p. 132) states, “standpoint theory provides arguments for the claim that some social 
situations are scientifically better than others as places from which to start off knowledge 
projects” rather than endorsing the equality of socially situated knowledge claims. Harding 
(1993/2004, p. 132) contrasts different assumptions of “the subject or agent of knowledge” that 
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empiricist epistemology and standpoint theory make to illuminate the source of the 
misinterpretation. “[For standpoint theory, ] the subjects/agents of knowledge . . . are multiple, 
heterogeneous, and contradictory or incoherent, not unitary, homogenous, and coherent as they 
are for empiricist epistemology” (Harding, 1993/2004, p. 134). Harding (1993/2004) goes further 
to suggest that feminist theories require “strong objectivity”, or continued, critical self-reflection, 
which results in a higher degree of objectivity than that of traditional scientific inquiry, which 
fails to see and reflect upon its social and historical context. The next theory focused the critical 
lens on oppression codified by law. 
Critical Race Theory 
 Critical race theory brings the critical enterprise to bear upon structures of oppression and 
domination within American society, particularly within the realm of law. Similar to the failure 
of the workers' revolution to bring about Marx's utopia, Civil Rights legislation in the 1950s and 
1960s failed to create the equality African Americans sought. In the 1970s, scholars, primarily - 
but not only - scholars of color, questioned the actual racial progress that resulted from Civil 
Rights litigation, which the courts weakened through subsequent legal rulings, issuing in a 
political era of racial retrenchment (Crenshaw, Gotanda, Peller, & Thomas, 1995; Delgado, 
2011; Delgado & Stefancic, 2000; 2001). Branching out of critical legal studies, critical race 
theory utilized a critical eye to deconstruct the underlying assumptions of the law and Civil 
Rights legislation to examine how legal doctrine perpetuates white supremacy and racial 
disparities in power and resources (Crenshaw et al., 1995; Delgado & Stefancic, 2001). Rejecting 
the liberal premise that the law is neutral, objective, and impartial, critical race theorists critiqued 
the Left for its adherence to colorblindness, which claims that the path to racial equality lies in 
disregarding race as a valid category in decision-making processes (Crenshaw et al., 1995; 
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Delgado & Stefancic, 2001). Far from ignoring the category of race in order to redress racial 
injustice, critical race theorists claim that solutions to address racial inequity must explicitly 
acknowledge race in order to change racial forms of structural oppression (Crenshaw et al., 1995; 
Delgado & Stefancic, 2001).  
 Critical race scholars, like many liberals, view race as a social construction, rejecting 
historical conceptualizations of race as natural or biological (Crenshaw et al., 1995; Delgado & 
Stefancic, 2000; 2001; Haney-Lopez, 1994/2000; Omi & Winant, 1994). Critical race theorists 
critiqued legal decisions that reduced the definition of racism to individual acts perpetrated 
against people of color in cases where the acts are intentional on the part of the perpetrator 
(Freeman, 1977-1978/1995). Termed the “perpetrator perspective” by Freeman (1977-
1978/1995), this framework fails to recognize the embedded nature of racism, understood as 
structural processes that simultaneously produce systemic inequalities and mask such inequalities 
as natural (Crenshaw et al., 1995, p. 29). As a result, individuals and communities of color are 
left unprotected from the conditions of subordination forced upon minority communities, such as 
unequal access to quality jobs, housing, education, and healthcare (Crenshaw et al., 1995; 
Freeman, 1977-1978/1995). Freeman (1977-1978/1995) argues adopting a “victim perspective” 
of racial discrimination would expand the focus of antidiscrimination legislation toward 
alleviating the conditions of oppression rather than limiting legal redress to individual acts of 
interpersonal discrimination.  
 Examining the narrative and mainstream definitions of racial categories, Freeman's 
(1977-1978/1995) theoretical approach correlates with the idealist camp within critical race 
theory. Delgado and Stefancic (2001) divide critical race theorists into two perspectives: idealist 
and realists. Idealists, “hold that racism and discrimination are matters of thinking, mental 
17 
 
categorization, attitude, and discourse” (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001, p. 17). Therefore idealist 
remedies seek to “chang[e] the system of images, words, attitudes, unconscious feelings, scripts, 
and social teachings by which we convey to one another that certain people are less intelligent, 
reliable, hardworking, virtuous, and American as others” (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001, p. 17). 
Similar to cultural feminists, critical race idealists deconstruct and challenge mainstream 
narratives and offer alternative images and conceptualizations of racial representation and 
conditions of oppression (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001; Donovan, 2000).  
 Realists acknowledge the importance of words and attitudes in perpetuating racism; 
however, they view racism as “a means by which society allocates privilege and status” 
(Delgado & Stefancic, 2001, p. 17). Many realists are also materialists and presuppose material 
conditions determine society's ideologies, which serve as rationalizations for differential 
treatment and imbalances in power (2001). For critical race scholars writing from a realist 
perspective, “understanding the ebb and flow of racial progress and retrenchment requires a 
careful look at conditions prevailing at different times in history” (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001, p. 
18). Rather than challenging images and representation, realists focus on changing the material 
conditions of people and communities of color as the proper avenue for alleviating racism and 
structural inequality (2001).  
 Regarded as laying the intellectual foundation of critical race theory, Derrick Bell's 
(1976/1995; 1980/1995) alternative vision of the historic Brown v. Board of Education (347 U. 
S. 483, 1954) case employs a realist perspective (Crenshaw et al., 1995; Delgado & Stefancic, 
2001). Bell (1980/1995) critically examines the state of political affairs following the Korean 
War in order to resituate the school desegregation decision within the interests of the white elite. 
He claims the need to improve the image of the United States in the international arena, 
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particularly among developing nations which the U. S. feared may embrace communism, led to 
the decision to desegregate public education (Bell, 1980/1995; Delgado & Stefancic, 2001). Bell 
(1980/1995) contends that lower courts enforced integration in order to legitimate local judicial 
power over the power of local school boards when school boards fought federal judicial 
mandates to desegregate public schools. Dudziak (1988) later conducted archival research of 
previously classified federal documents that corroborated Bell's (1976/1995) theory of interest 
convergence in the case of the Cold War and desegregation.  
 In addition to revisioning history and reframing representational narratives, critical race 
theory also critiqued liberalism and critical legal studies for a number of reasons. Peller 
(1990/1995) and Gotanda (1991/1995) refute the usefulness of colorblind ideology and policies, 
which fail to address structural racism. Calmore (1992/1995), Cook (1990/1995), Crenshaw 
(1988/1995), and Matsuda (1987/1995) contend that critical reflection and analysis of critical 
legal studies must be grounded in real-life experiences of minority and marginalized 
communities in order to create positive change, instead of negative impacts, in the lives of those 
at the bottom of the U. S. social hierarchy. Dalton (1987/1995) and Delgado (1984/1995) 
illuminate and challenge the systemic exclusion of work by scholars of color in Civil Rights 
scholarship. Crenshaw (1988/1995), Matsuda (1987/1995), and Delgado and Stefancic (2001) 
provide critiques of liberal rights discourse. Delgado and Stefancic (2001, p. 23) characterize 
critical race theorists as skeptical of rights because of their “procedural (for example, to a fair 
process) rather than substantive (for example, to food, housing, education)” focus and for the 
ease with which courts historically restricted civil rights that clash with powerful elite interests. 
Crenshaw (1988/1995) acknowledges the limitations of redress through rights but also highlights 
the significance of the rights discourse for the Civil Rights Movement. Greene (1990/1995) and 
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Bell (1992/1995) reject the notion that the law can correct current racial inequality and urge 
communities of color to adopt a new approach to challenge and end racial oppression. Freeman 
(1981/2000) holds that Bell's bleak projection for the usefulness of law in creating racial change 
and ending discrimination is a disservice to law students because it lacks hope.  
 Critical race theory responded to criticism from both external and internal sources 
(Delgado & Stefancic, 2000; 2001). Kennedy (1989/2000) critiqued the exclusion thesis 
(academia is racist and excludes the work of scholars of color) and the distinctiveness thesis 
(minority scholars hold unique and expert views on racial matters due to their race) as 
specifically advanced by Bell, Delgado, and Matsuda. Kennedy (1989/2000) equates the 
distinctiveness thesis with essentialism, similar to critiques of feminist standpoint theory. He 
writes, “Matsuda's analysis is marred by both her tendency to homogenize the experience of 
persons of color and her tendency to minimize the heterogeneity of opinions held and articulated 
by persons of color” (p. 315) and dismisses the distinctive thesis as a mechanism “that. . . 
stereotypes scholars” (p. 316, emphasis in original). In response to the exclusion thesis, Kennedy 
(1989/2000) demanded that critical race theorists empirically prove the merit of the work of 
scholars before decrying legal academia excluded it on racial terms. Responding to Kennedy's 
criticisms, Espinoza contended that Kennedy failed to understand the importance of context and 
held critical race theorists to the universalist standards of merit that they rejected as racist 
(Delgado & Stefancic, 2001). Barnes compared the unrealistic requirements that Kennedy 
demanded to prove discrimination in Civil Rights scholarship to similarly unrealistic standards 
set by the Supreme Court to prove racial discrimination (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001).  
 Like Kennedy, Farber and Sherry (1995/2000) rejected the distinctiveness thesis 
espoused by critical race theorists. In addition, they denounced critical race theory as anti-
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Semitic based on its critique of merit (1995/2000). Ferber and Sherry (1995/2000, p. 579) state, 
according to critical race theory, “‘merit’ has no meaning, except as a way for those in power to 
perpetuate the existing hierarchy.” This leads Ferber and Sherry (1995/2000) to question how the 
success of Jews and Asians as “model minorities” can be explained. They propose there are only 
four possibilities, all of which are anti-Semitic, and challenge critical race theorists to devise a 
“more moderate theory about the social construction of merit which would prove more 
defensible” (Farber & Sherry, 1995/2000, p. 582). To these anti-Semitic accusations, critical race 
theorists contended their critics “confused criticism of a standard with criticism of individuals 
who perform well under that standard” (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001, p. 90). Delgado and 
Stefancic (2001) also indicate the ahistorical perspective of Farber and Sherry rendered invisible 
the history and experience of racial oppression that Jews and Asians endured.  
 Rosen (1996/2000, p. 588) echoes Kennedy's concerns of essentialism but highlights the 
O. J. Simpson acquittal as real-world proof of “racial perspectivism”. In recognizing the impact 
of critical race theory on the world of popular culture as well as the courtroom, Rosen 
(1996/2000) blasts critical race theory for allowing murders like O. J. Simpson to walk free 
through emphasizing the importance of utilizing historical storytelling in the courtroom to offer 
counter narratives of life from the perspective of the oppressed. In Rosen's (1996/2000) account, 
critical race theory allowed Cochran to place the Los Angeles Police Department on trial as 
racists, which resonated with the African American jury. In response to claims of essentialism 
and against the use of storytelling, Delgado and Stefancic (2001, p. 91) remind their readers that 
“critical race theorists deploy stories and narratives as a means of building cohesion within 
minority groups and shattering the mindset created by the stories of the dominant group” and that 
they reject the concept of objective truth.  
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 Storytelling is one tactic to challenge negative mainstream representations of minorities, 
as groups and individuals. Storytelling can highlight extreme experiences as well as common 
experiences, which lends to group unification. Group unification is necessary because, as critics 
point out, minority communities are diverse in thought, conviction, and action (Kennedy 
1989/2000; Rosen, 1996/2000). Critical race theorists recognize the need to unify in order to 
attain the political pressure necessary to change an inherently racist system, but they are also 
mindful of the ways that identities conflict, compound, and diversify experiences of racism as 
indicated by the large body of critical race scholarship that focuses on intersectionality 
(Crenshaw, 1989; 1991; Crenshaw et al. 1995; Delgado & Stefancic, 2001). In this way, critical 
race theorists view themselves as using the tools available to unite minorities to create change as 
well as to examine the different needs of the various subgroups within the larger community.
 Internal criticism focuses on the relationship between theory and practice as well as 
strategies to create social change and end white supremacy and oppression (Delgado & 
Stefancic, 2001). Bell (1976/1995), Calmore (1992/1995), Matsuda (1987/1995), Crenshaw 
(1988/1995), as well as Lopez (1989/2000), Alfieri (1991/2000), Su (1998/2000), and Williams 
(1997/2000) challenge critical legal scholars as well as critical race theorists to ground their 
theories and ideas in the real-world experiences, needs, and desires of people of color. Lopez 
(1989/2000) illustrates how different social groups, such as women of color, devise strategies of 
survival and of social change that go unrecognized by legal academics. Su (1998/2000) draws 
attention to the power of the language to silence or empower. Contradicting client desires for her 
“to tell their story for them”, Su (1998/2000) contends that speaking for clients renders them 
voiceless while encouraging them to speak in their native tongue transforms them into “poetic 
and strong” (p. 612). Delgado and Stefancic (2001) conclude theory and praxis must inform each 
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other. Praxis provides the opportunity to empirically test theories, and theories provide new 
strategies, visions, and conceptualizations of how to transform society to eradicate oppression 
and discrimination (2001).  
 Internal criticism also questions the types of strategies that are necessary to end racial 
oppression (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001). Much of this debate rests on the differences between 
the idealist and realist perspectives within critical race theory. As critical race theory focused 
more on representation and identity issues, realists perceived the movement as losing sight of “its 
materialist roots and dwelling on matters that concern middle class minorities: micro 
aggressions, racial insults, unconscious discrimination, and affirmative action in higher 
education” (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001, p. 95). To materialists, this transition is critical because 
they view change in material conditions, not ideologies, as the primary means to alleviate 
oppression (2001). If critical race theorists focus exclusively on issues of identity, realists 
question if the end of oppression is attainable (2001). Delgado and Stefancic (2001, p. 95) 
indicate that internal criticisms “question only the movement's emphasis and allocation of 
resources. They do not threaten its solidarity, vitality, or ability to generate vital insights into 
America's racial predicament.” The next section introduces intersectionality theory, which builds 
upon feminist and critical race theories. 
Theory of Intersectionality 
 As critics of feminist standpoint theory and critical race theory indicated, minority groups 
contain individuals with different thoughts, attitudes, and experiences of oppression. Crenshaw 
(1989) coined the term “intersectionality” to highlight the ways race, sex, and class interact to 
compound oppression; however, Black feminist scholars have long described the differences race 
and class create in the experiences of women (Collins, 1986; Crenshaw, 1989; Davis, 1981; 
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Donovan, 2000; Smith, 2013-2014). According to Smith (2013-2014), “Black feminist[s]. . . 
demonstrated that women of color are not merely “doubly oppressed” by both sexism and 
racism. Black women’s experience of sexism is shaped equally by racism and class inequality 
and is therefore different in certain respects from the experience of white, middle-class women.” 
Through examining case law where Black women challenged workplace discrimination and 
sexual violence, Crenshaw (1989) illuminated how antidiscrimination policy regarded sexism 
and racism as distinct processes. Crenshaw (1989) illustrates how this renders invisible the 
unique experiences of discrimination Black women face at the intersection of race and gender. 
The courts only protect Black women from discrimination that affects all women or all Black 
people thereby leaving them unprotected in their marginalized status within both communities 
(1989).  
 Since the early formation of intersectionality by women of color, three areas of 
scholarship have emerged. According to Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall (2013, p. 785),  
“the first consist[s] of applications of an intersectional framework 
or investigations of intersectional dynamics, the second consist[s] 
of discursive debates about the scope and content of 
intersectionality as a theoretical and methodological paradigm, and 
the third consist[s] of political interventions employing an 
intersectional lens.” 
 
Few-Demo (2014, p. 169) compares different conceptualizations of intersectionality as a 
theoretical framework, which she characterizes, “as an extension of racial/ethnic feminisms and 
critical race theories.” Hancock (2007, p. 74) claims “intersectionality represents an emerging 
paradigm from critical theory and its companion deconstructivist approaches.” As a 
methodological framework, “researchers are encouraged to examine the fluidity, variability, and 
the temporality of interactive processes that occur between and within multiple social groups, 
institutions, and social practices” (Few-Demo, 2014, p. 170). Based on Greenwood (2008) and 
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Crenshaw (1989), Few-Demo (2014) lists four assumptions of the intersectional paradigm. First, 
people can possess multiple, complex, and sometimes conflicting, social identities (Crenshaw, 
1989; Few-Demo, 2014). In addition, the intersectional paradigm assumes that “social identities 
are grounded in ideological and symbolic domains” and that these domains “are historically and 
contextually situated” (Few-Demo, 2014, p. 170). Finally, the intersectional framework views 
social identities as being influenced by power structures (Few-Demo, 2014; Greenwood 2008).  
 Crenshaw (1991) delineates three forms of intersectionality: structural, political, and 
representational. Structural intersectionality illuminates how “overlapping structures of 
subordination” in society create or perpetuate inequality among and within different social 
groups (Cho et al., 2013, p. 797). Political intersectionality focuses attention on how traditional 
approaches to antidiscrimination policies based on race or gender perpetuate the marginalization 
of women of color (Cho et al., 2013; Crenshaw, 1989; Few-Demo, 2014). It also “reflects a dual 
concern for resisting the systemic forces that significantly shape the differential life chances of 
intersectionality's subjects and for the reshaping of modes of resistance beyond allegedly 
universal, single-axis approaches” (Cho et al., 2013, p. 800). Representational intersectionality 
examines the ways that stereotypical images of individuals and communities form narratives that 
influence the shape of social policies and institutions (Crenshaw, 1991). Emphasizing the 
theoretical links to the Marxist and feminist concept of praxis and goal of social transformation, 
the analysis of representational images, stereotypes, and narratives is the first step in re-shaping 
the images and narratives that characterize marginalized individuals and communities to change 
social conditions (Cho et al., 2013; Crenshaw, 1989; Few-Demo, 2014).  
 McCall (2005) approaches intersectionality as a methodology to examine categories of 
analysis. She defines “a methodology [as] a coherent set of ideas about the philosophy, methods, 
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and data that underlie the research process and the production of knowledge” (McCall, 2005, p. 
1774). This definition illustrates her concern “with the philosophical underpinnings of methods 
and the kinds of substantive knowledge that are produced in the application of methods” 
(McCall, 2005, p. 1774). She continues, “My focus is on the connections among these elements 
of the research process rather than on identifying any particular philosophy or method as 
feminist…” (McCall, 2005, p. 1774).  
 McCall (2005) identifies three approaches to intersectional research: anti-categorical, 
inter-categorical, and intra-categorical, but she also recognizes that not all intersectional studies 
utilize one of the three approaches she advances. The anti-categorical approach views the use of 
analytic categories as simplistic and reductionist because of the fundamental complexity of social 
relations (McCall, 2005). Similar to Adorno’s (1966/1973) concept of the non-identity of 
identity, the anti-categorical approach recognizes the limitations of categories to fully represent 
the complexity of social relations; as such, this view holds that the use of analytic categories is 
simplistic and leads researchers to deconstruct categories of analysis to illuminate complexity 
(McCall, 2005). The intra-categorical approach typically relies upon narratives to reveal within 
group diversity (McCall, 2005). Crenshaw (1989; 1991) as well as many early intersectional 
studies by academic women of color utilized the intra-categorical approach to highlight the 
unique experiences of Black women in comparison to Black men and white women. The inter-
categorical approach focuses on the “relationships of inequality among already constituted social 
groups” (McCall, 2005, p. 1975). This approach takes inequality between groups as its empirical 
hypothesis as opposed to the other approaches which assume a priori that inequality exists 
between groups (McCall, 2005). Due to this focus, the approach is “systematically comparative” 
(McCall, 2005, p. 1786). Intersectionality developed independently across disciplines (Hancock, 
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2007; McCall, 2005). In the following section, the discussion shifts to apply these four theories 
to the context of the study.  
Theory Applied 
 The preceding sections focused on the history and evolution of ideas of several critical 
approaches. This section describes how these theories form the research perspective for this 
study. According to Creswell (2007, p. 27), “critical theory perspectives are concerned with 
empowering human beings to transcend the constraints placed on them by race, class, and 
gender.” Critical theory lends itself to the deconstruction of social institutions through the 
questioning of assumptions in search for inequalities and injustices (Bronner, 2011; Creswell, 
2007). Agger (1991, p. 109) asserts, “critical theorists attempt to develop a mode of 
consciousness and cognition that breaks the identity of reality and rationality, viewing social 
facts not as inevitable constraints on human freedom but as pieces of history that can be 
changed.” Creswell (2007) suggests that critical theory can influence research design as a 
methodology or substantively, meaning critical theory influences the way the researcher reads 
and writes or influences the researcher’s topic of interest and conceptualization of the topic. This 
study incorporates critical theory and critical race theory substantively because it seeks to 
deconstruction assumptions of return as voiced in the media and ground the experience of return 
in structural inequalities and in race, gender, and class differences.  
 As an outgrowth of the critical enterprise, intersectionality as a research paradigm 
informs this study in several ways. Drawing on Crenshaw's (1991) concept of political 
intersectionality, this study seeks to understand the “overlapping structures of subordination”, 
namely housing, education, employment, and healthcare, that influenced the decision-making 
process of African Americans following Hurricane Katrina. Brodkin Sacks (1994) identified 
27 
 
these social institutions as key to upward mobility in the United States and as arenas in which the 
federal government supported systemic discrimination against African Americans. Drawing upon 
the work of Tomlinson (2013), Spade (2013), and Verloo (2013), this study recognizes important 
points of intersection are determined according to power relations within society, not according 
to identity claims. Like Spade (2013) and Cho et al. (2013), I reject a single-axis approach to 
understanding the complex processes of displacement, return, and recovery where survivors 
found themselves at the intersection of several changing institutional forces. Verloo (2013), 
reminiscent of Young (1990), advocates a politics of recognition and inclusion of different 
identities in order to alleviate policy decisions that perpetuate inequality. Bringing marginalized 
voices to the decision-making table provides the opportunity for the disenfranchised to discuss 
how possible solutions might interact with their specific context to further, rather than alleviate, 
discrimination and inequality (Cho et al., 2013; Verloo, 2013; Young, 1990).  
 Drawing upon standpoint theory, this study focuses on the experiences of African 
American residents of New Orleans. As a historically marginalized community involved in 
political activity to liberate itself from oppression, African Americans have unique insight into 
the structures of domination and oppression within the United States (Collins, 1991). 
Furthermore, the community's specific location on the margins of society leaves it particularly 
vulnerable in the context of colorblind disaster recovery policy. For example, the Road Home 
program, designed to compensate Louisiana homeowners whose houses Hurricane Katrina 
destroyed, compensated families according to the pre-storm value of their home (Gotham, 2014). 
This neglects the historical context of discrimination in real estate in the United States; both the 
discrimination that excludes African Americans from living in white communities as well as the 
discrimination that assigns higher land and house values to homes in white communities in 
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comparison to Black communities (2014). African American housing advocates successfully 
challenged the design of the Road Home program as discriminatory (2014).  
 Cognizant of the critiques against standpoint theory and intersectionality, this study does 
not seek to universalize or essentialize the experiences of the participants or of displaced African 
Americans (Crenshaw et al., 1995; Delgado & Stefancic, 2000; 2001; Hekman, 1997). Instead, it 
seeks to understand the nuanced differences that influenced their individual agency within the 
context of structural constraints on recovery and return (Bourdieu, 1990; Giddens, 1984). This 
analysis hopes to reveal the barriers to return as identified by Black residents to illuminate 
possible causes of the disparate return rates among African American and white residents that 
previous research reported (see Henderson et al., 2015). Through the experiences of African 
Americans and the unique standpoint that emerged following the political nature of Hurricane 
Katrina's recovery, this study also aims to critically examine structural policy decisions and their 
impacts as well as media representations of recovery. The next section focuses on disaster theory 
and illustrates how the critical perspective influences the theoretical frameworks used to 
understand of the causes and impacts of disasters.  
Theorizing about Disaster: From Normative to Social Vulnerability Frameworks 
 Quarantelli (2000) chronicles the historical evolution of disaster planning and emergency 
management to illustrate the impact of alternative perspectives on disaster studies research. His 
conclusions are based on reviews of published and unpublished empirical studies and 
governmental reports on disasters housed at the Disaster Research Center (DRC) at the 
University of Delaware (2000). Before the Enlightenment, religious explanations dominated 
cultural understandings of disaster (Furedi, 2007; Quarantelli, 2000). As Enlightenment 
intellectuals used secular rationality to discredit religious theories of the world, society’s 
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understanding of disasters shifted from the “Acts of God” to “Acts of Nature” (Furedi, 2007; 
Quarantelli, 2000, p. 3).  
Dynes (2000) credits Rousseau’s 1756 explanation of the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 as 
the first sociological explanation of disaster; however, he states it took almost 200 years for 
disaster research to emerge as a sociological enterprise. Largely, society accepted Voltaire’s 
perspective that the Lisbon earthquake represented the futility of religious optimism (Dynes, 
2000). Rousseau, an outsider among Enlightenment thinkers and a devout believer, challenged 
Voltaire’s attack on religious optimism by indicating the human action necessary to escalate an 
earthquake into a disaster, i.e. the decision to build tall buildings on land susceptible to 
earthquakes and the individual decisions among the nobility to delay evacuation in order to save 
material possessions (Dynes, 2000). Rousseau also suggested the earthquake only represented a 
disaster because it impacted the upper classes of Lisbon (Dynes, 2000). Bullard and Wright 
(2012) arrive at a similar conclusion in their comparative analysis of primary and secondary data 
on the impact of disasters on African American communities. The authors indicate local Florida 
officials did not view the Okeechobee Hurricane of 1928, the second deadliest disaster in United 
States history, as a disaster because, although the hurricane devastated an isolated African 
American community, the nearby white community sustained minimal damage (2012).  
How societies frame disasters determines how governments, communities, and 
individuals prepare and respond to disaster situations (Dynes, 1993; Furedi, 2007; Kroll-Smith & 
Couch, 1991; Quarantelli, 2000). Classifying disasters as “Acts of God” fostered a fatalistic 
perspective because this view locates disasters outside of human influence and control 
(Quarantelli, 2000, p. 5). The shift to an “Act of Nature” approach emphasized the ability of 
engineering to reduce risk by creating safer buildings and protection systems (Quarantelli, 2000, 
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p. 5). This perspective introduces limited human agency to lessen the impact of disasters through 
improving physical structures (Quarantelli, 2000). According to Quarantelli (2000, p. 3-4), as 
technological accidents, as opposed to natural weather phenomena, began to cause more disasters 
and as sociologist undertook empirical studies of disasters, society began to view disasters as 
“Acts of Men and Women”. Situating disasters as social constructions reveals the possibility of 
human action to mitigate and minimize the impact of disasters (2000).  
The normative view of disasters as social events that are not natural in origin or impact 
emerged from this evolution of ideas (Dynes, 1993; Furedi, 2007; R. Perry, 2005; Quarantelli, 
2000). The normative view recognizes that natural phenomena may act as catalysts; however, 
disasters are a breakdown of social relations and social systems (Dynes, 1993). Dynes (1993, p. 
177) lists five implications of regarding disasters as social constructions for disaster planning:  
1. “Prevention and mitigation must stress social rather than 
physical solutions.  
2. Disaster planning is not primarily the search for the 
implementation of technological solutions.  
3. Emphasis on the social allows for proactive, rather than 
reactive, strategies. Thus, it is possible to take actions prior to 
the appearance of the physical agent.  
4. Emphasis in the planning can be on internal, rather than 
external, factors. The potential threat is not ‘out there’, but 
resides in the ‘internal’ flaws within the social system.  
5. The view of disasters as social phenomena allows such 
happenings to be incorporated as a part of the nation’s 
development process. In fact, what is often called the 
‘recovery’ process after a disaster is development. That is, the 
recovery process is a process in which the population improves 
its level of adaptation to its environment and also lowers its 
future vulnerabilities.” 
 
This view also impacts the level of analysis for disaster planning and research. As social 
phenomena, disaster planning shifted from focusing on physical agents, i.e. fires, hurricanes, 
flooding, etc., to planning for different societal levels (1993). Drabek (1986) suggests ordering 
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social levels based on increasing structural complexity, moving from individual to group to 
organizational to community to society and, finally, to international actors, with each level 
requiring a unique planning focus. However, Dynes (1993) advocates the local community level 
as the appropriate level for disaster planning because the community unit maximizes local 
resources (in comparison to individual, groups, or organizations). In addition, local community 
level actors are more likely to become active in disaster response situations before more complex 
units, such as societal units or international actors (1993).  
Dynes’s (1994, p. 149) critique of dominant emergency planning emphasizes the false 
assumptions on which much of contemporary disaster planning is based due to viewing disasters 
as analogous to an “enemy attack”. The dominant model assumes chaos, antisocial behavior, and 
widespread panic in the immediate aftermath as well as dependent, passive victims incapable of 
proper, rational decision-making (Dynes, 1993; 1994; Wettenhall, 2009). These assumptions lead 
to the use of a military “command and control” emergency response strategy (Dynes, 1994, p. 
149). Emergency plans often focus on which agency has decision-making authority over various 
preparedness and response activities (Dynes, 1993). Citing DRC field research findings, Dynes 
(1993, p. 178) argues, “Planning is a process, not a product. What needs to be created is not a 
compendium of useless papers, but accepted ways of approaching problems dealing with 
preparedness, response, recovery, and/or mitigation.” As an alternative, Dynes (1994) advances 
the problem-solving model, which emphasizes continuity between pre- and post-disaster 
behavior and coordination and cooperation within and among government agencies and with 
community organizations in disaster response. This model views impacted communities and 
households as capable of using existing decision-making structures to address post-disaster needs 
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(Dynes, 1994). The problem-solving model also stresses the importance of integrating pre-
disaster and emergent organizations into flexible recovery plans (1994).  
As illustrated by Dynes (1993; 1994), definitions and assumptions influence policy 
measures and disaster management strategies. As such, disaster studies scholars critique and 
reframe research perspectives throughout the field’s history (Drabek, 2007; Freudenburg, 1997; 
Furedi, 2007; Kroll-Smith & Couch, 1991; Wettenhall, 2009). In response to the “generic” view 
of disaster offered by Quarantelli (1985; 1987), Kroll-Smith and Couch (1991, p. 356) identify 
strengths and limitations in Quarantelli’s perspective before presenting an ecological-symbolic 
approach to analyzing disasters. Kroll-Smith and Couch (1991) commend Quarantelli’s efforts to 
advance a common sociological definition of disaster that focuses on their socially constructed 
nature rather than geophysical aspects. They write Quarantelli’s “generic perspective views 
disasters as consensus-type social crisis occasions wherein demands are exceeding resources and 
emergent responses may generate social change” (Kroll-Smith & Couch, 1991, p. 357). The 
authors support viewing disasters as social, rather than geophysical, situations and recognizing 
that outcomes depend on emerging and changing, not static, conditions and resources (1991).  
Although supportive of some aspects of the generic perspective, Kroll-Smith and Couch 
(1991) suggest it is limiting for two reasons. First, it reduces possible research questions to a 
narrow focus on the “collective effort…to terminate a particular crisis by restoring capabilities to 
the level of demands…whether the agent is of the slow onset, cumulative and diffuse… or rapid, 
impactive, and focused variety” (Quarantelli, 1985, p. 50 as quoted in Kroll-Smith & Couch, 
1991, p. 358). In this move, the unique attributes of different disaster phenomena are obscured or 
ignored in favor of highlighting similarities among them (Kroll-Smith & Couch, 1991). The 
second reduction revolves around the inclusion of consensus as a modifier to exclude dissensus-
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type social crisis occasions, such as war and terrorism, from disaster studies research (Kroll-
Smith & Couch, 1991). Kroll-Smith and Couch (1991, p. 359) view this as an arbitrary 
distinction, which precludes analyzing “the relationship of disasters to social conflict” as well as 
excluding disasters with a contested meaning, such as many technological disasters where 
communities, governments, and private actors frequently disagree over cause, impact, blame, 
and/or adequate response measures (Picou, 2009; Picou, Marshall, & Gill, 2004).  
After critiquing the generic perspective, Kroll-Smith and Couch (1991) turn their 
attention to the strengths and limitations of the event-quality framework. As a newly emerging 
perspective in the mid-80s, Kroll-Smith and Couch (1991) indicate the diversity of physical 
factors scholars used to differentiate natural and technological disasters as well as contradictory 
definitions established by scholars who utilize an event-quality approach. They suggest its main 
strength lies in acknowledging the physical and social aspects of disasters (1991). However, the 
lack of consistency in classifying disasters, for example as natural or technological, or as short-
term or long-term is its major weakness (1991). This flaw leads to confusion and makes it hard to 
compare different empirical projects that use the framework (1991). In addition, much of the 
literature emphasizes linear causality between physical and social changes occurring after 
disasters (1991). According to Kroll-Smith and Couch (1991), this fails to recognize the 
significance of human interpretation of events.  
Building upon previous conceptualizations of disaster, Kroll-Smith and Couch (1991) 
advance an ecological-symbolic approach to framing disaster. To strengthen the event-quality 
approach, the authors ground it within an ecological-symbolic framework that relies on two basic 
assumptions:  
“(1) people exist in exchange relationships with their built, 
modified and biophysical environments. … (2) disruptions in the 
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ordered relationships between individuals, groups and 
communities, and their built, modified and natural environments, 
are labeled and responded to as hazards and disasters” (Kroll-
Smith & Couch, 1991, p. 361).  
 
By recognizing the interdependency of people and their environment and the human subjectivity 
involved in classifying an occasion as a disaster, this framework encourages scholars to 
investigate “how… aversive agents alter the relationships between communities and their 
environments and how … these environmental changes shape the course of social change” 
(Kroll-Smith & Couch, 1991, p. 362). Kroll-Smith and Couch (1991) add the ecological-
symbolic perspective draws attention to the processes through which sociopolitical agendas 
appropriate natural resources. The authors suggest the ecological stance addresses the inability of 
both the generic and event-quality approach to clearly distinguish between natural and 
technological disasters (1991). It does this by shifting focus from the cause to the impact of 
disasters (1991). The symbolic aspect directs researchers to consider for the first time “the role of 
human agency in appraising and interpreting disaster” (Kroll-Smith & Couch, 1991, p. 364).  
Having a framework to understand both natural and technological disasters is important 
because communities respond differently to different types of disasters (Furedi, 2007; 
Wettenhall; 2009). Scholars such as Erikson (1994), Kroll-Smith, Couch, and Marshall (1997), 
Gill and Picou (1998), and Freudenburg (1997) studied technological disasters like dam failures, 
toxic contamination, and chemical spills. These authors regarded technological disasters as more 
disruptive and harmful than natural disasters because community impacts are often longer and 
more severe (Erikson, 1994; Freudenburg, 1997; Furedi, 2007; Gill & Picou, 1998; Kroll-Smith 
et al., 1997). Frequently lacking a discernable end, technological disasters tend to create a lasting 
sense of anxiety within affected communities; in addition, “blame, mutual recrimination, and 
conflict” arise instead of unity or solidarity (Furedi, 2007, p. 484).  
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Furedi (2007) characterizes the transition from a generic sociological lens to the 
ecological perspective approach of the 1980s as a shift in scholarly focus from community 
resilience and solidarity to community vulnerability. The concept of community vulnerability 
also shifted over time. Originally, scholars limited the scope of causes of community 
vulnerability to ecological factors such as proximity to hazard-prone areas, population density, 
climate change, and land use decisions (Weichselgartner & Sendzimir, 2004). By the mid-90s 
scholars, such as Wisner et al.(2004), Peacock, Morrow, and Gladwin (1997), Phillips et al. 
(2010), Enarson (2012), and Bullard and Wright (2012), began to focus on socio-political causes 
of community vulnerability and studied how marginalized communities experienced, made sense 
of, and recovered from natural and technological disasters (Furedi, 2007).  
Wisner et al. (2004, p. 5) pushed the field of disaster studies beyond ecological 
vulnerabilities by “link[ing the] analysis of disasters that are supposedly caused mainly by 
natural hazards to broader patterns in society.” They challenge scholars to move beyond socio-
environmental factors, such as impoverished communities forced to live on cheap, hazard-prone 
land, and to examine how underlying political and economic social structures manifest disasters 
(2004). Wisner et al. (2004, p. 11, emphasis in original) define vulnerability as, “the 
characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their capacity to 
anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard (an extreme natural 
event or process).” They stress that power relations determine which groups are at risk in society 
and what material resources and information different social groups have to respond to and 
recover from environmental triggers (2004). Focusing on disasters and recovery in less 
developed countries, Wisner et al. (2004, p. 6, emphasis in original) state, “People’s exposure to 
risk differs according to their class (which affects their income, how they live and where), 
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whether they are male or female, what their ethnicity is, what age group they belong to, whether 
they are disabled or not, their immigration status, and so forth.”  
Phillips et al. (2010) employ the social vulnerability approach to understanding the 
impact of natural hazards. They identify the same socio-political hazards as Wisner et al. (2004). 
They explore the ways different theoretical perspectives shape inquiry, knowledge, and action 
(2010). Phillips et al. (2010) draw on Gramsci’s (1971) conceptualization of hegemony and 
Foucault’s (1980) conceptualizations of truth and power to explain the continued dominance of 
the normative view of disasters as natural, freak events that create chaos in the face of decades of 
empirical research suggesting the central role socio-political vulnerabilities play in determining 
the impact of environmental hazards. They suggest the dominant view continues to thrive in 
popular culture and media representations because it shifts blame from the structures of power to 
processes outside of human influence (Phillips et al., 2010). Thus, the dominant view controls 
popular discourse to ensure the balance of power does not change in the wake of social disasters 
(2010). The research on disaster recovery and vulnerable populations concludes most disaster 
recovery plans exacerbate social and environmental vulnerabilities (Chhotray & Few, 2012; 
Christoplos et al., 2010; Ingram et al., 2006; Le Masson, 2015; Mainka & McNeely, 2011; Pais 
& Elliot, 2008; Wang, Chen, & Li, 2012). The next chapter reviews the empirical research on 
social vulnerabilities and disaster impacts and recovery before focusing on scholarly literature 




The normative view of disasters focused on hazards, such as tornados or flooding, to the 
exclusion of technological disasters like chemical spills and toxic contamination (Furedi, 2007; 
Kroll-Smith, 1991; Quarantelli, 2000). This shaped what scholars identified as the impact of 
disasters. Initial codification projects to summarize the growing body of disaster research 
identified positive outcomes for communities struck by natural disasters (Quarantelli & Dynes, 
1977). For example, Fritz (1961) conducted the first attempt to summarize early disaster research 
and found a “therapeutic community” emerged, capable of mediating the psychological 
responses of victims (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977, p. 26, emphasis in original). Dynes (1974) 
drew upon field observations and interviews to understand post-disaster organizational behavior. 
He found some pre-disaster organizations take on new tasks and many organizations form after 
disasters that help with pre-disaster and emergent community needs in contrast to assumptions 
that people could not operate rationally after crises (1974).  
Scholars who studied technological disasters found much more devastating impacts than 
those caused by natural phenomena (Erikson, 1976; Furedi, 2007; Kroll-Smith, 1991; Picou, 
2009; Picou et al., 2004; Wettenhall, 2009). In a combination of field research and qualitative 
analysis of deposition transcripts, Erikson (1976) found the survivors of a dam failure in Buffalo 
Creek, West Virginia, experienced long-term negative psychological impacts. He described the 
loss of community as a collective trauma that prevents displaced residents from being able to 
heal in the ways previous disaster research illustrated (1976). However, Dynes (1978) questioned 
the validity of his findings because Erikson (1976) collected the data as a member of the legal 




Rather than community solidarity, technological disasters often fostered a corrosive 
community, where victims and other groups assign blame and expect compensation 
(Freudenburg, 1997; Furedi, 2007; Picou et al., 2004). Marshall, Picou, and Gill (2003, p. 78) 
explain, “the term ‘corrosive’ implies that the negative impacts of some disasters damage a 
community and individuals over an extended period of time.” Based on previous research, they 
identified three factors particularly critical to predict the emergence and persistence of corrosive 
communities: “(1) the mental and physical health of victims; …(2) ‘recreancy’ or perceptions of 
governmental or organizational failure; …and (3) protracted litigation” (Picou et al., 2004, p. 
1496). In a longitudinal study of the impact of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Picou et al. (2004) 
collected quantitative survey data through field interviews and follow-up mailings in Cordova, 
Alaska, from 1989 and 1992. They used structural equation modeling to analyze their data to 
allow the variables to operate both independently and dependently variables (2004). Picou et al. 
(2004, p. 1513) found “the mediating variables – work disruption, litigation stress, recreancy, 
risk of future spills, and community attachment – were predicted by exogenous social structural 
characteristics”, particularly being a litigant. Litigant respondents dealt with more sources of 
stress than non-litigant respondents reported (2004). Their findings suggest there may be merit to 
Dynes (1978) critique of Erikson’s (1976) methodology, which relied primarily upon the 
experiences of litigants.  
In addition to Erikson (1976), other scholars sought to understand the psychological 
impact of natural disasters on victims in order to determine if recovery policies adequately 
address post-disaster mental health needs. Goenjian et al. (2001) investigated the impact of 
Hurricane Mitch to determine if the storm caused posttraumatic stress disorder and depression 
among Nicaraguan teens. They surveyed 158 public school children from one school in each of 
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three cities with varying degrees of damage from Hurricane Mitch (Goenjian et al., 2001). 
Respondents filled out three different questionnaires: “a hurricane exposure questionnaire, the 
Child Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Reaction Index, and the Depression Self-Rating Scale” 
(Goenjian et al., 2001, p. 788). The authors used Kendall’s tau b, Pearson’s correlation, and 
multiple stepwise regressions to analyze the data, to compare results between cities, and to 
identify significant demographic and hurricane-related factors in predicting posttraumatic stress 
disorder and depression (Goenjian et al., 2001, p. 790). They found a city’s level of impact, 
objective hurricane-related exposure, subjective hurricane-related exposure, and current thoughts 
of revenge “explained 68% of the variance in Child PTSD Reaction Index scores” (Goenjian et 
al., 2001, p. 792). Additionally, they found PTSD scores, death of a family member, and sex 
“explained 59% of the variance in depression score[s]” (Goenjian et al., 2001, p. 792). This lead 
the authors to conclude that the level of impact and degree of exposure to objective and 
subjective features significantly impacts the psychological state of teens affected by disasters 
(2001).  
Thompson, Norris, and Hanacek (1993) examined the psychological effects of adult 
hurricane victims to ascertain if age differences contribute to post-disaster stress vulnerability. 
Through in-person interviews conducted twelve, eighteen, and thirty-four months after impact, 
the authors surveyed 831 adults affected by Hurricane Hugo about hurricane-related stresses and 
their current psychological condition (1993). A curvilinear regression analysis that controlled for 
differences in sex, race, education, and traumatic and undesirable life events revealed that all age 
groups suffered psychological consequences as a result of Hurricane Hugo (1993). The study 
revealed the most vulnerable were middle-aged participants (1993). Middle-aged respondents 
maintained a higher level of responsibilities than other age groups before the storm, which 
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increased their vulnerability to post-disaster stress (Thompson et al., 1993). The authors 
conclude, “our study provides ample evidence of substantial, pervasive, and relatively lasting 
distress in disaster-stricken communities, especially among more traumatized victims. Injury and 
life threat had the strongest effects, but financial and personal loss were also distressing” 
(Thompson et al., 1993, p. 614).  
Building upon studies that found victims with higher levels of exposure to hazards often 
suffer greater psychological impacts, scholars sought to identify the different social factors that 
influence vulnerability (Brinkmann & Fernando, 2008; Bullard & Wright, 2009; 2012; Coch, 
2015; Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003; Enarson, 2012; Fara, 2001; Lam, Arenas, Brito, & Liu, 
2014; Peacock et al., 1997). Cutter et al. (2003) used 1990 county-level census data to create a 
social vulnerability index (SoVI) and illustrate the spatial nature of social vulnerability. The 
authors used a principal component factor analysis to reduce forty-two socioeconomic and 
demographic variables identified in research literature to eleven underlying independent factors 
(2003). The composite factors they identified included: personal wealth, age, density of built 
environment, single-sector economic dependence, housing stock and tenancy, race (specifically 
the percent of African Americans and Asians), ethnicity (specifically the percent of Hispanics 
and Native Americans), occupation, and infrastructure dependence (2003). Although Cutter et al. 
(2003) failed to find a positive correlation between presidential disaster declarations and the 
SoVI score, many studies, such as Finch, Emrich, and Cutter (2010) and Lam et al. (2014) used 
and further developed the SoVI to illustrate the spatial nature of social vulnerability in different 
contexts.  
Lam et al. (2014) followed the lead of Cutter et al. (2003) to create a social vulnerability 
index applicable to twenty-five Caribbean countries. They modified the previous approach in 
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two important ways (Lam et al., 2014). First, Lam et al. (2014) used the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change’s (IPCC) definition of vulnerability, which encompasses a system’s degree 
of exposure, degree of impact, and capacity to adapt to extreme events whereas Cutter et al. 
(2003) limited their conceptualization to socioeconomic factors. Second, the authors ran a 
regression analysis to determine the weight of each variable in predicting actual damage and 
used the resulting beta regression coefficients to weight the contribution of each variable (2014). 
Cutter et al. (2003) did not weight their variables. Lam et al. (2014) tested their index by 
conducting regression analyses between damage variables and their vulnerability index variables, 
which resulted in explaining 63% of the variance. While they view their index as a more accurate 
measure than the one developed by Cutter et al. (2003), Lam et al. (2014) recognize the limited 
comparability of their results to the twenty-five countries in their study. As a result of their 
model, the authors found low adaptive capacity as indicated by “low socioeconomic status, high 
electricity consumption, and low infrastructure development [played] a more important role [than 
storm exposure] in increasing vulnerability” (Lam et al., 2014, p. 477). Both SoVI indexes 
illustrate social conditions, such as class and race, and social decisions, such as density of the 
built environment, to a large extent determine which populations are most vulnerable to the 
impact of storm events (Cutter et al., 2003; Lam et al., 2014).  
Coch (2015) used a different approach to understand and compare differences in 
vulnerability between regions in the United States. Coch (2015) conducted a case study using 
historical documentation to identify factors that increase the vulnerability of the New York-New 
Jersey metropolitan area to hurricane damage in comparison to southern regions of the country. 
His analysis illustrated how “meteorologic, geographic, oceanographic, and anthropogenic 
characteristics in the northeast magnify storm damage” (Coch, 2015, p. 210). However of the ten 
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variables he identifies as pivotal in determining hurricane-related death and damage, only three 
are anthropogenic: resident perception of risk, density of development, and preparation, in which 
he includes both mitigation and evacuation measures (Coch, 2015).  
Other scholars limited their focus to the influence of strictly social characteristics on the 
impact of disaster outcomes for different places and subpopulations (Bullard & Wright, 2009; 
2012; Enarson, 2012; Fara, 2001; Fothergill, 2004; Neumayer & Plümper, 2007; Peacock et al., 
1997). These authors highlight the important roles race, class, gender, and age play in mitigating 
the impact of hazards. Neumayer and Plümper (2007) used data from the Emergency Disasters 
Database to analyze the impact of natural disasters on the life expectancy rates of women in 
comparison to men for 141 countries. They hypothesized that the life expectancy gap between 
men and women would increase in accordance with the magnitude of the event and as the 
socioeconomic status of women decreased (2007). Regression analyses confirmed their 
hypotheses and revealed that socioeconomic status is a major factor in the gendered effect of 
natural disasters (2007).  
Fara (2001) also found poverty to be the major contributing factor to vulnerability in his 
qualitative study of communal land in Southern Namibia. Through extensive fieldwork, analysis 
of historical documents, and a literature review, Fara (2001) sought to understand the causes and 
processes that influence vulnerability to drought in Southern Namibia. His analysis revealed 
poverty to be the main cause of vulnerability to drought, and that Southern Namibia’s poverty 
resulted from colonial practices and settlement patterns that persist to the present (2001). These 
practices institutionalized unequal access to land, education, transportation, infrastructure, and 
nutrition (2001). By historically contextualizing present-day poverty in Southern Namibia, Fara 
(2001) illustrated the structural and institutionalized nature of social vulnerability.  
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Bullard and Wright (2012) employ a similar qualitative approach to analyze the influence 
of race and class on the impact of disasters in the United States. With an environmental justice 
and social vulnerability framework, the authors examine governmental responses to African 
American communities in the South struck by natural and man-made disasters spanning eight 
decades (2012). To conduct their comparative case study, Bullard and Wright (2012) rely on in-
depth qualitative interviews with residents in affected communities and document analysis of 
archival records and secondary sources. The phrase, “All communities are not created equal. 
Some communities are more equal than others,” echoes throughout their book (Bullard & 
Wright, 2012; p. 3). Their cases illustrate the disparate treatment African American communities 
receive in relation to white communities, which includes: less compensation for similar losses, 
increased risk and exposure to toxic contamination, longer timeframes for official recognition, 
notification, and clean up of environmental health hazards, and smaller penalties on those who 
pollute Black communities (2012). They conclude, “Race maps closely with pollution, 
vulnerability, and unequal protection”, which leads people of color to have high levels of distrust 
in the government’s willingness to protect and compensate their communities in times of disaster 
(Bullard & Wright, 2012, p. 232). Their analysis illustrates that social vulnerabilities influence 
the impact of disasters and the recovery trajectory of communities and individuals.  
Research on post-disaster recovery identifies several factors, in addition to 
socioeconomic characteristics, that impact individual and community recovery trajectories. Post-
disaster assistance plays a pivotal role in shaping recovery outcomes at the individual and 
community level (Kamel & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004; Selimovi, 2011; Wang et al., 2012). Wang 
et al. (2012) constructed a quantitative survey to identify factors that contributed to differences in 
the cost and the length of the recovery process of rural households in China affected by the 
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Yao’an Earthquake. The authors used logistic regression to analyze the survey data they 
collected when conducting fieldwork in the affected region. Wang et al. (2012) found that family 
income, the quantity of assistance, and how quickly the assistance arrived had the greatest 
influence on the recovery trajectory of participant households. Households that received 
assistance quickly and in sufficient amounts to reconstruct their lives reported significantly 
shorter recovery times and costs than those households that did not receive immediate assistance 
or enough assistance to meet their needs (2012).  
Kamel and Loukaitou-Sideris (2004) revealed how disaster assistance impacts 
neighborhood change. In a mixed-methods study, Kamel and Loukaitou-Sideris (2004) analyzed 
the implementation of post-disaster federal housing assistance programs in the case of the 
Northridge Earthquake, which struck Los Angeles, CA, in 1995. They sought to understand how 
neighborhood demographics and assistance affect the recovery process (2004). The authors 
analyzed government documents and conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 
twenty-three program officials to understand the post-disaster federal housing assistance program 
objectives, eligibility requirements, and distributions of funds (2004). They followed the 
qualitative analysis with, “a series of regressions to test significance of housing and demographic 
variables in determining the distribution of assistance” (Kamel & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004, p. 
539). In a final step, they created an “assistance-damage ratio… by dividing the sum of all 
federal assistance from all programs in a zip code by the total damage reported in this zip code” 
(Kamel & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004, p. 540). In confirmation with Bullard and Wright’s (2012) 
findings, the authors found neighborhoods with majority minority populations had less access to 
assistance, which lead to neighborhood demographic changes (Kamel & Loukaitou-Sideris, 
2004). Decreased access to housing assistance in minority neighborhoods decreased the available 
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housing and, thus, population within these neighborhoods as Los Angeles, CA, recovered 
(Kamel & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004). Kamel and Loukaitou-Sideris’s (2004) work emphasizes 
how post-disaster policies act to exacerbate social inequalities through unequal access and 
distribution of disaster recovery assistance.  
In addition to understanding how vulnerabilities such as race or class impact disaster 
recovery, many scholars sought to understand if recovery improves the vulnerability of 
communities. Ingram et al. (2006) conducted a qualitative case study on the recovery of Sri 
Lanka following the 2004 tsunami. Specifically, the authors analyzed how the post-tsunami 
buffer zone policy, which prohibited the reconstruction of residential buildings along the coast, 
impacted “socioeconomic disparities, livelihoods, communities and the environment” (Ingram et 
al., 2006, p. 607). Ingram et al. (2006) found the buffer zone policy, which forced coastal 
communities to relocate, exacerbated long-term vulnerability. The authors conclude that tension 
and “confusion between [short-term and long-term recovery] objectives can delay the recovery 
process and increase vulnerability of affected populations” (Ingram et al., 2006, p. 612).  
Mainka and McNeely (2011) continue the discussion of decreasing vulnerability during 
recovery by conducting a synthesis and review of existing disaster research. They “review… 
literature on previous disasters and lessons learned in the International Union for Conservation of 
Nature’s experience working in the field on post-disaster environmental recovery to develop 
some principles for planning and action” in Haiti (Mainka & McNeely, 2011, p. 2). Mainka and 
McNeely (2011, p. 8) found proper pre-disaster ecosystem management has the ability to reduce 
the impact of natural disasters, and “in the recovery and restoration phases of humanitarian 
assistance, integrating ecosystem considerations can support sustainable development and 
reconstruction of the regions affected.” While they echo Ingram et al.’s (2006) precaution that 
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recovery policies and processes can exacerbate vulnerabilities, Mainka and McNeely (2011) 
emphasize negative impacts on environmental not social vulnerability.  
Chhotray and Few (2012) suggest a framework of continued vulnerability better 
describes post-disaster recovery efforts based on their qualitative case study of three villages in 
Orissa, India, struck by a super-cyclone in 1999. To explore the implementation of long-term 
recovery processes in the decade following the cyclone, the authors conducted forty-five 
unstructured conversations and thirty follow-up semi-structured interviews with community 
members, state officials, politicians, and key informants. In comparing villages from two sites 
with different distances from the coast, Chhotray and Few (2012, p. 700) reveal “an entrenched 
ongoing vulnerability remains, in which a combination of recurrent hazards, poor grassroots 
adaptive capacity and weak institutional support deeply undermines even recovery to a pre-
hazard state, let alone a position of enhanced resilience.” The authors found a lack of viable 
livelihoods after storm-related salinity issues destroyed agriculture and a lack of suitable housing 
materials contributed to increased vulnerability of both sites to future storms (2012). Contrasting 
Wang et al.’s (2012) study on the Yao’an Earthquake in China, Chhotray and Few (2012) found 
state and NGO post-disaster assistance did little to improve the long-term recovery trajectories in 
India.  
Christoplos et al. (2010) adopted a qualitative approach to understanding how and why 
social vulnerabilities remain when disaster recovery agents, both governmental and international 
aid organizations, frame recovery as the chance to improve socioeconomic conditions of 
impoverished, disaster-stricken areas. Christoplos et al. (2010) used Nicaragua’s recovery from 
Hurricane Mitch to analyze the impact of post-disaster recovery policies on social vulnerabilities. 
They combine, “a literature review, interviews with stakeholders at the national level, and field 
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studies in three municipalities that were heavily affected by Hurricane Mitch: Dipilto, San 
Francisco Libre, and Terrabona” (Christoplos et al., 2010, p. S203). Their study found that even 
though government officials and other actors framed recovery efforts as an opportunity to create 
a better, safer country, authorities knew they lacked the finances to implement projects that 
would reduce social vulnerabilities (2010). As such, officials chose not to pursue research on 
methods to decrease vulnerability and, in terms of social vulnerability, little improved as a result 
of Hurricane Mitch (2010). This suggests intentions are not enough to alleviate social 
vulnerabilities through disaster recovery processes and that the rhetoric of recovery may not 
match the outcomes.  
Le Masson (2015) echoes this stance in her qualitative study of Ladakh, India. Through a 
combination of secondary document analysis and in-depth, semi-structured interviews with: 
flood victims; residents; government, development organizations, and community stakeholders; 
and local, national, and international NGO senior management and field workers, Le Masson 
(2015) examines government and NGO disaster risk reduction (DRR) policies and practices to 
understand the extent to which these entities incorporate and address social vulnerabilities in 
disaster preparedness, response, and recovery activities. She found, “The way vulnerability is 
conceived in policies and practices at each level of decision-making remains strongly influenced 
by the dominant approach to disasters” with a “focus on hazards, exposure, infrastructure, or the 
lack of awareness of at-risk populations, rather than tackling the root causes of people’s 
vulnerability and drawing on existing local knowledge and capacity” (Le Masson, 2015, p. 113). 
Although government officials expressed the desire to incorporate community-based approaches 
to reduce social vulnerabilities, they had not acted to incorporate DRR best practices into disaster 
preparedness, response, or recovery plans (2015). Le Masson (2015, p. 113) indicated that NGOs 
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and local officials employed appropriate post-disaster DRR practices but continued to rely on 
“top-down, hazard-focused” preparedness strategies that previous research has shown to 
exacerbate social vulnerability. Ultimately, Le Masson’s (2015, p. 104) research revealed that, 
“establishing policies does not guarantee that appropriate practices will follow.” 
Pais and Elliot (2008) approached post-disaster recovery and continued vulnerability with 
an alternative theoretical perspective, which shifts from viewing continued vulnerability as an 
unintended consequence to framing it as intentional to maintain power relations. They applied 
Logan and Moloth’s (2007) growth machine theory to analyze place-based recovery (Pais & 
Elliot, 2008). The authors selected four regions in the United States hit by major hurricanes in 
the 1990s and ran a regression analysis on 1990 and 2000 census data to determine if population, 
housing, and in-migration increased or decreased at the census tract level between surveys 
(2008). Pais and Elliot (2008) found that the selected regions experienced an increase in 
population, housing, and in-migration between surveys that exceeded pre-storm levels and that 
post-disaster growth is spatially uneven, which supports their assertion that most reconstruction 
efforts do not challenge or improve social vulnerabilities. They conclude by suggesting,  
“Inserting this perspective into disaster studies moves us beyond 
the simple recognition that some groups are more vulnerable to 
environmental hazards than others to illuminate how this 
vulnerability is generated by ongoing and unequal struggles over 
local development. In turn, it also raises the question of how these 
struggles change after a major disaster hits, as competing interests 
respond to opportunities created by the damage, displacement and 
rebuilding that ensues, that is, as the local growth machine 
transforms into a recovery machine” (Pais & Elliot, 2008, p. 1418-
1419).  
 
Using a growth machine framework illuminates the competing interests and imbalances in power 
between social groups that characterize most urban communities. This in turn highlights how 
post-disaster recovery practices that reinforce inequality serve the interests of society’s most 
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powerful actors (Pais & Elliot, 2008). Pais and Elliot (2008) illustrated that continued 
vulnerability is profitable for some sectors of society. The next section examines the social 
vulnerability of New Orleans in the context of Hurricane Katrina’s impact and recovery.  
Unequal Impact of Hurricane Katrina 
Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, LA, on August 29, 2005, and caused catastrophic 
damage when levees broke and flooded eighty percent of the city. In a Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) Report for Congress, Gabe et al. (2005) conducted a descriptive statistical 
analysis to determine the demographic characteristics of Hurricane Katrina’s victims. The 
analysis compared victim demographics to those of the affected areas and presented the data by 
geographical region, providing victim characteristics for Orleans Parish alone. The report 
revealed African-Americans represented 73% of those displaced but only 67% of the city’s 
population based on 2000 census data (Gabe et al., 2005, p. 16). Poverty rates among the 
displaced also surpassed those of the population as a whole in the areas affected (2005). Gabe et 
al. (2005) estimated 34% of displaced African American residents from New Orleans lived in 
poverty in comparison to 19. 6% in the state of Louisiana, 21. 4% in storm-damaged areas of 
Louisiana, and 14. 6% of non-Black displaced residents from New Orleans (Gabe et al., 2005, p. 
17). Their results indicated that Hurricane Katrina disproportionately impacted poor, African-
Americans in Orleans Parish (2005).  
Cutter and Emrich’s (2006) socio-spatial analysis of Hurricane Katrina’s impact arrived 
at similar conclusions as Gabe et al. (2005). Using the SoVI created by Cutter et al.(2003) and 
decennial census data from 1960 to 2000, Cutter and Emrich (2006) compare changes in the 
social vulnerability of all counties affected by Hurricane Katrina. Their analysis ranked Orleans 
Parish as the most vulnerable of all counties affected by the storm and the only county in the 
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New Orleans metro to increase in social vulnerability between 1960 and 2000, which “indicates 
that not only do the persons living in Orleans Parish generally have less ability to cope with 
major natural disasters than their counterparts in the other parishes, but they also have less ability 
to rebound from catastrophe than they did in 1960” (Cutter & Emrich, 2006, p. 108). Their 
model attributed the high level of social vulnerability within Orleans Parish and the entire metro 
area to race, class, and gender (2006). Their analysis highlighted that Orleans parish residents, 
particularly the poor, African Americans, and women, possessed less ability to respond to 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 than they had to respond to Hurricane Betsy in 1965 (2006).  
 In addition to identifying the most vulnerable victims, scholars studied the impact of 
Hurricane Katrina on evacuee mental and physical health (Adeola & Picou, 2012; 2014; 
Mortensen, Wilson, and Ho, 2009). Mortensen et al. (2009) studied the mental and physical 
health of New Orleans evacuees in Houston, TX, as well as their access to healthcare. The 
authors conducted three waves of self-administered surveys on different non-random 
convenience samples of evacuees (2009). The authors solicited participants for the successive 
rounds of surveys at shelters, hotels, and apartment complexes immediately following, two 
months, and one year after Hurricane Katrina, respectively (2009). The authors employed quota-
sampling techniques to ensure equal numbers of male and female respondents, but their sample 
included predominately low-income and unemployed African Americans who reported problems 
accessing health care (2009). Mortensen et al. (2009, p. 524) found nearly sixty percent of 
respondents experienced negative mental health symptoms, including: “nervousness, 
restlessness, worthlessness, hopelessness, and spells of terror or panic at least a few times a 
week” with twenty-eight percent reporting a decrease in mental and physical health as a result of 
Hurricane Katrina.  
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In contrast to Mortensen et al. (2009), Adeola and Picou (2012; 2014) surveyed residents 
in Louisiana and Mississippi that never left or returned within three years of the storm. Adeola 
and Picou (2012; 2014) used random digit dialing (RDD) telephone survey data collected in the 
spring of 2008 by the University of South Alabama polling group to determine the relationship 
between race, social capital, and the physical and mental health consequences of Hurricane 
Katrina on victims. A binary logistic regression analysis indicated, “gender (female), older age, 
and lack of social capital significantly predict[ed] the odds of [physical] Katrina-related health 
problems” (Adeola & Picou, 2012, p. 10). Multivariate discriminant and ordinary least squares 
regression analyses showed that residents from both states reported significant levels of 
psychosocial stress and depression with respondents in Louisiana exhibiting the highest mean 
scores for all indicators but one (Adeola & Picou, 2014). “Other socio-demographic variables 
such as being African American, female, elderly, and having social capital deficits were the most 
important determinants of depression and psychosocial distress consequences of exposure to 
Katrina” (Adeola & Picou, 2014, p. 142). In both studies, Adeola and Picou (2012; 2014) found 
that African Americans reported higher rates of Katrina-induced physical and mental health 
issues than white respondents, and “the lack of social capital result[ed] in chronic mental health 
impacts for survivors of catastrophes such as Katrina” (Adeola & Picou, 2014, p. 143). Their 
findings build upon Mortensen et al.'s (2009) study because they indicate that even after 
returning to their pre-Katrina county of residence evacuees continued to exhibit negative health 
consequences three years after Hurricane Katrina (Adeola & Picou, 2012; 2014). Lacking access 
to proper health care and other important material resources, disadvantaged populations often 
rely on social networks to meet their needs (Desmond, 2012; Domínguez & Watkins, 2003; 
Miller-Cribbs & Farber, 2008; Sarkisian & Gerstel, 2004; Stack, 1974).  
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 Social networks play a large role in the survival mechanisms socially vulnerable 
populations employ to meet daily needs in non-disaster situations (Desmond, 2012; Domínguez 
& Watkins, 2003; Miller-Cribbs & Farber, 2008; Sarkisian & Gerstel, 2004; Stack, 1974). In an 
ethnographic study of low-income African American kinship networks, Stack (1974) found that 
poor, African Americans relied upon complex, organized networks comprised of friends and 
family in order to survive on incomes drastically below the poverty line. Recent scholars 
explored how social networks changed over time to rely less on the kin networks explored by 
Stack (1974), which require a high level of reciprocity that many of today's impoverished 
families cannot provide due to chronic poverty (Desmond, 2012; Domínguez & Watkins, 2003; 
Miller-Cribbs & Farber, 2008; Sarkisian & Gerstel, 2004). Through ethnographic interviews and 
participant-observation of five African American and five Latin American low-income mothers 
with children in high poverty neighborhoods in the Boston metropolitan area, Domínguez and 
Watkins (2003) found the social networks of African-American and Latin-American mothers 
tend to incorporate more social service organizations than in the past because appropriate 
reciprocity is limited and does not require sharing scarce material resources. Miller-Cribbs and 
Farber (2008, p. 43), “review historical and contemporary research on the structure and function 
of African American kin networks.” Their analysis revealed the ability of kin networks to 
provide necessary resources and support dwindled overtime due to chronic poverty. Desmond 
(2012, p. 1296) conducted a “yearlong ethnographic study, living in two low-income Milwaukee 
neighborhoods – a majority-white trailer park and a majority-Black inner-city neighborhood – 
and follow[ed] tenants evicted from their apartments.” Desmond (2012) contends today’s urban 
residents rely on weak, disposable ties among strangers rather than on kin to make ends meet.  
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As in non-disaster situations, social networks are an important means of survival 
following disaster. Several scholars studied the role social networks served as survivors coped 
with social vulnerabilities during Hurricane Katrina and the changes that followed (see Elliot et 
al., 2010; Fussell, 2006; 2012; Litt, 2008; 2012; Litt et al., 2012). In a theoretical piece published 
shortly after Hurricane Katrina, Fussell (2006) described the ability and importance of social 
networks to expand access to resources in times when survival depends on personal resources. 
Using qualitative interviews with fifty-seven low-income mothers with at least one dependent 
child, Fussell (2012) studied the capacity of social networks to assist and support members 
during disaster situations. From her study, she concluded, “differential vulnerability to disaster is 
compounded as a result of the concentration of vulnerable groups within social networks” 
(Fussell, 2012, p. 164).  
Litt (2008; 2012) provides a powerful example of network capacity in the context of 
Hurricane Katrina. Litt’s (2008; 2012) qualitative study illustrated the power and ingenuity of 
women’s networks in times of crisis to work together to keep people safe. Using in-depth 
qualitative interviews, the study explored the process by which two poor, Black women 
mobilized their social network to evacuate more than twenty-five people to Baton Rouge before 
the storm and how their network continued to operate during displacement (Litt, 2008; 2012). 
Litt (2008) found the authority carried within informal networks versus that of government 
sources influenced the success of these networks to aid in pre-event evacuation. However, not all 
networks are capable of meeting the post-disaster needs of vulnerable populations (Elliot et al., 
2010; Litt et al., 2012).  
Elliot et al. (2010), Fussell (2012), and Litt et al. (2012) emphasize social networks vary 
in the capacity to provide resources and support during disasters and recovery. Elliot et al. (2010) 
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conducted a comparative analysis to understand recovery in unequal contexts. Using phone 
interview survey data with ninety respondents from the Lower 9th Ward and eighty-nine 
respondents from Lakeview, the authors found differences in social networks and social capital 
created different post-Katrina recovery outcomes for Lakeview, an affluent, white neighborhood, 
and the Lower 9th Ward, a poor, African-American neighborhood (Elliot et al., 2010). Their 
analysis revealed a cumulative effect of inequality, which increased the gap between advantaged 
and disadvantaged neighborhoods overtime (2010). Litt et al. (2012) concluded after years of 
following the participants in their qualitative study that women's networks vary in their ability to 
absorb disaster situations. They asserted, “. . . improv[ing] the current tragedy in New Orleans – 
demands policy that simultaneously builds infrastructure and supports women in creating 
network strength” (Litt et al., 2012, p. 140, emphasis in original).  
 In the context of post-Katrina recovery, several scholars examined the extent of 
demographic change as a result of the storm (Bankston, III, 2010; Finch et al., 2010; Groen & 
Polivka, 2010; Myers, Slack, & Singelmann, 2008; Stevenson, Emrich, Mitchell, & Cutter, 2010; 
Watkins & Hagelman, III, 2011) and linked those changes to discriminatory disaster recovery 
policies (Gotham; 2014; 2015; Gotham & Campanella, 2013). Other scholars analyzed the 
multiple recovery planning processes New Orleans city government implemented after Hurricane 
Katrina that bred uncertainty and restricted citizen participation (see Ehrenfeucht & Nelson, 
2011; Nelson et al., 2007; Williamson, 2007).  
 To examine socio-spatial aspects of recovery in the New Orleans metro after Hurricane 
Katrina, Myers et al. (2008) examined the relationship between social vulnerability and 
migration trends from July 1, 2005 to July 1, 2006 in the 117 counties eligible for FEMA 
individual and public assistance due to hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Expanding upon Cutter et 
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al.'s (2003) social vulnerability index, Myers et al. (2008, p. 280) use similar methods to create a 
regional SoVI for the Gulf Coast and identify five dimensions of social vulnerability: 
disadvantaged populations, less developed, density of built environment, elderly populations, and 
dependent populations. A regression analysis found areas with higher rates of socially vulnerable 
populations and housing damage had significantly higher rates of outmigration (2008). These 
populations tended to “spillover” into the surrounding counties with lower rates of social 
vulnerability and housing damage, which experienced in-migration (Myers et al., 2008, p. 286). 
The “spillover” pattern created geographic clustering (Myers et al., 2008, p. 286). This suggests 
that socially vulnerable populations in areas that sustain higher levels of housing damage 
typically do not return to their pre-storm county of residence.  
Stevenson et al. (2010) and Finch et al. (2010) also found recovery produced uneven 
spatial clustering. The authors laid residential construction building permit site locations in Bay 
St. Louis, Pass Christian, and Long Beach, Mississippi, over GIS maps with damage polygons 
created by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for FEMA after Hurricane Katrina 
(Stevenson et al., 2010, p. 61). Using Spatial Scan Statistic 8. 0, which does not assume the 
existence or location of clusters, Stevenson et al. (2010) found severity of damages and the 
amount of housing highly correlated with when and where clusters emerged between October 
2005 and May 2008, with the earliest clusters forming in 2005 in heavily damaged coastal areas 
and no damage areas further inland in Long Beach.  
Similarly, Finch et al. (2010) studied the spatial recovery of post-Katrina New Orleans 
from June 2005 to June 2008. Rather than building permits, Finch et al. (2010) used U. S. postal 
service data on active residential addresses and aggregated the data to facilitate comparison with 
census tract level flood depth and social vulnerability data. The authors found vulnerability and 
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the extent of damage impacted the rate of neighborhood recovery. Unexpectedly, they found 
neighborhoods in the middle of the vulnerability spectrum lagged the most in recovery because 
they lack the resources of wealthy neighborhoods yet fail to qualify for government assistance 
designed for the most vulnerable (Finch et al., 2010). Using a regression model to test the 
significance of the Road Home program on recovery, Finch et al. (2010) identified Road Home 
sales as a significant predictor, but not Road Home repair grants. From their study they 
“conclude[d] that the Road Home program has not stimulated recovery and in many 
communities (e. g., Lower Ninth Ward and New Orleans East) has provided an additional 
challenge to those wishing to return” (Finch et al., 2010, p. 199). Together, these studies indicate 
that recovery is often unevenly distributed spatially and that vulnerable populations require 
assistance and adequate policy measures to enable their communities to return and rebuild (Finch 
et al., 2010; Myers et al., 2008; Stevenson et al., 2010).  
 Adding to the discussion of socio-spatial change in post-Katrina recovery, Bankston, III 
(2010) and Ehrenfeucht and Nelson (2013) seek to contextualize demographic change after 
Hurricane Katrina. Bankston, III (2010) conducted a historical analysis of demographic changes 
in New Orleans from 1810 to 2009 using U. S. census data. He situated post-Katrina 
demographic changes within the larger demographic trends to emphasize continuity in 
population loss (2010). The analysis illustrated New Orleans consistently lost population through 
outmigration from 1970 to the present (2010). As such, Bankston, III (2010) encouraged city 
officials to adopt recovery plans and policies that fit a shrinking economic base. Ehrenfeucht and 
Nelson (2013) use qualitative interviews to understand how newcomers view their role in the 
recovery of the city. The authors conducted seventy-eight semi-structured interviews with young 
and mid-career professional who came to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina (2013). They 
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found most respondents viewed their role in post-Katrina change as limited to their influence on 
the culture of the city and did not recognize their social and political impact (Ehrenfeucht & 
Nelson, 2013). In this, respondents failed to see how recovery plans improved the city to attract 
newcomers rather than to facilitate the return of displaced residents (2013). Ehrenfeucht and 
Nelson (2013) revealed the often overlooked social and political ripples that flow from 
demographic change.  
In addition to studying how the city changed after Hurricane Katrina, Nelson et al. 
(2007), Williamson (2007) and Ehrenfeucht and Nelson (2011) examined the recovery planning 
process of New Orleans. These studies highlighted the multiple, complex planning processes the 
city underwent to strategize how to rebuild from the devastation of Hurricane Katrina and the 
levee failure. Nelson et al. (2007) conducted a qualitative case study to analyze four different 
planning processes enacted after the storm and found two major tensions in the planning process 
slowed down the city’s recovery. First, the planning process had to overcome the need to quickly 
develop a plan with the need to carefully consider all options before deciding upon a course of 
action (2007). Secondly, tension developed between the relative value given to professional 
versus resident opinions in the creation of recovery priorities (2007).  
Rather than analyzing the totality of the planning process, Williamson’s (2007) 
qualitative case study focused upon resident participation in the Unified New Orleans Plan 
(UNOP), one of the four recovery plans examined by Nelson et al. (2007). The author conducted 
semi-structured, in-depth qualitative interviews with twenty key community stakeholders and 
leaders during the week before the final Community Congress, a public forum to discuss the plan 
(2007). Williamson (2007) found community leaders and officials viewed resident participation 
as a strategy to build public support in the plan. Drawing on Arnstein’s (1969) Ladder of Citizen 
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Participation, Williamson (2007) concluded citizen participation in UNOP amounted to little 
more than tokenism. Through an in-depth analysis of the post-disaster planning process, 
Ehrenfeucht and Nelson (2011) found the multiple planning processes created confusion and 
uncertainty among residents. In addition, minority distrust of government agencies undermined 
the planning process (2011). They also described citizen participation in the planning process as 
tokenism and proposed the incorporation of meaningful citizen participation could improve post-
disaster recovery planning processes (2011). Privileging professional opinions over resident 
input in the planning process could explain why post-disaster recovery plans met the needs of 
newcomers more so long-term or displaced residents (Ehrenfeucht & Nelson, 2013).  
Analysis of the planning process illustrated a lack of concern with the voice of residents 
struggling to rebuild (Ehrenfeucht & Nelson, 2011; Nelson et al., 2007; Williamson, 2007). 
Analyses of the recovery policies implemented at the federal, state, and local level contextualize 
the policy decisions and identify the impact of different policy measures, like Community 
Development Block Grants (CDBG) and the Road Home program on the city’s recovery 
trajectory (Gotham, 2014; 2015). Gotham (2014; 2015) and Tierney (2015) linked post-Katrina 
disaster policies to neoliberal ideologies that favor decentralization, privatization of public 
services, and public-private partnerships. Both indicated the policies further entrenched social 
vulnerabilities (Gotham, 2014; 2015; Tierney, 2015).  
Drawing on eight years of qualitative and quantitative data collection, Gotham (2014) 
conducted an in-depth case study analysis on the Louisiana Road Home Program to evaluate its 
long-term impact. Gotham (2014, p. 786) framed “the Road Home Program as a racialized state 
rescaling strategy” that “had disruptive and destabilizing effects on prospects for community 
recovery.” His analysis revealed structural racism perpetuated through colorblind language 
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(Gotham, 2014). Situated within the history of federally mandated discriminatory housing 
practices that limited the mobility of African Americans and depressed values in their 
neighborhoods, Gotham (2014) shows the arbitrary decision to base housing assistance awards 
on pre-storm value rather than estimated repair cost replicated pre-storm racial and class 
disparities. African American homeowners received lesser amounts than white homeowners with 
homes of similar size with comparable damage; in addition, the program favored owner-
occupied dwellings over rental units, which limited the ability of renters to return (2014).  
In his analysis Gotham (2014) identified one mechanism that produced the disparate 
impacts Bullard and Wright (2012) found in their research on eighty years of government 
response to disasters in African American communities. Within Bullard and Wright’s (2012) 
research, the governmental response to Hurricane Katrina appears typical. Gotham (2014; 2015) 
and Bullard and Wright (2009; 2012) conclude that the policy decisions need to explicitly 
address racial differences in order to stop perpetuating historic racial disparities through post-
disaster recovery measures. These studies provide an example of how post-disaster recovery 
strategies became a barrier in the recovery process for African American communities.  
A Gap in the Literature 
A large body of research by social scientists exists on the topic of Hurricane Katrina, the 
levee failure, and New Orleans. This research touches on many aspects of the storm’s impact and 
subsequent recovery process. The literature indicates who suffered the most in New Orleans as 
the result of man-made vulnerabilities. In disparate impact and rates of recovery, the research 
agrees that the African American community of New Orleans suffered the worst extent of 
damages and received the least from policy measures aimed to aid recovery (Cutter & Finch, 
2006; Elliot et al., 2010; Finch et al., 2010; Gabe et al., 2005; Gotham, 2014; 2015). As the most 
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impacted, the African American community standpoint, developed during a contentious recovery 
process, may hold insights into policy barriers in the disaster recovery process. Understanding 
the needs of those most affected with the least ability to cope will illuminate how policy makers 
can improve conditions within the city of New Orleans and use Orleans Parish recovery as a 
template for other urban areas struck by natural phenomena.  
This study adds another dimension to the literature available in the field. It fills the gap of 
how residents view the effects and challenges of the storm and of the recovery process. As a 
qualitative project, it provides an opportunity to hear resident voices and opinions in the context 
of recovery. This project offers insight into how those most affected frame the struggle to return 
and what obstacles they encountered.  
Another oversight within the literature is the attempt to isolate specific barriers from all 
other obstacles to understand the effects of one variable at a time. This reductionist approach 
minimizes the monumental task of returning to post-Katrina New Orleans, where families did not 
have the option to deal with only one hurdle at a time. An intersectional perspective, informed by 
Crenshaw’s (1991) concept of political intersectionality, allows the opportunity to examine the 
structural challenges as interwoven and inseparable from each other in the process of return 
(Choo & Ferree, 2010). This approach is necessary to understand the full impact of the storm and 
subsequent policy decisions on African Americans because it analyzes the entirety of their 






To gain a deeper understanding of the process to return, this qualitative study seeks to 
explore how African Americans frame obstacles to return to post-Katrina New Orleans. 
Additional research questions are: How do these obstacles affect the decision-making process? 
How are these obstacles overcome? What is needed to facilitate return? How do participants and 
the media frame race, class, and gender in the context of return? 
Research Design: A Qualitative Case Study 
The research question determines the appropriate research design for any study (Babbie, 
2004; Creswell, 2007; Denzin & Lincoln, 2008; Yin, 2009). Researchers can use different 
approaches to explore how African Americans frame obstacles to return to post-Katrina New 
Orleans depending on what they hope to learn and what resources they have to conduct the 
study. This section begins by discussing the research design for this project before addressing 
strengths and weaknesses of the study. It concludes by discussing the strengths and weaknesses 
of an alternative approach.  
This study uses a qualitative approach to explore the decision-making process of African 
Americans displaced from New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina. Qualitative research creates an in-
depth examination of social phenomena rather than a statistical description (Babbie, 2004; 
Creswell, 2007). Denzin and Lincoln (2008, p. 4) describe, “Qualitative researchers [as] 
study[ing] things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena 
in terms of the meanings people bring to them.” Babbie (2004, p. 307) highlights several 
strengths of qualitative research, including its ability to reveal “subtle nuances in attitudes and 
behavior and [to examine] social processes over time.” This project seeks to uncover the nuanced 
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decision-making process of displaced African Americans and how they framed obstacles to 
return. Furthermore, the researcher hopes to gain a deeper understanding of the relationship 
between individual agency and structural changes following Hurricane Katrina (Bourdieu, 1990; 
Giddens, 1984). To explore these questions, a qualitative approach is appropriate.  
Qualitative researchers use different strategies to investigate social phenomena. Creswell 
(2007) describes five different approaches: narrative research, phenomenology, grounded theory, 
ethnography, and case study; but he acknowledges scholars classify qualitative research 
differently across disciplines. As a strategy of inquiry, a case study allows the in-depth 
examination of a specific issue via one or more cases over a specified time frame using multiple 
means of data collection (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2009). Yin (2009, p. 18) offers the following 
definition of the case study method: 
“1. A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident.  
 
2. The case study inquiry copes with the technically distractive 
situation in which there will be many more variables of interest 
than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of 
evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, 
and as another result benefits from the prior development of 
theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.”  
 
Yin (2009, p. 19) differs from Creswell (2007) by depicting the case study as more than “just a 
form of ‘qualitative research.’” Although he finds scholars critical of the case study method tend 
to conflate it with a form of data collection, Yin (2009, p. 19) views the case study as a research 
method that allows both “quantitative and qualitative evidence.” Incorporating data from 
multiple sources collected via different methods creates a detailed, multifaceted understanding of 
the social phenomenon illustrated by the selected case (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2009).  
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Case study research can focus on a single case or include multiple cases (Creswell, 2007; 
Yin, 2009). Scholars ascribe different names and purposes to studies involving single and 
multiple cases. Creswell (2007) uses the term collective case study while Yin (2009) refers to the 
comparative case method. The comparative case study method creates more compelling and 
robust studies by providing evidence of the ability to replicate the findings across different cases 
while single case studies highlight “(a) a critical test of existing theory, (b) a rare or unique 
circumstance, or (c) a representative or typical case, or where the case serves a (d) regulatory or 
(e) longitudinal purpose” (Yin, 2009, p. 52). Yin (2009) contends multiple case studies are 
undertaken to support reliability of findings on the basis of replication. Creswell (2007) 
acknowledges Yin’s (2009) emphasis on replication but stresses it as a replication of procedure 
not a replication of results. To Creswell (2007), scholars design collective case studies to use the 
same procedures to illuminate different aspects of a single research topic or social phenomenon.  
This project aligns with Creswell’s (2007) concept of a collective case study because it 
uses the same process to compare three cases with different outcomes to provide an in-depth 
examination of African American decision-making following Hurricane Katrina. To understand 
how displaced African American residents frame obstacles to return to post-Katrina New Orleans 
and how obstacles change over time, this study compares the decision-making processes of 
displaced residents: (1) who returned, (2) who remain displaced in Houston, Texas, and (3) who 
relocated to Houston after returning to New Orleans for more than six months. Comparing these 
three cases will illuminate how obstacles changed over time as well as what some African 
Americans may need to live in post-Katrina New Orleans. Using multiple cases also allows the 
study to compare the various states of return and displacement in which residents continue to 




 To investigate the decision-making process of African Americans following Hurricane 
Katrina, this case study collects two types of data through two different methods. Creswell 
(2007, p. 129) describes four main types of qualitative data: “observations (ranging from 
nonparticipant to participant), interviews (ranging from close-ended to open-ended), documents 
(ranging from private to public), and audiovisual materials (including materials such as 
photographs, compact disks, and videotapes).” Rather than dividing data into four categories, 
Yin (2009, p. 98) states evidence originates, “…from six sources: documents, archival records, 
interviews, direct observation, participant-observation, and physical artifacts.” The research 
approach often influences the forms of data included in a particular study (Babbie, 2004; 
Creswell, 2007; Seidman, 2006). For example, narrative, phenomenology, and grounded theory 
approaches rely heavily on interviews while ethnography incorporates observations in 
conjunction with interviews (Creswell, 2007; Seidman, 2006). Case studies may draw upon all of 
these to create an in-depth depiction of each case (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2009). This project relies 
primarily on open-ended, qualitative interviews with displaced and returned African American 
residents and documents, specifically local and national news articles on New Orleans recovery.  
Qualitative interviews are different than other types of interviews, such as survey 
research interviews (Babbie, 2004; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Seidmen, 2006). According to 
Seidman (2006, p. 9), “At the root of in-depth interviewing is an interest in understanding the 
lived experience of other people and the meaning they make of that experience.” Babbie (2004, 
p. 309) describes qualitative interviews as “a guided conversation” as opposed to “a search for 
specific information.” Survey interviews tend to be highly structured; for example, most require 
interviewers to phrase questions identically to all participants in order to reduce interviewer 
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influence on the study (Babbie, 2004). In contrast, qualitative interviews tend to be less 
structured, which allows for the exploration of participants’ thoughts and attitudes on the 
interview topics (Babbie, 2004; Seidman, 2006). Semi-structured interviews allow the researcher 
to explore topics that arise during the interview while open-ended questions allow respondents to 
recount their experiences in their own words (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Seidman, 2006).  
Seidman (2006, p.13) acknowledges “a research method ideally is determined by what 
one is trying to learn” but continues to suggest “some researchers and scholars see the choice as 
a political and moral one.” To understand how displaced African Americans frame obstacles to 
return, this study draws upon semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions conducted 
by the researcher. While the method suits the focus of the project, the decision to examine the 
decision-making process of African Americans through their own words is political and moral in 
the theoretical context of the study. Feminist theory, critical race theory, and critical and 
ingenious methodologies all stress the importance of allowing marginalized communities to tell 
their own stories as a means of empowerment and as a way to create counter narratives that 
describe their experiences and the meanings they attribute to those experiences (Collins, 1991; 
Crenshaw et al., 1995; Delgado & Stefancic, 2001; Denzin, Lincoln, & Smith, 2008; Donovan, 
2000; Su, 1998/2000).  
In addition to qualitative interviews, the study proposes to analyze media narratives of 
post-Katrina New Orleans through conducting a content analysis. Babbie (2004, p. 314) 
describes content analysis as “the study of recorded human communications, such as books, Web 
sites, paintings, and laws.” Content analysis seeks to answer, “Who says what, to whom, why, 
how, and with what effect?” (Babbie, 2004, p. 314). This method can be used in qualitative or 
quantitative studies and has several strengths, including: its economical use of time and money; 
66 
 
its relatively easy and inexpensive ability to reproduce a portion of the study if mistakes occur; 
its ability to address long-term processes; and its unobtrusive nature, meaning the analyst rarely 
affects the data (Babbie, 2004, p. 323-324). However, content analysis is limited in that it only 
works for studying recorded communications and that it raises questions of validity and 
reliability depending on how the data is coded (2004). These limitations will be discussed further 
in the following sections.  
To perform a content analysis, the researcher will collect local and national media articles 
concerning the recovery of New Orleans. This will involve performing a database search to find 
articles that describe (1) the process of return for African American residents, (2) housing, 
education, employment, and healthcare policy changes implemented after Hurricane Katrina, or 
(3) the general state of recovery of post-Katrina New Orleans. The project incorporates the 
content analysis of media articles based on the preliminary findings of a pilot study, which found 
the media influenced experiences with disaster assistance and perspectives of recovery. In 
addition, the content analysis may allow the emergence of additional obstacles to return not 
discussed in the interviews and provide the opportunity for data triangulation (Babbie, 2004; 
Yin, 2009). The next section discusses the selection of research participants for the study.  
Sampling 
 In addition to how the data is collected, the research design also determines the 
appropriate means of sampling (Babbie, 2004; Creswell, 2003; 2007; Fowler, Jr., 2009). 
Sampling is a strategy by which researchers select research subjects to study the phenomenon in 
question (Babbie, 2004; Creswell, 2007). There are many different ways to construct research 
samples and different levels at which to sample (Creswell, 2007; Seidman, 2006). Quantitative 
studies typically rely on probability sampling, which uses different mechanisms to randomly 
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select research participants (Babbie, 2004; Creswell, 2003; Field, 2013; Fowler, Jr., 2009; Sirkin, 
1999). If a random sample is representative of the population, then the results can typically be 
generalized to the larger population (Babbie, 2004; Field, 2013; Fowler, Jr., 2009; Sirkin, 1999). 
Qualitative researchers use alternative sampling methods that do not rely on probability theory, 
which limits the ability of qualitative findings to be generalized to a larger population (Babbie, 
2004; Creswell, 2003).  
As opposed to random sampling, qualitative research relies on purposefully constructing 
samples “to elucidate the particular, the specific” (Creswell, 2007, p. 126). There are many 
strategies associated with purposive sampling (Seidman, 2006). Babbie (2004) discusses quota 
sampling, where researchers limit participants to create a sample that is representative of the 
larger population, and snowball sampling, where participants refer the researcher to future 
participants. Seidman (2006) and Creswell (2007) identify several more, including: maximum 
variation, homogenous, critical case, theory based, confirming/disconfirming cases, snowball or 
chain, extreme or deviant case, typical case, intensity, politically important, random purposeful, 
stratified purposeful, criterion, opportunistic, combination or mixed, and convenience sampling 
(Creswell, 2007, p. 127). Creswell (2007) encourages qualitative researchers to combine 
strategies as necessary to meet the needs of the research approach and the project.  
This study combined a few techniques to create a purposive sample. The project sampled 
at two levels, the city and the individual. Nearly every state sheltered Hurricane Katrina evacuees 
following the levee failure (Weber & Peek, 2012). Constraints on resources required selecting 
one city in which to interview displaced African American residents. The researcher selected 
Houston, TX, because it sheltered the largest number of African American evacuees after the 
storm and offered federal disaster assistance that other cities did not (Weber & Peek, 2012; Bliss, 
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2015). To select individual participants, the project relies on maximum variation. This approach 
maximizes the differences among participants in order to increase the possibility for different 
perspectives and experiences to emerge (Seidman, 2006; Creswell, 2007). The study also used 
snowball sampling to find participants.  
In qualitative studies, sample size is determined by saturation and sufficiency (Seidman, 
2006). Saturation is reached when interviews stop revealing new information (Yin, 2009). 
Sufficiency refers to including enough voices to reflect the range of possible (2009). The study 
includes seventeen participants, which meets the standards of a small case study (Seidman, 2006; 
Yin, 2009). The initial sampling strategy planned for five participants in each category that 
represented a variety of voices. Due to difficulties locating participants who relocated to Houston 
after returning to post-Katrina New Orleans, there are fewer participants in the third case with 
less variation in demographic characteristics.  
Data 
The data for this project consists of two rounds of interviews four to five years apart. The 
first round of interviews took place between August 2011 and February 2012 with seventeen 
participants that self-identified as an African American displaced from New Orleans by 
Hurricane Katrina. All participants were over eighteen at the time of the interview, but two 
participants were minors at the time of the storm. All participants had an annual household 
income of less than $200,000 before the disaster. The researcher administered all interviews 
face-to-face and audio recorded them. Six respondents chose to be video recorded as well. 
Qualitative interview best practices stress setting interview length between sixty to ninety 
minutes to allow enough time to cover topics in depth without lasting so long as to be taxing on 
the participant (Creswell, 2007; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Seidman, 2006). When engaged in 
69 
 
answering a question at the sixty-minute mark, the researcher pursued the questioning until an 
appropriate concluding point. The researcher interviewed most participants alone and only once. 
Two participants that shared an initial interview required second interviews because they did not 
finish within the allotted time. Three other participants, an aunt and her two nieces, shared a two-
hour interview. They did not require follow up interviews.  
The second round of interviews took place from May to August 2016. The researcher 
conducted follow-up interviews with fourteen of the seventeen participants. Two participants 
could not be reached and one participant failed to answer the phone at the scheduled interview 
time. One other participant only completed half of the interview questions due to time constraints 
and scheduling conflicts. This interview was included because qualitative research does not 
require asking the same questions (Babbie, 2004; Creswell, 2007). The researcher conducted 
three interviews face to face in the New Orleans. The remaining eleven interviews took place via 
phone. Two participants completed the interview process across two conversations. The 
researcher audio recorded the interviews and paid a professional transcriber to transcribe them 
verbatim. The researcher double checked the transcripts and corrected any discrepancies between 
the audio recording and the written transcript. The interviews ranged from thirty to ninety 
minutes. The follow-up interviews sought to understand how participants' lives changed since the 
initial interviews and their view of New Orleans recovery.  
Case one included five participants who returned to New Orleans. The sample included 
two women and three men between 14 and 56 years old at the time of the storm. Two owned 
homes; the other three rented. Three lived in New Orleans; two returned to the metro areas of 
Metairie and Slidell. Of these participants, the researcher identified one as middle class and the 
other four as working class. The earliest participant to return moved back in January of 2006, and 
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the last returned in November of 2011. The researcher conducted all interviews in the New 
Orleans metro between July 2011 and February 2012.  
For case two, the researcher interviewed nine participants residing in the Houston metro 
that never returned to live in New Orleans. Six participants were women, and three were men. 
The researcher identified two as middle-class and the remaining six as working-class. Seven 
rented, and two owned their home. Participants ranged from 13 to 38 years old at the time of 
Hurricane Katrina. The researcher conducted the interviews in Houston between September 2011 
and January 2012. Two participants shared an interviewed with their family member in case one, 
which took place in Slidell, LA, in January 2012.  
Case three included three participants who relocated to Houston after they returned to 
live in New Orleans for over a year. All three were male homeowners that the researcher 
identified as middle class. Their ages ranged from 30 to 42 years old at the time of the storm. 
The longest period of living in New Orleans spanned five years from October of 2005 until 
September of 2010. The shortest lasted for eighteen months between 2007 to 2009. The 
researcher interviewed two participants in Houston in September and November of 2011. The 
third participant chose to schedule his interview during a visit to New Orleans in January of 
2011.  
Commitments to Participants 
The researcher made several commitments to the participants including confidentiality. 
One participant asked to remain anonymous, so the researcher randomly assigned aliases to 
everyone. The researcher also promised to give respondents their interview transcripts, a DVD of 
their interview (if opted to be video recorded), and the final report. In addition, participants must 
grant permission for the researcher to use the interviews for any other project. Participants 
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received twenty dollars in cash at the start of each interview in the first round and a twenty dollar 
money order by mail for participating in the second round of interviews.  
Case 1 Descriptions: Participants that Returned to New Orleans 
Shawn Jackson. At the time of the disaster, Shawn Jackson, a 35-year old working class 
renter, worked at Tulane University Hospital. When his 18 year-old daughter refused to evacuate 
with his 1-year-old grandson, he stayed although he had packed and planned to leave. They 
sheltered-in-place in an empty third floor apartment in the St. Bernard Public Housing 
Development with his daughter’s aunts and their families. After the flooding, they devised a way 
to float to a nearby overpass, but the helicopter rescue crew only took women and children. 
Separated from his family, he walked to New Orleans International Airport, where attendants 
evacuated him by plane to Atlanta, GA. He stayed for a month to help his mother get settled 
before he relocated to Houston for disaster housing assistance. In Houston, he reunited with his 
daughter and grandson. He stayed the same apartment in Houston until November 2011 when he 
returned to help his daughter raise his grandson. In February 2012, he was looking for work, 
living with his daughter and her two children (now 7-year-old grandson and 10-month-old 
granddaughter) in her grandmother’s renovated house. I met him through his aunt, the 
administrative assistant at the University of New Orleans. In 2016, his aunt reported he had 
relocated to Phoenix, AZ. He could not be reached for a follow-up interview. 
Steven Bell. In 2005, Steven Bell, a 44-year-old middle class truck driver, lived with his 
companion of many years, her daughter, and her granddaughter in his family home in the Lower 
9th Ward. Before Hurricane Katrina, they evacuated to a hotel in Houston. After the flooding, 
they met people at a church-sponsored clothing drive, who helped them find and furnish an 
apartment. As a gasoline truck driver, Steven reported he transferred his licenses and 
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certifications to work in Texas and within a few weeks he had a full-time job. In 2007, he visited 
for Mardi Gras and applied to a local trucking company that had reopened. They hired him the 
next day, which enabled him to stay permanently. He intended to fix his grandfather's house but 
ran into family issues, including legal battles over and theft of insurance money. In September 
2011, he rented his uncle's house, where he lived with his elderly mother. In 2016, he reported 
the only major change was that his teenage granddaughter had moved in with him because she 
missed New Orleans. He also stated the family home had collapsed, and the legal battle 
continued. He still planned to rebuild once the judge ruled he and his mother had 100% 
ownership of the house. I met him through his best friend, whose house I gutted in June of 2006.  
Thomas Stevens. When Hurricane Katrina hit, Thomas Stevens, a working class 20-
year-old sophomore at Tulane University, shared an apartment in the Carrollton area with his 
father, who worked as a bellman at the Ritz-Carlton. He went to school for free because his 
mother worked for Tulane University Hospital. When Thomas evacuated to his girlfriend’s 
parent’s house in Houston, his father chose to go to work, thinking the hotel would offer him a 
room as they had in the past, but this did not happen. and Thomas supported him financially until 
his death in 2009. In January 2006, Thomas returned when classes resumed and lived on campus. 
However, he did not know his mom lost her job, meaning he lost his tuition waiver. Tulane 
University kicked him out in May 2006 for nonpayment. After he lost campus housing, he 
struggled with homelessness and eventually moved into a FEMA trailer with his mother and his 
girlfriend. He also struggled to financially support his father, who became severely depressed 
after being trapped in the floodwaters and never returned to work before he died in 2009. 
Thomas turned to alcohol to alleviate the pressure and was arrested several times for public 
intoxication and other related charges.  
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In August 2011, Thomas lived alone in Metairie with plans to return to New Orleans 
eventually. He operated his own tax company and planned to graduate from Southern University 
at New Orleans in May of 2012. A few months after the 2011 interview, he moved in with his 
mother, where he continued to be until 2016. At the time of the 2016 interview, he stated he was 
transitioning into his grandfather's house in Slidell, which needed repairs because it had been 
vacant since his grandfather's death in 2012. Thomas reported he had graduated from college but 
could not find a job in his field because he received a felony conviction although he was the 
victim of a check cashing scam. He also stated a doctor diagnosed him as bi-polar, but he could 
not afford the medicine. Drinking continued to be a problem that had alienated him from his 
friends and social network and that led to arrests, which interfered with maintaining low-wage 
service jobs. I met him through Joseph Johnson in case 2.  
Paulette Watson. At the time of Hurricane Katrina, Paulette, a 57-year-old single mother 
of five, worked for the Sewer and Water Board and owned a house in Algiers, where she lived 
with her 16-year-old son and her elderly mother. They evacuated to a Mississippi shelter before 
the storm but met a woman outside the shelter looking to house a family. After staying with her 
for a week, Paulette relocated to Houston because she had friends there. She returned in January 
2007 to save her retirement benefits. In 2011, she was the only member of her family living in 
New Orleans because her mother died shortly after they returned and her adult children did not 
return. Her youngest returned for a short while before moving to his brother's house in California 
because he could not find a job in post-Katrina New Orleans. In 2016, Paulette had retired with 
100% of her benefits. She paid off her house and her car and found a part-time retail job to keep 
her active. She stated she was also working on losing weight and improving her physical health, 
which suffered when she turned to food to deal with the stress and depression of displacement. I 
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met her through her grandson, who worked with a colleague’s husband on the New Orleans Fire 
Department. 
Josephine Davis, a working class 14-year-old, started high school a few days before the 
disaster. With her mom and one of her sisters, she evacuated to rural Mississippi and stayed at 
her grandmother's house, which lost electricity and running water in the storm. Her dad, 
Raymond Davis in case 3, picked her up and took her to Atlanta to where he evacuated before 
the storm. When her dad returned to New Orleans in October 2005 for work, she went to 
Houston to live with her sister. Eventually, she moved in with her aunt, now living in Katy, 
Texas, a western suburban of Houston. At the end of the 2006-2007 school year, she moved to 
her mother’s new place in Slidell. She graduated from Slidell in May 2009. In January 2012, she 
lived in her own apartment in Slidell with her 2-month-old daughter. In 2016, she reported she 
lived in Metairie with her daughter, her fiancé, and their 6-month old son. I met her through her 
aunt, Barbara Davis in case 2.  
Case 2 Descriptions: Participants that Stayed Displaced in Houston 
Lisa Wilson. Before the interview, Lisa Wilson introduced me to her family by showing 
me photo albums. She is the daughter of a teenage mother who worked three jobs to provide for 
her. She is married to a private practice lawyer; both were born and raised in New Orleans. At 
the time of Hurricane Katrina, they owned their home, had a 4-year-old son, and expected their 
daughter, whom they wrongly believed had Down syndrome, to be born in November. They 
evacuated to Houston before the storm and over time accepted relocation as permanent because 
of the slow pace of recovery. In 2011, they owned their house in Houston, and she was a stay-at-
home mother. In 2016, they continued to be in the same house, but she had to return to work to 
make ends meet. Her mother also lived with them, which put stress on her marriage. Lisa stated 
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her mother's health was deteriorating due to depression from displacement and several deaths in 
the family. This forced Lisa to into her mother's role in her family network, a role she still 
struggled to accept. I met her through Joseph Johnson. 
Joseph Johnson is a single, middle class man. In his late twenties in 2005, he rented an 
apartment with his sister on the Westbank. He left his car and evacuated with a friend to a hotel 
in Houston before the storm. He tried to return in October 2005, but housing conditions, lack of 
family, and the overall state of recovery deterred him. In 2011, he planned to return when he had 
enough money to create positive change for African Americans in New Orleans. I met him 
through a colleague that conducted research with his father, a social justice advocate in New 
Orleans. Joseph could not be contacted in 2016 and did not participate in a follow-up interview. 
Barbara Davis was a married, 37-year-old, working-class mother of two teenage 
daughters at the time of the storm. Headed to Baton Rouge, contraflow sent her and her husband 
to Mississippi while her daughters, riding in a more reliable friend’s car, reached the state 
capital. They were separated for a week before she learned that her brother drove to Baton 
Rouge, found her children, and took them to his house in Katy, Texas. She relocated to Katy at 
the insistence of her husband and chose to stay because of the school system. After Hurricane 
Katrina, she became a Jehovah’s Witness, and her marriage ended. A changed sense of morality 
and dissatisfaction with the state of recovery helped her accept permanent relocation. In 2016, 
she reported she no longer had family members living with her. She also stated she had moved to 
Houston and shared a house with a friend and her friend's daughters. She still continued to work 
at the call center that hired her in 2007. Barbara also reported she struggled with depression since 
her father's death in 2013. I met her via her brother, Raymond Davis, a participant in case 3. 
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Regina Walker. At the time of the disaster, Regina, a working-class 13-year-old, lived in 
New Orleans East with her mother, brother, and grandfather. They evacuated to Baton Rouge 
before the storm and moved to Orlando a month later. Their family moved several times while 
her mother searched for stable employment and housing. Each move meant a new school, which 
created anxiety issues for Regina and a Florida teacher recommended she be home schooled. 
This enabled her to move in with her aunt, Barbara Davis, in 2007 when her mother chose to 
send the kids to Katy for the summer to save money. As Regina became established in Texas, 
she chose to stay permanently. In 2012, she reported her mother continued to ask her to move 
back to Fort Lauderdale, Florida. In 2016, she stated she had been married for three years and 
had worked at the call center with her aunt for almost 4 years. She lived alone with her husband 
in a Houston apartment and planned to have children eventually. I met her via her aunt, Barbara 
Davis.  
Ella Taylor, a working-class, single mother, was 25 at the time of Hurricane Katrina. She 
lived in the St. Bernard Public Housing Development and was expecting her third child on 
Valentine’s Day in 2006. She evacuated to Mississippi before the storm at the insistence of her 
grandmother. After she was notified that her complex would not reopen, she left her family and 
relocated to Houston for disaster housing assistance. She expressed a deep desire to return to 
New Orleans, but high rents, poor school standards, and the slow pace of recovery persuaded her 
to stay in Houston until her children graduate. In 2016, she reported the last few years had been 
hard. Her oldest daughter began acting out and was diagnosed as bi-polar. She had lost her public 
housing voucher because her caseworker claimed she did not return her annual verification, 
which Ella insisted she submitted. I met her via her aunt, who worked for the maintenance 
77 
 
department the University of New Orleans before the University privatized maintenance 
services. 
Dwayne Edwards, a working-class 35-year-old father, and his brother evacuated via 
government means to Atlanta, where they stayed in a church shelter. After a few days, the church 
sent Dwayne, his brother, and other displaced residents to Houston on a Greyhound bus to apply 
for disaster housing assistance. In Houston, they reunited with the rest of their family. After 
seeing the economic opportunity and finding a construction job in Houston, he chose to stay, 
which separated him from his family, including his son and step-daughter, who all returned to 
New Orleans. In 2016, he continued to live in the same apartment he first moved into in 2005. 
He reported he had a new job as doiler maker at a chemical plant in Houston, where he had 
doubled his salary. He stated he would always be displaced but shared his love for second lines 
and New Orleans culture with those in Houston. Being separated from his family, especially his 
children, negatively impacts his mental health. I met him via Jason Boissiere. 
Jason Boissiere, a working-class 28-year-old musician and barber, sought shelter in the 
Lafitte Public Housing Development with his cousin during Hurricane Katrina. He sent his 
estranged wife and two-year-old daughter to her family in Dallas, Texas, but stayed because his 
car was in the repair shop. After the flooding, he and his friends walked to the Superdome with a 
grill. They stayed outside and became community chefs until buses transported them to Houston. 
In Houston, he reunited with his extended family at the Reliant Center. His parents, extended 
family, and, by then, ex-wife and four year old daughter returned to New Orleans in 2007. As an 
entrepreneur who had to establish a clientele in Houston to survive displacement, he stayed 
because he did not want to start over again in a city that was both partially functioning and 
partially populated. In 2012, he owned his own shop and planned to return in retirement. In 2016, 
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he continued to own his own shop and live in the same apartment but planned to buy a house 
soon. He had gotten married and had a son and a daughter. His ex-wife and daughter also 
relocated to Houston in November 2011 to be closer to him. He stated he continued to play in a 
brass band in Houston, but his involvement in his Mardi Gras Indian culture suffered because he 
could not attend events. He indicated he had recently applied for an arts grant to teach two 
apprentices how to sew and construct the costume and about the culture. He had returned to 
college for criminal justice and still intended to return when he retired at 50. A colleague sent me 
a newspaper article that featured his store. I visited his barbershop each time I went to Houston 
to interview participants.  
Edith Jones. At the time of the storm, Edith Jones, a working-class 21-year-old single 
mother, lived with her mother and 2-year-old daughter. Her mother worked for the Astor-
Crowne Plaza and received a room for her family to stay in during the storm. On the seventh day, 
the hotel put everyone out. Edith heard about a bus pick up point on the Westbank and pooled 
her money with strangers to hire someone to drive them across the Crescent City Connection 
because they heard Jefferson Parish police had orders to shoot anyone walking on the bridge. 
Edith and her family waited two weeks to be evacuated from the flooded city. Her family ended 
up in shelter in Keller, Texas, for a month before receiving housing assistance in Fort Worth. She 
relocated to Houston in October 2006 to find stable employment. She stated, “They tried to kill 
us,” when explaining why she could not return to New Orleans.  
In 2016, Edith reported she and her girlfriend had purchased a house in Fresno, Texas, a 
few months after the 2011 interview and got married at the end of 2015. She continues to 
experience discrimination based on her sexual orientation and physical appearance (i.e.: hair and 
clothing choices) that she does not experience in New Orleans. She also stated she developed 
79 
 
physical health problems due to stress eating that led to hospitalization multiple times over the 
past five years. In the follow-up interview, she described being wrongfully convicted of food 
stamp fraud in Houston. Financially unable to fight the charges, she accepted a plea deal when a 
Houston attorney told her, as an African American resident from New Orleans she could not win. 
She found the felony theft charge made it even more difficult to find and keep employment in 
Houston. I met Edith via a colleague who interviewed her for a study on the rate at which low-
income women returned to college after Hurricane Katrina. 
Cora Williams. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, Cora Williams, a 38-year old homeowner 
and single mother, lived in Waggaman, LA with her six-year-old daughter. They evacuated to 
stay with family in Baton Rouge. After a week, she relocated to Houston with her aunts and their 
families because her aunt's company had rented them two suites for her family. Cora reported 
she made too much money to qualify for federal disaster assistance. Her house did not flood, but 
the hospital where she worked, Tulane University Hospital, did. Her daughter wanted to stay in 
Houston, so she found a job at a medical center and increased her salary by more than $20,000. 
She sold her house in Louisiana for a profit because it was not damaged and bought a new house 
in Sugarland, Texas. She remarried in 2010 and planned to go to doctoral school in 2012. In 
2016, she scheduled a follow-up interview but did not answer at the arranged time. Another time 
could not be arranged, so she did not participate in the second round of interviews. 
Case 3 Descriptions: Participants that Relocated to Houston after Returning to New 
Orleans 
Raymond Davis. After holding a ‘Run Motherfucker Run’ party in his French Quarter 
nightclub, 42-year-old New Orleans East homeowner, Raymond Davis, flew to Atlanta. In 
October 2005, his social network provided him with a job tip and he returned to New Orleans to 
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work as an inspector for FEMA. By the time FEMA laid him off nine months later, he and his 
business partners had reopened the club. As the city recovered, competition grew, and the club 
folded. In September of 2010, he relocated to Katy, Texas, and moved in with his sister, Barbara 
Davis, and other family members. When interviewed in September and November, 2011, he 
planned to return as soon as the audio-visual industry recovered. In 2016, Raymond reported a 
month or two after he moved into his own apartment in Houston, his job forced him to relocate. 
After moving to Atlanta, he began having back problems that interfered with sitting for long 
periods of time, which forced him to resign. However, he began managing clubs in Atlanta for 
one of his former New Orleans business partners. He stated he intended to move to Baton Rouge 
at the end of the summer of 2016. He indicated the audio-visual industry was thriving in Baton 
Rouge and returning would allow him to be closer to his daughter and grandchildren. He 
continued to be a renter and had not purchased another house since Hurricane Katrina destroyed 
his house in New Orleans East. I met Raymond through Dr. Sanyika. 
Marcus Booker, a 30-year-old homeowner in Gentilly, worked in marketing and public 
relations. He evacuated in advance to a relative’s house in Houston with his extended family, his 
girlfriend, and his dog. When her law firm reopened in December 2005, his girlfriend returned to 
New Orleans. His job relocated him to a branch in Pidgin Forge, Tenneesee, but he quit and 
returned to Houston within a few months to be closer to family. He and his best friend started a 
social aid and pleasure club for New Orleanians in Houston. He bounced around between 
Houston and New Orleans as his employment and relationship status changed. In January 2012, 
he planned to return in February to marry his girlfriend, now fiancé, in May. In 2016, he reported 
he returned and married as planned, and he had two kids, a son and a daughter. He described 
watching many of his friends return and relocate within a few years because of the inflated real 
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estate prices and the violence. He no longer focused much energy on Houston or trying to 
convince people to return because he understood New Orleans could not offer middle class 
families the wages, home prices, or safe environments they found elsewhere. He admitted the 
marketing industry had not returned, but with his wife's income he did not need to work. A 
month before the follow-up interview, they purchased a corner store for him to run. I met him 
through Dr. Sanyika. However, Mr. Boissiere also suggested I interview him. 
Lemont Cummings. Before the disaster, Lemont Cummings, a 34-year-old project 
manager, lived in Kenner with his wife, 6-year-old daughter, and 8-month-old son. They 
evacuated to Houston before the storm. Their condo sustained minor damage, and at his wife’s 
request, they returned in January 2006. After two months, his company laid off him off when 
they realized the pace of recovery was too slow to be profitable. Unable to find work in New 
Orleans, the financial strain contributed to his divorce. In 2010, he relocated with his children to 
Houston because of its economy. When interviewed in September and November, 2011, he 
worked for himself and had no plans to return to New Orleans because of the way all levels of 
government handled the response and recovery. By 2016, Lemont and his two children had 
moved with his mother in Katy, Texas, after experiencing kidney failure due to undiagnosed case 
of pneumonia. He attended dialysis three times a week for four hours each visit. At 
accommodate his health needs, he continued to work for himself. He stated dialysis left him tired 
which interfered with his work as well as with his normal daily routine of cooking and cleaning 
for his family. He hoped to receive a kidney transplant by the end of 2016, so he could start 
working full time again. I met him through Raymond Davis. 
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Content Analysis Data 
 In addition to interview data, this project uses documents. To perform the content 
analysis, the researcher collected articles about New Orleans recovery from two different 
newspapers, the Times-Picayune (TP) and the New York Times (NYT), to represent local and 
national narratives, respectively. Negrine and Eyre (1998, p.47) claim, “Local newspapers 
...cover local events in great detail...to help the local reader/citizen make sense of his or her 
environment.” Cotter (2003, p.416) argues, “Each word [in a local newspaper] is an open 
invitation to comment and criticism by citizens of varying enthusiasms who watch closely 
whether the paper strays too far as a player on the civic team.” This suggests the TP narrative is 
crafted to shape the way residents in the New Orleans metro area interpret the pace and progress 
of recovery without upsetting local politics. Cotter (2003, p. 416) reported, “The news that the 
[New York] Times sees fit to print often finds its way into discussions by policy-makers and 
politicians, meaning that it effectively sets (or follows) national agenda for public discussion, as 
well as functions as a ‘paper of record’ for society.” Because of its influence on national politics 
and its history for acknowledging social differences, the researcher selected the NYT as a 
national media narrative that helped individuals outside of the metro area make sense of New 
Orleans recovery after the disaster.  
  To sample media articles, the researcher performed a database search and limited the 
search results by date: from August 29, 2005 - August 1, 2016. Keywords for the search 
included: New Orleans, Hurricane Katrina, recovery, Road Home, housing, school, education, 
income, employment, jobs, health, and return. The researcher created a database of potential 
articles by selecting the first 100 articles from each keyword search when sorted by relevance. 
The researcher also selected results when sorting by time to ensure the database included articles 
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published in each year included in the study. Due to differences in search engines, sorting by 
time happened differently. The TP database contained the first 20 articles for each year because 
the program displayed search results by year. However, it resulted in 1636 different articles in 
the database, so the researcher redid the relevance search and only selected the first 50 articles. 
This resulted in a database with 462 articles. NewsBank did not contain NYT articles, so the 
researcher used LexusNexus. The search process changed slightly because LexusNexus did not 
offer the same search functions as NewsBank. The researcher selected the first 100 articles by 
relevance and the first 50 articles for the housing and jobs keyword searches sorted by most 
recently published. This resulted in a database with 587 articles.  
 The researcher used purposive sampling to select articles for the sample. This included 
selecting articles: by date, by headline themes, and by series (i.e.: Road Home legal battles 
formed a series, so the researcher selected the article published last, assuming it would contain 
similar information from earlier articles on the topic as well as the final court decision). 
Although the researcher intended to limit the sample size to 50 articles per paper, the sample 
contained 115 articles: 59 TP articles and 56 NYT articles. The additional NYT articles allowed 
the sample to include all six statistical updates on the condition of post-Katrina New Orleans 
instead of just one. These annual updates tended to be short, so the researcher included them in 
addition to 49 other articles. The researcher thought removing anymore articles from the TP 
sample would result in holes, so the researcher decided to expand the sample size to 59. This 
made sense in light of the search results which showed the TP published thousands of more 




 Before interview data can be analyzed, the researcher must transcribe the audio 
recordings verbatim (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Seidman, 2006). For qualitative research, 
verbatim transcription means including pauses, laughs, filler words, and nonverbal cues in the 
written text (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Seidman, 2006). The author transcribed the original 
interviews, which Seidman (2006) suggests allows researchers to know their data better. Time 
constraints led the researcher to use a transcription service to transcribe the 2016 follow-up 
interviews. Although Seidman (2006) discusses transcribing only pertinent sections in order to 
decrease the time necessary to transcribe interviews, for this project, the researcher transcribed 
each interview in its entirety. This ensures the data is not reduced or limited before analysis 
begins (Seidman, 2006). The news articles moved directly to analysis.  
 When conducting a content analysis, researchers can analyze the data through a 
quantitative or qualitative approach (Babbie, 2004). Babbie (2004, p. 318, emphasis in original) 
suggests that, “Content analysis is essentially a coding operation…[a] process of transforming 
raw data into a standardized form.” A quantitative approach requires coding the data in such a 
way as to end with numerical values that can be analyzed using statistical processes (2004). 
Researchers have options for reducing data to numbers, which include counting manifest content, 
“the concrete terms contained in a communication” or assigning numbers to codes describing 
latent content, “the underlying meaning of communications” (Babbie, 2004, p. 319). Babbie 
(2004) also emphasizes the necessity of including base line measures. For example, in addition to 
reporting the number of articles that cited housing as an obstacle to return, to create a 
comparison the researcher would need to report the number of articles that did not mention 
housing as an obstacle as well as the number of articles that portrayed housing as a means to 
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return and those which focused on different obstacles. This project used a qualitative approach to 
conduct a content analysis of news articles, which will be coded and analyzed in the same 
manner as the interview transcripts.  
To analyze qualitative research, the data is broken into statements and grouped around 
similar ideas, which are called codes (Babbie, 2004; Creswell, 2003; 2007). This process, known 
as coding, involves, “…identifying and reordering data, allowing the data to be thought about in 
new and different ways” (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996, p. 29). Coffey and Atkinson (1996) describe 
coding as simplifying and reducing as well as complicating data. It reduces data into manageable 
segments and categorizes it according to relevant concepts (1996). The codes become conceptual 
labels that link passages addressing similar topics from different data sources (Coffey & 
Atkinson, 1996; Creswell, 2007). However, Coffey and Atkinson (1996, p. 29) contend that, 
“Coding need not be viewed simply as reducing data to some general, common denominators. 
Rather, it can be used to expand, transform, and reconceptualize data, opening up more diverse 
analytic possibilities.”  
Creswell (2007) encourages researchers to use multiple rounds of coding and pull code 
names from multiple sources. To begin, he suggests scholars limit themselves to five or eight 
codes that originate from initial scans of the data (2007). Overall, Creswell (2007) recommends 
limiting the total number of codes to twenty-five or thirty in order to keep future analysis steps 
manageable. Although researchers may use predetermined or “a priori” codes, Creswell (2007, 
p. 152, emphasis in original) advocates allowing inductive codes to emerge during the coding 
process. This allows the codes to “reflect the views of the participants in a traditional qualitative 
way” and does not limit the analysis to only those concepts selected by the analyst before data 
collection (Creswell, 2007, p. 152). In vivo codes are code labels that are direct quotes from the 
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data (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996; Creswell, 2007). As codes emerge, it may be necessary to 
recode the dataset. Subsequent rounds of coding further clarify and organize the data within 
codes (Creswell, 2007). For this project, deductive codes emerged from the literature review. 
They included recovery planning, recovery policy, uneven recovery, recovery outcomes, 
continued vulnerability, barriers to rebuild, barriers to return, assistance, race, class, and gender. 
The researcher also allowed inductive and in vivo codes to emerge. A full list of codes is in the 
appendix. 
After coding, the researcher analyzed the codes for meaning and combined them to create 
themes. To analyze the data, this project used a holistic rather than an embedded approach 
(Creswell, 2007). Embedded approaches selectively analyze specific facets where holistic 
approaches analyze the case as a whole (2007). For this project an embedded approach would 
limit analysis to institutional obstacles presented by housing, education, healthcare, and 
employment policy changes. Instead, the researcher will analyze each case in its entirety, 
including physical, emotional, and psychological obstacles as well as institutional barriers. This 
approach allows a deeper understanding of the needs and experiences of displaced African 
Americans because the participants’ framework and identification of barriers will direct the 
analysis process.  
With a holistic approach, this study used two levels of analysis. First, the researcher 
analyzed the cases separately utilizing a within-case analysis (Creswell, 2007). In this phase, 
codes are combined to allow themes to emerge (2007). The second level of analysis used a cross-
case analysis where the researcher conducted “a thematic analysis across the cases” (Creswell, 
2007, p. 75). This analysis compared and contrasted the themes developed in the within-case 
analysis of each case to see if they apply to multiple cases (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2009). This 
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process allows the researcher to form assertions about the meaning of each case as it relates to 
the central research question and to the other cases (Creswell, 2007).   
Validity 
Establishing validity is important in all research projects (Creswell, 2003; Babbie, 2004; 
Denzin & Lincoln, 2008; Denzin et al., 2008; Seidman, 2006; Sirkin, 1999; Field, 2013; Yin, 
2009). In quantitative research, validity refers to the degree that a construct measures what it 
intends to measure (Babbie, 2004; Field, 2013: Sirkin, 1999). This is an important idea because 
many of the concepts scholars attempt to measure are not easily quantifiable. There must be a 
logical connection between indicators and the quality to be measured to ensure the accuracy of a 
study’s findings and conclusions (Babbie, 2004; Field, 2013). In qualitative research, validity 
still refers to the accuracy of the concepts and interpretations; however, validity is verified 
through alternative means (Babbie, 2004; Creswell, 2007). To Babbie (2004), qualitative 
research tends to offer greater validity than quantitative studies that use surveys or experiments 
because qualitative field research allows the in-depth investigation of the meaning of concepts, 
which typically is not possible via quantitative surveys. Some scholars suggest using alternative 
terminology to discuss validity in qualitative research, and others reject the notion of objectivity 
that validity relies upon (Seidman, 2006). Yin (2009) proposes using data triangulation to ensure 
validity. Seidman (2006, p. 26) ultimately argues that researchers must strive to understand how 
their study can benefit from grappling with questions of validity rather than prescribe 
“mechanistic responses” appropriate for all studies.  
This study employs several methods to ensure validity. First, the validity of the findings 
will be verified by comparing them to previous research in the field (Creswell, 2007). Secondly, 
the study includes interviews with grassroots organizers, who can act as key informants to verify 
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the accuracy of the information reported (Babbie, 2004; Creswell, 2007). Finally, the findings 
from the content analysis and interviews ought to align with each other, which will provide 
another source to check the validity of the overall research findings (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2009). 
Additionally, the content analysis will focus on latent content, not manifest content, which 
reduces issues with validity but can increase issues with reliability (Babbie, 2004).  
Reliability 
 Reliability refers to the ability of a study to be replicated and arrive at the same research 
findings (Babbie, 2004; Creswell, 2003). Qualitative research tends to have greater issues with 
reliability than quantitative research because of the interpretive nature of qualitative research 
(Babbie, 2004; Creswell, 2007; Seidman, 2006). For example, in a quantitative content analysis, 
a researcher may count the number of times particular words appear. Because this process does 
not depend on the subjectivity of the researcher, different researchers can replicate it easily and 
expect to arrive at similar conclusions (Babbie, 2004; Creswell, 2007). A qualitative content 
analysis, relying on the meaning a passage expresses, requires researchers to interpret events 
similarly in order to reproduce the findings of the study (Babbie, 2004). This is more difficult as 
researchers bring different ideological lenses and understandings to bear on the data (Babbie, 
2004; Creswell, 2007).  
 To ensure reliability of this project, the researcher explicitly indicates personal bias 
concerning the recovery process of New Orleans as well as the individual recovery processes of 
displaced African Americans. Situating the role of the researcher within the context of the study 
achieves this goal (Creswell, 2007). In addition, the project follows Babbie’s (2004) 




Role of the Researcher 
 I undertake this project as a young, Black mother, aware of the legacy of African 
American activist scholars. My role in the recovery of New Orleans began in March, 2006, when 
I participated in the college spring break initiative: Katrina on the Ground (KOTG). The 
organizers of KOTG designed a comprehensive political education experience for African 
American college students based the teachings of Ella Baker and the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee. After volunteering several times, I relocated to New Orleans in 
September, 2007, to learn grassroots community organizing from the KOTG organizers, who 
organized the New Orleans Survivor Council (NOSC). I organized residents throughout New 
Orleans and residents in Renaissance Village and other Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) trailer parks in Baker, LA, to facilitate a community return.  
 While organizing the New Orleans Survivor Council, thousands of Hurricane Katrina 
survivors shared their experiences with organizers. The residents described what they went 
through in the initial wake of the storm and what they continued to experience as a result of 
Hurricane Katrina. At the first meeting of the New Orleans Survivor Council in January, 2006, 
over four hundred survivors came together to plan an organized return to the city. They identified 
four factors necessary for their community to return. These included, “a place to live, a place to 
send their children to school, a place to go when they got sick, and a job” (People’s Organizing 
Committee, 2008). It is from these mandates that I explore the impact of Hurricane Katrina 
through a race, class, and gender sensitive perspective.  
Alternative Research Design 
 Although this project proposes a qualitative approach, alternatives exist. Changing the 
approach impacts the research question because the different approaches address different types 
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of questions. Quantitative studies focus on “what” or “how many” rather than “how” or “why” 
(Babbie, 2004; Creswell, 2007; Field, 2013; Yin, 2009). The quantitative research questions are:  
1) Is there a statistically significant relationship between race, class, and gender 
and attitudes on and experiences with post-Katrina housing, employment, 
education, and healthcare policy changes? 
 
2) Can attitudes on and experiences with post-Katrina housing, employment, 
education, and healthcare policy changes accurately predict if participants 
returned or not? 
 
To examine these questions, the methods would also change. The project would use a 
survey questionnaire with closed-ended questions rather than interviews with open-ended 
questions (Field, 2013; Fowler, Jr., 2009). The survey would collect demographic information, 
inquire about post-Katrina housing, employment, education, and healthcare experiences, and use 
Likert scales to measure respondent attitudes on opportunities and challenges in post-Katrina 
New Orleans and in displacement. Likert scales use “standardized response categories…to 
determine the relative intensity of different items” (Babbie, 2004, p. G6). The responses would 
be scored to form a simple index.  
As a quantitative survey, the sampling strategy would also change. The study would use a 
clustered, simple random sample strategy (Babbie, 2004; Creswell, 2003; Field, 2013; Fowler, 
Jr., 2009; Sirkin, 1999). The researcher would contact the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) to receive a list of all residents from New Orleans that applied for Hurricane 
Katrina-related disaster assistance. The list would be organized by race and gender to increase 
the probability of randomly selecting a representative sample (Fowler, Jr., 2009). The researcher 
would use a computer program to randomly select one thousand participants from the stratified 
list to provide a large cushion for nonresponses. With four race, two gender, and three class 
categories, a sample of 300 to 400 respondents should allow subgroup minimums to be met, 
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would meet Fowler, Jr.'s (2009) recommendations for a reliable sample size, and match 
standards within the field.  
To analyze the survey data, the researcher would use IBM Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS). Pearson’s chi-square would test for significant correlations between race, class, 
and gender and attitudes on and experiences with housing, employment, education, and 
healthcare in post-Katrina New Orleans (Field, 2013; Sirkin, 1999). The researcher would then 
conduct a series of binary logistic regressions. The regression models would use the attitudes and 
experiences of participants, as represented by an index score, to predict if respondents returned 
after Hurricane Katrina. Attitudes and experiences would be analyzed separately as well as 
together to explore the impact of attitudes and experiences on rates of return.  
In order to generalize the findings to the larger population of New Orleans residents that 
applied for Hurricane Katrina-related disaster assistance from FEMA, the study must address 
issues of reliability and validity. Babbie (2004, p. 275) reports, “Survey research is generally 
weak on validity and strong on reliability.” Using standardized, self-administered surveys 
increases reliability, or the likelihood that the study would reproduce the same results if repeated 
(2004). To ensure validity, the survey would be vetted with a few evacuees of different races, 
classes, and genders to determine problems (Fowler, Jr., 2009). Using Likert scales ensures 
clarity and consistency in question format to reduce confusion (2009). The researcher would 
conduct a principle component factor analysis to test the validity of the survey questionnaire 
(Field, 2013). Additionally, the study would use multiple questions in different formats to 
investigate respondent attitudes and experiences. Fowler, Jr. (2009, p. 111) suggests, “Multiple 




Although this approach addresses many of the weaknesses of qualitative research, survey 
research comes with its own list of weaknesses (Babbie, 2004; Field, 2013; Fowler, Jr., 2009; 
Sirkin, 1999). First, while enabling the possibility to sample thousands, surveys can require 
extensive time and resources to carry out effectively (Babbie, 2004; Creswell, 2003; Fowler, Jr., 
2009). Secondly, the use of standardized processes makes survey research less flexible than other 
methods (Babbie, 2004). Additionally, nonresponse rates with mail surveys can reduce the 
ability to generalize the results (Fowler, Jr., 2009). To address this limitation, best practices 
recommend multiple mailings (Creswell, 2003; Fowler, Jr., 2009).  
The next chapters report the findings from the content analysis and the interviews before 
presenting an analysis and discussion of the findings. The concluding chapter discusses policy 




Planning as a Barrier 
 The content analysis showed the NYT and TP sampled articles depicted recovery planning 
as a barrier to return and a hindrance to recovery. Schwab, Topping, Eadie, Deyle, and Smith 
(1998/2005, p. 47) suggested communities develop plans after disasters, “to provide some vision 
that serves as a beacon for decision makers and some framework within which decisions will be 
taken.” Ideally, post-disaster planning is an opportunity to craft a clear community vision for 
rebuilding that balances short-term needs with long-term goals (Schwab et al., 1998/2005). In 
contrast, the samples reported the post-Katrina planning process left government officials, 
residents, and developers confused. Some authors argued uncertainty and perceived risk delayed 
critical actors (i.e.: residents, developers, federal agencies, etc.) from investing in the future of 
the city, which stalled recovery. Others blamed federal officials for implementing long-term 
plans at the expense of short-term housing needs.   
The inductive codes that emerged within the recovery planning gross code combined to 
form three key themes that showed how the samples portrayed recovery planning. The majority 
of the sampled articles reported problems with the planning process. In their view, processes left 
out citizen voice and allowed personal interests to influence recovery strategies, which slowed 
down recovery, led to poor policy decisions, and caused residents to lose faith in official 
planning efforts described as, “dysfunctional, tedious and often corrupt horse trading...” by Rich 
(2015) in a NYT sampled article. A handful of the authors in the sample suggested government 
officials viewed recovery as an opportunity to fix long-standing social problems (i.e.: school 
achievement gap, concentrated poverty, racial discrimination). These articles argued improving 
pre-Katrina quality of life took precedence over helping the displaced return. A few sampled 
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authors also indicated barriers that compounded the difficulty of creating a recovery plan. These 
pieces sought to excuse and ease blame for planning failures.  
A Flawed Planning Process 
 The sampled articles presented several issues with the post-Katrina planning process; the 
issues fell within four categories: limited citizen participation in planning processes, influence of 
politics on recovery planning, multiple planning processes, and slow results. Although the 
authors writing for a national audience used different topics to illustrate planning issues, their 
criticisms of the recovery planning process matched those voiced by authors writing for the local 
New Orleans metro.  
Limited resident participation in recovery planning. Eight TP and five NYT sampled 
articles reported issues with citizen participation in the post-disaster planning process. The 
papers showed government officials made recovery decisions without public input. Two authors 
from the TP used decision-making processes about public school reforms as an example of state 
leaders making decisions without consulting city residents. Many schools failed to meet state 
standards for student test scores and graduation rates (T. Perry, 2006). When local officials chose 
to keep public schools closed for the 2005-2006 academic year and to fire all school personnel, 
the state legislature placed the majority of Orleans Parish schools under the authority of the state-
run Recovery School District (2006). The state granted some schools permission to reopen as 
charter schools (2006). 
“The state Department of Education is poised to take over another 
102 public schools in New Orleans as the House gave final 
approval Tuesday to legislation to strip the Orleans Parish School 
Board of its authority over all but 13 campuses. …Many members 
of the Orleans Parish delegation… complained about making such 
a drastic change when the people it will affect could not be 
included in the discussions because they are scattered around the 




Reporting the trend of limited participation continued throughout the school unification decision 
made in 2016: “Harper Royal especially objected that the bill was developed without extensive 
public meetings. One source of outrage against the 2005 takeover is that the Legislature acted 
with limited public input, while people were trying to get their lives back together after 
Hurricane Katrina” (Dreilinger, 2016). The authors suggested excluding residents from policy 
decisions created anger and resentment among residents and city leaders for higher levels of 
government.  
The remaining articles framed limited citizen participation as an issue in the federal 
decision to demolish public housing developments and rebuild them as mixed-income 
communities. In the NYT, Saulny (2006) reflected resident concerns about the timing of public 
housing redevelopment, “‘Right now, we feel it’s not the time to start huge building projects 
because there are lots of people who are displaced as we speak and need a place to stay,’ said 
Lynette Bickham, who was evacuated from the St. Bernard project. ‘We’re going to continue to 
fight for our homes.’” One sampled TP article claimed the way officials framed the public 
housing debate concealed resident desires that emerged from the third recovery planning process.  
“The all-or-nothing tenor of the tear-down debate tends to obscure 
support for the hybrid plan, one that would save better-constructed 
buildings in public complexes but allow for changes, such as 
restoration of the original street grids, and for the incorporation of 
mixed-income features. Such ideas surfaced often during public 
meetings called last year to obtain feedback for the Unified New 
Orleans Plan effort” (Warner, Krupa, & Filosa, 2007).  
 
The NYT and TP reported that the federal, state, and local government entities did not listen to 
residents.  
“Despite pitched opposition, the federal Department of Housing 
and Urban Development is going forward with plans to demolish 
and redevelop the city’s four largest housing projects, knocking 
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out 3,000 apartments that were occupied by low-income families 
before the storm and adding middle-income families to the mix. So 
far, there is money in place to rebuild only about 1,000 units 
affordable enough for previous residents” (Dewan, 2007).  
 
“While HUD has reopened some complexes, such as Iberville, 
most remain closed and surrounded by fencing. Eager to return, 
former residents have marched in protest to force the government 
to open more, but HUD has refused” (Walsh, 2006).  
 
Walsh (2006) showed that residents devised strategies, such as protests and public 
demonstrations, to communicate their rebuilding desires to public officials when planning 
processes did not allow them to participate.  
 Two TP articles contradicted the view that HUD did not incorporate resident input into 
redevelopment plans. Hammer (2008b) described the department’s response to criticism about 
not following resident demands by quoting HUD spokesperson, D. J. Nordquist,  
“Nordquist said HUD has, in fact, consulted extensively with 
public housing tenant groups. The tenant groups have held 
numerous meetings with the developers of new complexes and 
visited other cities to study similar redevelopment projects. And 
she said HUD has worked vigorously to help the displaced return 
home” (Hammer, 2008b).  
 
The authors portrayed HUD as limiting resident participation to how new developments should 
look. Reckdahl (2011) recognized HUD consulted residents but indicated resident inclusion in 
design discussions did not help former residents return to redeveloped units. Reckdahl (2011) 
wrote, “The relatively small number of returnees at Harmony Oaks [previously C. J. Peete or the 
Magnolia Projects] understates the substantial influence residents have had on the new 
complex.” Together the articles in these codes showed that residents demonstrated to 
communicate their desire to return to the existing units, but HUD only consulted residents after 
making the decision to redevelop the complexes. 
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 Both samples reported government officials made recovery decisions without consulting 
the residents. The authors used public housing redevelopment to show federal officials ignored 
public protests and limited resident input. The TP sample also portrayed state officials as 
changing public education without public participation. The authors showed residents devised 
strategies to be heard by local, state, and national actors when government officials announced 
unpopular plans. The papers indicated resident protest did not stop state or federal plans. 
However, returned residents influenced local plans because local politicians worried about 
reelection. The next section examines how city politics and multiple planning processes created 
issues for recovery planning efforts.  
City politics & multiple planning processes. In addition to problems caused by state 
and federal officials making decisions with limited citizen participation, the sampled articles 
portrayed recovery planning as shaped by city politics and power differences among local 
interest groups. The authors argued personal interests and political careers shaped city-wide 
recovery plans. Three TP articles and six NYT articles in the sample described how politics 
influenced recovery planning. Three of the six NYT articles also discussed the series of planning 
processes initiated after Hurricane Katrina. The NYT authors blamed city politics for causing the 
city to undergo multiple planning processes, which increased the time to make a recovery plan 
and slowed down recovery. 
Both samples portrayed recovery as contingent on government decisions. An October TP 
article emphasized the importance of government decisions by quoting sociology professor and 
disaster expert Benigno Aguirre.  
“‘The tendency is to try to explain things on the individual level, to 
ask whether the evacuee in Arkansas is going to return or not. 
...But ...it is a collective dynamic going on: the decision-making of 
government officials, the use of the land and the type of work you 
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make available to people. That is a political and a cultural factor. 
…I think the impact of government decisions is going to be much 
greater in New Orleans than it has been in other places hurricanes 
have hit,’ he said. ‘That relates to the fact that it is a city below sea 
level surrounded by water. To what extent will the levees be 
strengthened? What areas within the city will be rebuilt? Will some 
areas be dredged out and become wetlands, and others built up so 
that they are at a higher elevation? What sorts of subsidies might 
be available for housing? A lot of people did not have flood 
insurance. They will be hit much harder economically than in most 
other storms where a lot of the damage is done by wind’” (Moran, 
2005).  
 
Moran (2005) concluded, “[T]he climate set by government at all levels in the next few months 
will be a major factor that influences how many of the displaced will return.” In a January NYT 
article, Dao (2006) used a study by Brown University sociology professor John R. Logan to 
suggest up to eighty percent of African American residents “might not return for several 
reasons: their neighborhoods would not be rebuilt, they would be unable to afford the relocation 
costs, or they would put down roots in other cities.” Dao (2006) wrote that Logan stated, “The 
continuing question about the hurricane is this: Whose city will be rebuilt?” Both samples used 
experts to support the view that government decisions would affect return rates by determining 
recovery priorities and policies. The NYT sample emphasized that African Americans were the 
most vulnerable because their neighborhoods received the most damage. 
In a NYT one-year anniversary article, Nossiter (2006) suggested elected officials, rather 
than professional planners, leading recovery planning, hurt the city’s recovery.  
“A big test will come soon when the Council considers overhauling 
the day-to-day planning process, taking most decisions out of 
political hands -- their own -- and putting them under the purview 
of professional planners. That change was accomplished a century 
ago in most other places. But the old system has held on in New 
Orleans, with serious implications for orderly reconstruction of the 
ruined neighborhoods and equitable preservation of those that are 




Nossiter (2006) also quoted New Orleans City Council Member Stacy Head to illustrate the 
stress and pressure recovery planning placed on elected officials. “‘I don’t want this power,’ Ms. 
Head said. ‘This is horrible. I don’t like that responsibility. I think it should lie with the 
planners’” (Nossiter, 2006). In a NYT four year anniversary article, the author portrayed New 
Orleans public officials as a barrier to effective recovery planning. Robertson (2009a) wrote, 
“The city’s political leadership remains torn by factionalism, and few people look to it for 
visionary or inspirational ideas.” Robertson (2009a) presented an example of how political 
factionalism impeded recovery by blocking economic development projects.  
“Plans for a public-private partnership for economic development 
were suspended this month by Mayor C. Ray Nagin, who cited a 
lack of diversity in the venture’s proposed membership, among 
other reasons. His opponents, including Arnold Fielkow, the 
president of the City Council, said the move was retaliation for the 
Council’s rejection of the mayor’s plan to move City Hall to the 
vacant Chevron building downtown” (Robertson, 2009a).  
 
The NYT sample portrayed depending on city leadership as an error. Nossiter (2006) framed the 
city council as less qualified than professional planners to lead recovery planning. In Robertson’s 
(2009a) depiction, city leaders made community development decisions based on personal 
interests rather than the city’s needs. 
Two TP sampled articles and one NYT sampled article used re-election concerns to 
illustrate how city politics influenced recovery planning decisions. In April in the TP, Walsh 
(2006) quoted HUD Secretary Alphonso Jackson, who explained some federal planning 
decisions would not be made until after the mayoral runoff election on May 20, 2006.  
“…Jackson said that complexes that suffered severe damage will 
likely be torn down and redeveloped. Although, he said, it will be 
up to the mayor -- either incumbent Ray Nagin or Lt. Gov. Mitch 
Landrieu, depending on who wins the May 20 runoff -- to make the 
key decisions on rebuilding. ‘We will rebuild, if that’s what the 
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mayor wants,’ Jackson said. ‘Do we rebuild the same way? 
Probably not’” (Walsh, 2006).  
 
In early August, Russell (2006) used expert opinions to argue that even after the election city 
government continued to avoid making decisions, which led to a slower rate of return between 
April and June 2006 than the first three months of the year. Russell (2006) reported in the TP 
that Professor Logan from Brown University:  
“…blamed the [slow rate of return] in part on a lack of leadership 
and confusion about the city’s future among the displaced. ‘This is 
a time when public officials have to make the hard decisions about 
where and how to invest, and enough time has passed since the 
local elections that one could expect more decisive action by now,’ 
[Logan] said.” 
 
Walsh (2006) and Russell (2006) presented examples of the federal and local government 
waiting to make recovery decisions. Although Walsh (2006) framed the delay as respecting local 
elections, Russell (2006) suggested officials continued to stall essential recovery decisions after 
the elections. 
 In the days leading up to the ten year anniversary, the NYT published an article that 
showed how re-election politics nullified the first planning process. Rivlin (2015) interviewed 
Alden J. McDonald Jr., president and chief executive officer of Liberty Bank and Trust 
Company and chairman of the New Orleans Chamber of Commerce, who served on Mayor 
Nagin’s Bring New Orleans Back Commission (BNOB).  
“McDonald was also frustrated by the response to a 17-member 
panel he sat on created by Mayor Ray Nagin shortly after Katrina 
to develop a plan for rebuilding the city. …[A]nother member of 
the panel recommended that the city temporarily ban rebuilding in 
its lowest-lying parts while officials made up their minds about 
whether to reinvest in neighborhoods that were in harm’s way. 
This idea infuriated those eager to start work on their homes. 
Nagin, with an election only a few months off, did not want to step 
into this controversy and simply thanked his commission for its 
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hard work and then ignored its suggestions, as if every proposal 
were tainted by the proposed temporary ban.” (Rivlin, 2015).  
 
Rivlin (2015) used McDonald's experiences to frame Nagin’s dismissal of all BNOB ideas as a 
decision to further his personal political career. The article reported the recovery planning 
process started over after Nagin rejected all BNOB proposals.  
 The sampled NYT authors suggested starting over lengthened the overall recovery 
planning period, which impacted the decisions of state officials and residents. 
“The latest notion, after earlier false or incomplete starts, is to 
turn planning over to the citizens, allowing neighborhoods to 
choose from a list of planners, with the hope that at the end it can 
all be folded into one giant framework. It was pushed by state 
officials holding the redevelopment purse strings who grew 
impatient this summer with the city’s abortive planning efforts” 
(Nossiter, 2006). 
 
As Nossiter (2006) indicated, the Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP) planning process began 
almost one year after the disaster. This is significant because one NYT article in the sample 
suggested, “the six-month point [was] a moment when many must decide whether to establish a 
life in a new place or return home” (Dewan, Connelly, & Lehren, 2006). Nossiter (2006) 
suggested repetitive planning processes that failed to produce action discouraged residents.  
“Like others, Ms. Hazlett professes bewilderment at a planning 
process, now stretching out for nearly a year, that involves an 
ever-shifting cast of characters, embraces and then swiftly rejects 
differing visions, and calls for repeated consultations with the 
citizens – and still produces no plan” (Nossiter, 2006).  
 
Nossiter (2006) described displaced residents as uncertain about recovery as a result of the 
planning process.  
 The sampled articles showed city politics influenced recovery in several ways. Both 
samples used expert opinions to argue government decisions would shape recovery and 
determine return rates. Authors presented examples of federal officials delaying recovery 
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planning decisions until after local elections. The samples portrayed local politicians as 
susceptible to political pressures. In their view, city leaders placed their personal aspirations 
before the city's needs and avoided making recovery decisions that could hurt their careers. 
Citing Nagin's rejection of all BNOB proposals, Rivlin (2015) suggested re-election pressures 
caused the recovery planning process to start over and delayed the adoption of a recovery plan. 
The slow pace of recovery planning discouraged residents and became a barrier to recovery. 
Too slow to produce a recovery plan. The articles discussed above suggested local 
leaders hurt recovery planning efforts by prioritizing their careers when faced with controversial 
proposals. They argued initiating multiple planning processes extended the planning period and 
slowed down recovery. Six sampled NYT articles and two sampled TP articles described 
recovery planning as slow and indicated barriers residents, developers, and financial institutions 
faced as a result.  
According to both samples, without a recovery plan to restore public institutions, 
returning to post-Katrina New Orleans became challenging for residents. A TP sampled article 
stated, “Orleans Parish public schools, where more than 90 percent of students before Katrina 
were Black, have no plans to reopen any east bank campuses before the summer of 2006, leaving 
parents to look elsewhere for places to educate their children” (Moran, 2005). Another sampled 
TP article stated, “Eight months after Hurricane Katrina, the future of the 10 public housing 
complexes in New Orleans remains an open question” (Walsh, 2006). These articles emphasized 
how long the city waited to make plans to rebuild public institutions that served primarily Black 
or low-income residents.  
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The NYT sample claimed the slow planning process created uncertainty, which operated 
as a barrier to return. Nossiter, Rivlin, Schwartz, Lipton, and Steinhauer (2005) showed how 
uncertainty made residents and businesses hesitant to rebuild: 
“Every major decision seems to rely on another decision that has 
to be made first, and no one has stepped in to announce what the 
city will do and break the cycle of uncertainty. Many residents and 
business owners will not return and invest without an assurance of 
flood protection, for example.”  
 
They also documented the impact of the slow planning process on resident decisions, “While the 
politics become untangled, the futures of thousands of people hang in a terrible balance. ‘We 
need to know what the city is going to do,’ said Oliver Thomas, the president of the New Orleans 
City Council, ‘so we can start planning our lives’” (Nossiter et al., 2005). Nossiter et al. (2005) 
suggested resident plans depended on city plans, and recovery stalled because residents and 
business owners waited for the city's plan before deciding to return. Four months later, Dewan et 
al. (2006) interviewed displaced residents about their lives seven months after Hurricane Katrina. 
They reported, “Many [displaced residents] expressed frustration about what they perceived as a 
lack of clear instructions about where or whether they could rebuild. ‘We’re kind of left in 
limbo,’ Mr. Rodrigue said. ‘So we can’t move forward and we can’t move back’” (Dewan et al., 
2006). Dewan et al. (2006) found without a city recovery plan in place, residents expressed the 
inability to form their own, which agreed with Nossiter et al.’s (2005) view.  
 Five months later, Saulny and Rivlin (2006) echoed concern over the lack of recovery 
plans.  
“With no concrete plan in place to help landlords, a large part of 
the rental stock has been festering for a year now, preventing 
residents from returning and depleting the work force. … A lack of 
information even 12 months after the hurricane has caused 
confusion and frustration. ‘There is no real identifiable plan that 
anyone can point to that would enable people to say, ‘I can rely on 
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this,’’ said Jerome Anderson, an assistant dean at Tulane Law 
School who owns five units around the city. The storm destroyed 
Mr. Anderson’s home and all his rental properties, putting 
tremendous financial pressure on his resources to rebuild. His 
situation is typical among local landlords” (Saulny & Rivlin, 
2006).  
 
Saulny and Rivlin (2006) connected the lack of a plan to its impact on recovery and the economy 
as workers without a place to stay had no choice but to remain displaced. They showed the 
failure of the city to produce a recovery plan frustrated residents and delayed housing repairs, 
which further hurt the economy by restricting the workforce.   
The NYT sample also suggested recovery planning delayed private market actors from 
investing in the city. Nossiter (2006)  reported the lack of a recovery plan continued to stall 
private investment a year after the disaster.  
“The outside world is scared by New Orleans. Banks, for instance, 
are insisting on unusually high collateral in real estate deals, and 
for good reason, given... no guarantee that neighborhoods will 
return to life. …With little direction from the top, long-term 
planning for the city’s future remains incoherent. A year after the 
storm, there are no plans for large-scale infrastructure and 
redevelopment in the city. …The absence of a plan has forced 
developers, who might otherwise be building housing for the 
displaced, to the sidelines. ‘The developers, they want to know 
what the plan is,’ said Andy Kopplin, executive director of the 
Louisiana Recovery Authority” (Nossiter, 2006). 
 
Nossiter (2006) quoted Kopplin to show that financial institutions and developers viewed 
investing in New Orleans real estate as risky because the city did not have a recovery plan in 
place. The article stated the risk from the uncertainty increased the cost of lending, and therefore 
the cost of rebuilding, by requiring more collateral. Nossiter (2006) concluded, “The longer the 
city is without a master plan, the shakier the fate of the ruined neighborhoods, some planners 
say.” Three years later, Robertson (2009a) suggested the hesitancy of the private market to invest 
in New Orleans remained although for a different reason.  
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“But perhaps the largest barrier to major private investment is the 
uncertainty that hangs over every facet of life in the city: the future 
of the New Orleans economy depends on what happens when the 
waters rise again. The Army Corps of Engineers has a Hurricane 
and Storm Risk Reduction System scheduled to be ready in 2011” 
(Robertson, 2009a).  
 
Together Nossiter (2006) and Robertson (2009a) showed the uncertainty caused by the slow pace 
of recovery planning remained over time and prevented the private market from taking an active 
role in rebuilding New Orleans immediately after the storm. Nossiter (2006) also indicated that 
projects took a long time to complete after officials announced plans.  
 The sampled articles claimed the pace of recovery planning became a barrier to return. 
The TP sampled articles highlighted the length of time it took for officials to create plans to 
rebuild public schools and public housing. The NYT sampled articles portrayed resident plans as 
dependent on city plans. The authors described investment in post-Katrina as risky due to the 
uncertainty that existed without a recovery plan. The view suggested residents, businesses, and 
banks hesitated to rebuild and stalled the city's recovery because the planning process took too 
long to create a recovery plan.  
 The TP and NYT samples described several flaws in the planning processes enacted after 
Hurricane Katrina. The samples found state and federal officials limited residents from 
meaningful participation in recovery decisions and local officials shied away from controversy 
while prioritizing personal career aspirations over recovery needs. The samples also claimed the 
slow pace of planning stalled recovery because the lack of a plan increased the perceived risk of 
investment. The sampled authors indicated uncertainty hurt recovery in two ways: banks inflated 
the cost of lending on New Orleans real estate and residents and businesses waited to return and 
rebuild until the city announced a plan. The samples also portrayed recovery planning as a 
barrier to recovery by the goals officials and planners set.  
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Recovery Goals: An Opportunity for Return Change 
 The sampled articles showed that recovery became an opportunity to improve social 
conditions in New Orleans. Over time, some authors noted experimenting with solutions for 
urban poverty overshadowed creating plans with the goal of helping displaced residents return. 
Eleven articles in the TP sample and nine articles in the NYT sample discussed the goals that 
guided post-Katrina recovery planning. Three codes emerged from the quotes about recovery 
goals: improving pre-Katrina quality of life, creating models to address urban poverty nationally, 
and no plan for return. The NYT sample limited quality of life concerns to public housing, 
healthcare, levee protection, public education, and economic opportunity. In the TP sample, 
improving quality of life also required repairing basic infrastructure (i.e.: streetlights, potholes), 
removing environmental contamination, and lowering crime. It included repairing social support 
systems as well, which highlighted the importance of community at the local level.  
 Two TP articles and four NYT articles in the sample described the goal of recovery as 
improving New Orleans quality of life. In the NYT, Robertson (2009a) wrote, “…[R]everting to 
the city that existed here before the flood is not the goal. …[T]here was much about pre-Katrina 
New Orleans, from the unstable floodwalls to the stagnant economy, that was best left behind.” 
Robertson (2009a) used pre-storm conditions to justify post-storm changes. Maggi (2005) 
reported that the Louisiana governor viewed social reform as necessary to attract residents to 
return: “‘Families won’t come back without good public schools,’ [Governor] Blanco said… 
‘The state will redesign the schools as an overdue gift to our children.’” In the samples’ 
perspective, officials viewed public housing and schools as deterrents to return and assumed 
residents had to be lured back.   
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 Two articles in the TP emphasized the opportunity for public housing reform created by 
displacement. Before HUD announced its redevelopment plans, Walsh (2006) reported on 
comments from a lawyer with New Orleans Legal Assistance. “‘I think they are getting ready to 
demolish public housing,’ said Laura Tuggle... ‘One of the hardest parts of redevelopment is 
having to relocate residents of public housing. That job was done for them.’” With residents 
already displaced, the federal goal to redevelop public housing into mixed income communities 
became easier. Warner et al. (2007) stated, “[The demolition] plan was in place long before the 
killer storm… HUD officials saw in Katrina’s wreckage and population displacement an 
opportunity to accelerate plans to revamp complexes...” These authors portrayed federal officials 
as capitalizing on displacement and recovery to implement long-term redevelopment plans.  
 Three articles in the sample framed recovery as an opportunity to develop models to 
address national issues. In a NYT article, Ouroussoff (2011) wrote, “...the [Iberville 
redevelopment] project is a comprehensive effort to link housing to jobs and transportation. In 
doing so, it could begin to undo a pattern of racial discrimination that extends back decades.” 
Ouroussoff (2011) suggested recovery plans could test “a promising new model for housing the 
poor in cities across the country.” This viewpoint stated that recovery could be a chance to 
experiment with strategies to correct systemic discrimination established during Jim Crow, but it 
does not prioritize a quick return for displaced residents. In a TP op-ed, federal Department of 
Health and Human Services secretary Sebelius and New Orleans Mayor Landrieu (2010) wrote, 
“We believe [the new healthcare delivery] system will serve two goals: Providing better health 
care for the people of the region and serving as a model for the entire country as we reform our 
health care systems.” Similarly in the NYT, Robertson (2009a) reported, “[Young nonprofit 
workers] envision the city as a national example for innovative schools, smart urban planning 
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and a housing stock built to the highest environmental standards.” These articles showed that 
government officials and relief workers viewed testing new models of public service provision, 
rather than enabling return, as a primary goal of recovery.  
 A tenth anniversary NYT article suggested the focus on improving the city overshadowed 
helping displaced residents return. Alden McDonald, Jr., president of Liberty Bank, commented, 
“‘There was never a plan to bring people home. …There was never a plan of any kind’” (Rivlin, 
2015). To Rivlin (2015), improving the city became a barrier to return because federal, state, and 
local officials focused more on attracting people to New Orleans than on helping former 
residents return. The sampled articles suggested prioritizing return would have changed the 
shape of recovery programs. For example, Rivlin (2015) noted a focus on facilitating return 
would have reoriented recovery plans from compensating homeowners according to pre-storm 
value to awarding homeowners the cost to replace their homes.  
 In contrast, a TP article challenged the idea that federal officials did not create plans to 
help residents return. 
“The survey ...exposed a weakness in HUD’s relocation efforts. ... 
[O]f those outside New Orleans who want to return ...the vast 
majority ...said their return would be delayed by a lack of 
transportation or by moving expenses. C. Donald Babers, the lone 
member of the HUD receivership board that runs HANO, said it 
was disheartening to see the persistence of such perceived barriers 
when HUD has a contract with U-Haul to pay for travel and 
moving expenses of returning families. He said HUD needs to do a 
better job of advertising and explaining the program.” (Hammer, 
2008a).  
 
Hammer (2008a) suggested plans to help residents return existed. Although this article emerged 
as an outlier in this research, it indicated the importance of creating outreach plans to inform the 
public of disaster assistance programs.  
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 Authors in the sample portrayed those planning recovery set improving the city's social 
institutions and quality of life as the primary goal of recovery to attract former residents and 
newcomers. They suggested recovery became a time to implement long-term reform plans and to 
test new education, housing, and healthcare delivery models. In the NYT, Rivlin (2015) claimed 
improving New Orleans for newcomers took precedence over helping residents return and 
rebuild their communities. Hammer (2008a) reported federal agencies created programs but 
failed to inform eligible residents, so many residents continued to think they could not return 
when help existed. Similar to the authors that found officials' goals set recovery planning astray, 
other sampled authors identified factors to justify the flaws in the planning process.  
Barriers to Recovery Planning: Justifying a Flawed Planning Process  
  To explain the flaws in the planning process, twelve TP and fifteen NYT articles 
highlighted barriers that compounded the difficulty of recovery planning after Hurricane Katrina. 
Five factors emerged, including: uncertainty around how many residents would return, opposing 
resident desires over rebuilding, displacement limited resident participation in planning 
processes, recovery plans depended on federal decisions and funding, and that no action resulted 
after officials announced plans.  
 The uncertainty about future demographics presented the first barrier to recovery 
planning in the view of the sampled articles. Three articles in each sample questioned how many 
residents would return. The TP authors assumed New Orleans would lose population as a result 
of the disaster. However, they reported uncertainty around just how much the city would shrink.  
“Two weeks ago, USA Today conducted a telephone survey 
showing that 40 percent of evacuees from New Orleans did not 
intend to return to the city. …William Frey, a Brookings Institution 
demographer who has followed New Orleans population trends, 
thinks that figure is exaggerated. Because the city was home to 
such a strong culture, with its own culinary and musical traditions 
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and families that have lived here for generations, he said, all but 
20 percent will come back” (Moran, 2005).  
 
“Joachim Singelmann, director of the Louisiana Population Data 
Center at Louisiana State University …concurred with [Mayor] 
Nagin’s estimate that New Orleans would lose about 200,000 
residents for the next few years, though he said numbers ultimately 
hinge on the speed of the rebuilding and whether affordable 
housing becomes available” (Moran, 2005).  
 
Moran (2005) illustrated the debate that existed among demography experts, who expected the 
population of New Orleans to drop twenty to forty-five percent. Moran (2005) showed experts 
arrived at different conclusions based on their assumptions; Frey assumed cultural ties would 
draw people to return whereas Singelmann focused on recovery policy as the determining factor. 
A NYT article echoed Frey’s assumption that most residents wanted to return based on 
“interviews with more than 300 evacuees conducted by The NYT” (Dewan et al., 2006). 
“…[M]ost of those interviewed favor returning to the city, expressing… a fierce yearning for 
home, as if staying away from New Orleans were like trying to breathe air through gills” 
(Dewan et al., 2006). The NYT sample portrayed less uncertainty than the TP sample and 
suggested most residents had a strong desire to return and rebuild. 
The samples reported that although residents wanted to return and experts expected the 
city to recover the majority of its pre-storm population demographers did not anticipate “the rate 
of return [would] be distributed equally across the demographic spectrum” (Moran, 2005). A 
NYT article stated: 
“...unless New Orleans built housing in flood protected areas for 
low-income residents, and also provided support for poor people 
to relocate, chances were good that many low-income Blacks 
would not return. ‘If they didn’t have enough resources to get out 
before the storm,’ Mr. Stonecipher said, ‘how can we expect them 




Sampled authors quoted Frey and other experts to support predictions that vulnerable 
populations, such as low-income, minority, and/or elderly residents, as well as those in the 
hardest hit areas would have a more difficult time returning. 
Moran (2005) stated Frey anticipated eighty percent of the residents would return, but by 
the one year anniversary another sampled TP article reported a change in his opinion. “As of 
June 30, the data indicated that only thirty-seven percent of the city’s pre-storm residents were 
back in town… [Frey] said getting that number up to sixty percent over the long haul would be 
impressive” (Russell, 2006). The samples suggested that uncertainty around population change 
lingered over time, so that successive planning phases continued to base decisions on poor data. 
The sampled TP authors also portrayed experts as less optimistic about return rates over time.    
In the TP, Warner (2005) depicted the uncertainty around future population size and 
demographics presented a barrier to planning:  
“…[A]t the Louisiana Recovery and Rebuilding Conference… it 
was clear that no one knows how many people will return, what 
neighborhoods they will return to and what collective job 
prospects they may have. … Experts and policymakers are restless 
for answers about how the area’s population may change. For now 
there are mostly questions: Will Orleans and St. Bernard parishes 
regain sizable populations? Will New Orleans have an electorate 
with a strong black majority? Will the area’s modest Hispanic 
count explode with the influx of new workers? Will higher-income 
jobs emerge from Katrina’s wreckage? … Tulane University 
architecture professor Grover Mouton, another meeting 
participant, said such forecasts are critical to myriad long-range 
planning efforts.” 
 
In this view, planning the future of New Orleans depended on who would return and to which 
neighborhoods. Warner (2005) indicated no one knew. Sampled authors suggested planning for a 
smaller city impacted the types of plans experts suggested. The articles in the sample showed 
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residents mobilized to defend their right to return to their neighborhoods after plans to shrink the 
city emerged.  
 The samples reported that in addition to uncertainty, recovery planning had to contend 
with opposing residents demands. Five NYT articles and three TP articles depicted antagonistic 
resident desires as impeding planning. The TP sample showed residents expressed conflicting 
views on public housing redevelopment.  
“[City Council member, Stacy] Head said most of the e-mail she 
has received from constituents on the issue favors demolition, and 
she said that appeals against the HUD plans tend to come from 
people living far away” (Warner et al., 2007).  
 
Warner et al. (2007) indicated a division existed between returned and displaced residents. 
Robertson (2010) wrote in the NYT: 
“From the first year, the city has had to navigate a natural tension 
between the rights of the returned and the rights of the displaced. 
Those who have come back to streets of decaying houses and 
overgrown lawns want to see their neighborhoods thrive again. 
Those who have not come back -- and plan to -- often say they need 
more time and resources to repair their homes.” 
 
Warner et al. (2007) and Robertson (2010) depicted a conflict between returned residents' wants 
and the needs of displaced residents. The sample portrayed tension between returned and 
displaced residents as a barrier to planning by suggesting the groups wanted city officials to 
enact opposing plans.  
Four NYT sampled articles showed how returned homeowners influenced neighborhood 
planning processes. 
“In some areas, in fact, homeowners are trying to use the recovery 
process to rid their neighborhoods of long-standing apartment 
buildings that were damaged during the storm. Building parks in 
the place of apartments that neighbors said lowered property 
values is ‘killing two birds with one stone,’ said Joseph St. Martin, 
an architect hired by homeowner groups in New Orleans East to 
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work on the community development plan the city has asked every 
neighborhood to devise” (Saulny & Rivlin, 2006).  
 
Saulny and Rivlin (2006) reported homeowners used the UNOP planning process to improve 
their property values. Three years later, Robertson (2009b) portrayed the Black middle class as 
blocking housing opportunities for low-income homeownership in their neighborhood.  
“A development of 35 single-family, lease-to-own homes in the 
Black middle-class neighborhood of New Orleans East was 
blocked by the New Orleans City Council in August. The 
arguments against it -- that it would damage property values and 
quality of life -- were similar to those heard in St. Bernard” 
(Robertson, 2009b).  
 
Robertson (2009b) described the City Council voting in favor of homeowners who wanted to 
block affordable housing in their neighborhood. This example suggests the City Council 
prioritized returned homeowner demands over plans to create affordable housing. In contrast, 
only one sampled TP article framed residents as a issue for creating affordable housing. LaRose 
(2016) wrote,  “The challenge... now is overcoming the NIMBY obstacle - neighbors who support 
the concept of housing equity, but ‘not in my backyard.’”  
Four TP sampled articles argued displacement limited citizen participation in recovery 
planning processes. In October, Moran (2005) wrote, “Also complicating recovery is the breadth 
of the Katrina diaspora.” Weber and Peek (2012) documented residents ended up in every state 
in the country. Six months after the levees failed, Warner (2006) framed the racial pattern in 
displacement trends as a result of the hurricane when he wrote, “Black people displaced by the 
killer storm were more likely than white residents to have found a temporary refuge at great 
distance from New Orleans.” Two years later, Alpert (2008) indicated the storm affected classes 
differently as well.  
“…[E]mphasis on the importance of strong local leadership [in 
neighborhood recovery outcomes] tends to miss one compelling 
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picture of New Orleans neighborhoods: that a higher percentage 
of the city’s poorest residents tended to be displaced to far-flung 
communities, making it harder for them to keep in touch with local 
officials as recovery plans for their old neighborhoods were 
developed” (Alpert, 2008).  
 
These authors sought to frame racial and class disparities in citizen participation as a 
consequence of the storm to alleviate blame from local planning officials.  
 Both samples characterized the federal government as a barrier to planning. Two TP and 
eight NYT sampled articles blamed the federal government for recovery planning issues. In 
February, Filosa (2006a) wrote:  
“The New Orleans region cannot restore essential services -- from 
hospitals to utilities -- on its own and needs direct help from the 
federal government, according to [the Brookings Institution] a 
Washington, D. C., think tank that is monitoring the slow pace of 
recovery since Hurricane Katrina. … ‘We are just stunned by two 
things: the will of the people and their spirit, and by the lack of 
federal commitment still needed to address the basics,’…said Matt 
Fellowes, a senior research associate at Brookings.” 
 
Filosa (2006a) used the study results to indicate the importance of federal funding to fix 
damaged infrastructure and the federal reluctance to provide the necessary funding. The NYT 
sample also reported that the federal government failed to meet the city’s financial needs in 
several areas, including environmental protection.  
“Amid the city’s divisions, there is one area of consensus: its 
levees and floodwalls must once again be able to protect New 
Orleans from swirling gulf waters before the city can fully recover. 
To date, however, the Army Corps of Engineers has performed 
only the most rudimentary of repairs, plugging holes and driving 
steel pilings to create a quick-and-dirty version of protection 
against Category 3 hurricanes. That will not be enough to restore 
confidence in the city’s future among traumatized residents. 
Virtually all city and state officials agree that flood protection 
must be increased to withstand a Category 5 storm” (Nossiter et 




 “One ambitious coastal restoration plan called Coast 2050 won 
support from local officials and scientists, but at $14 billion over 
several decades it has not received federal financing. …In the end, 
it will be Congress who decides, by its financing of the Army 
Corps, how high a surge New Orleans will be protected against” 
(Schwartz, Revkin, & Wald, 2005).  
 
These authors suggested city and state officials did not control recovery decisions that required 
federal funding. Nossiter (2008a) suggested the federal government impacted recovery in more 
ways than its commitment, or lack thereof, to fund plans.  
“The city official in charge of the recovery effort, Edward J. 
Blakely, said the public’s frustration was understandable, but he 
suggested that bureaucratic hurdles had made moving faster 
impossible. Mr. Blakely said crucial federal money had only 
recently become available, the process of designing reconstruction 
projects within the 17 zones was time-consuming, and ethics 
constraints on free spending were acute, given a local history of 
corruption” (Nossiter, 2008a).  
 
Nossiter (2008a) used Blakey to frame the slow disbursal of federal recovery funds and 
bureaucratic oversight to prevent corruption as a barrier to implementing recovery plans quick 
enough to satisfy residents.  
 The lack of progress frustrated residents and became another barrier to recovery planning 
as described in both samples. Three TP and two NYT articles in the sample reported that no 
action followed to implement plans after official announcements.  Nossiter (2008a) presented an 
example in the NYT:  
“In March 2007, city officials finally unveiled their plan to 
redevelop New Orleans. . . It was billed as the plan to end all 
plans, with Paris-like streetscape renderings and promises of 
parks, playgrounds and ‘cranes on the skyline’ within months. But 
a year after a celebratory City Hall kickoff, there have been no 
cranes and no Parisian boulevards. …There has been nothing to 
signal a transformation in the sea of blight and abandonment that 
still defines much of the city. Weary and bewildered residents, 
forced to bring back the hard-hit city on their own, have searched 
the plan’s 17 ‘target recovery zones’ for any sign that the city’s 
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promises should not be consigned to the municipal filing cabinet, 
along with their predecessors. On their one-year anniversary, the 
designated ‘zones’ have hardly budged. ‘…I haven’t seen anything 
they’ve done to even initiate anything,’ said Ms. [Cynthia] Nolan, 
a manager in a state motor vehicles office who has painstakingly 
raised her house here nearly four feet. ‘It’s too long. A year later, 
and they still haven’t initiated anything they decided to do?’” 
(Nossiter, 2008a).  
 
Nossiter (2008a) also used the voice of residents and City Council member Stacy Head to show 
the frustration residents and city officials experienced at the lack of action. Nossiter (2008a) 
quoted Mid-City resident, Sheila White, to describe how official announcements “give people 
hope” only to end up broken promises that “fall into the background.”  
The TP sampled articles suggested funding had little to do with the lack of progress from 
recovery plans.  
“Prior to Katrina, almost three-quarters of New Orleans renters 
lived in buildings with four units or fewer. As of mid-June, 4,557 
owners of such small buildings applied for money through the 
state’s small-rental program. But 85 percent had not begun 
construction as of June, PolicyLink found” (Reckdahl, 2008b).  
 
“[T]housands of affordable apartments approved for financing 
through federal housing programs have yet to materialize, 
according to a new Bureau of Governmental Research report” 
(Reckdahl, 2009a).  
 
Reckdahl (2008b; 2009a) used policy think-tank reports to shift blame from federal funding to 
those responsible for rebuilding housing: landlords and developers. Reckdahl (2008b; 2009a) 
suggested the availability of recovery funds did not spur local development because federal 
programs required projects to have multiple funding sources.  
 The sampled articles justified recovery-planning issues by indicating the barriers that 
confronted the people creating the plans. Both samples claimed uncertain future population 
forecasts and opposing resident desires complicated the planning process. Authors in each 
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sample also framed the federal government as a barrier to recovery planning because many local 
and state plans relied on federal funds. These authors portrayed recovery as dependent on federal 
dollars and described official reluctance to commit federal funding for infrastructure repairs. 
Four TP sampled authors framed racial and class trends in displacement as natural impacts of 
Hurricane Katrina. In their view, displacement limited the ability of residents to participate in 
public meetings, which caused the same racial and class trends to manifest in citizen 
participation or in who could participate in recovery planning.  
Summary 
 Planning emerged as a barrier to recovery in the sampled articles. The inductive codes 
combined to form three themes. In the first category, authors indicated four flaws in the planning 
process: limited citizen participation in planning decisions, personal interests influenced 
recovery decisions, leaders created multiple planning processes, and planning took too long to 
create a plan. In the second category, authors showed government officials assumed residents 
would not return without social reforms. These articles portrayed recovery as an opportunity to 
improve quality of life and to test models designed to fix urban problems. However, Rivlin 
(2015) indicated the emphasis on fixing New Orleans overshadowed helping residents return. 
The third category contained justifications for the poor planning process, such as: poor data on 
return estimates, conflicting desires among residents, displacement restricted citizen 
participation, recovery plans depended on federal funding, and plans did not create action. These 
authors sought to explain planning failures and shift blame from local leaders. 
 The sampled articles claimed issues in the recovery planning process led to poor 
decisions and manifested issues in recovery programs. The samples suggested recovery policies 
contained design and implementation issues that perpetuated systemic discrimination. The next 
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chapter explores policy issues to show how the samples framed recovery policy as compounding 




Recovery Policy Compounds Vulnerability 
 In the samples' view, planning officials used recovery to implement changes to improve 
individual and neighborhood outcomes. The sampled articles evaluated the success of these 
measures. Both positive and negative outcomes emerged as inductive codes from the recovery 
outcome deductive gross code in each sample. A positive narrative emerged that portrayed 
recovery as a successful experiment; however both samples focused more attention on negative 
outcomes as seen in Figure 1 below. Through emphasizing negative outcomes and factors that 
restricted return, the samples portrayed post-Katrina recovery policies as decreasing resident 
abilities to respond to normal emergencies and future disasters.  










Pull to Stay 
Displaced Determinants  
 
# # % # % # % # % # 
Times Picayune 
Sample 
242 63 26.0 170 70.2 4 1.7 5 2.1 56 
NYT 
Sample 
264 76 28.8 181 68.6 5 1.9 2 0.8 98 
 
 In addition to being a deductive gross code, recovery policy emerged as an inductive 
code inside the continued vulnerability deductive code. Twenty-three TP and twenty-seven NYT 
sampled articles framed recovery policy as compounding vulnerability through decreasing daily 
stability and increasing susceptibility to future emergencies. The sampled articles portrayed 
recovery policy as increasing vulnerability by creating gaps in assistance that perpetuated racial 
discrimination and poverty and by failing to improve pre-storm conditions. Affordable housing, 
environmental concerns, healthcare, and displacement emerged as inductive codes that 
represented factors the samples identified as compounding vulnerability.  
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 The continued vulnerability gross code also contained quotes that described the 
populations recovery policy made more vulnerable. Seventeen TP articles and fourteen NYT 
articles viewed recovery policy as increasing the vulnerability of vulnerable populations after 
Hurricane Katrina. Both samples framed recovery policy as compounding vulnerability through 
its design and implementation. The sampled articles claimed policy issues manifested gaps in 
assistance that compounded the vulnerability of vulnerable populations (i.e.: African Americans, 
poor, elderly, etc.) as well as middle and upper class residents, who lost access to basic services, 
such as healthcare. The sampled authors also provided examples of policies that impacted races 
and classes differently and described how the struggle to return affected mental health.  
Vulnerable Ever After: The Sampled Media's Portrayal of Vulnerability  
 According to the sampled articles, recovery policies enacted after Hurricane Katrina 
exacerbated the vulnerability of certain populations. Both samples portrayed African-Americans, 
disadvantaged children, renters, working-class residents, minimum-wage families, public 
housing residents, the displaced, the poor, the elderly, the homeless, the mentally ill, the 
disabled, and/or those with medical needs as vulnerable populations. The sampled authors 
provided examples that showed these households encountered limited access to housing, schools, 
and healthcare after the disaster because recovery policy created gaps in recovery. The samples 
claimed these gaps restricted the ability of vulnerable households to return.  
 Two articles in each sample suggested populations not traditionally viewed as vulnerable 
became vulnerable after the storm. They suggested different reasons for the increase in 
vulnerability. Based on a Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation report, Moran (2007) wrote in the 
TP: 
“While barriers to health care tend to be higher among poor, 
uninsured and minority populations, the report argues that health 
121 
 
has declined among people of all income levels who are 
experiencing high stress levels and have in some cases lost their 
doctors and medical records. … Diane Rowland [said,] ‘While the 
poor and uninsured had some of the most devastation in terms of 
their access to care, there was a leveling effect across the city.’” 
 
Moran (2007) quoted Rowland, executive director of the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and 
the Uninsured, to show the lack of hospital facilities increased the vulnerability of middle and 
upper class residents  because the city offered limited healthcare options at a time of increased 
need. In a sampled NYT article, Zernike (2016) framed public education employment decisions 
as making some middle class residents more vulnerable: “About 7,500 teachers were fired -- 
most of them Black -- damaging the city’s Black middle class, economically and politically.” In 
contrast to Moran (2007), who depicted increased vulnerability as a consequence of the disaster, 
Zernike (2016) attributed the increase to a policy decision that gave a large section of the Black 
middle class incentive to accept jobs elsewhere and to stay displaced long-term.   
The articles in the TP and the NYT samples indicated several recovery policies that 
decreased the stability of vulnerable households and made it harder for their families to respond 
to and recover from Hurricane Katrina and the levee failure. The rest of this chapter explores 
examples from the media samples that showed how design and implementation problems in 
housing, education, and healthcare policy affected the ability of residents to return. The samples 
argued housing policies prioritized homeowners, gave disproportional assistance to white 
communities, isolated renters, and increased living expenses for public housing residents. The 
sampled authors depicted education reform as perpetuating racial inequality by allowing the 
highest performing charter schools to use selective enrollment policies that privilege middle class 
families and white neighborhoods. The sampled articles used healthcare recovery to suggest the 
slow pace of recovery left residents more vulnerable for years after the disaster. Together, the 
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samples showed residents faced multiple challenges to rebuilding their lives in New Orleans, 
which made them more susceptible to instability and mental health issues.   
Housing: A Diverse Set of Issues for a Diverse Set of Residents  
Seven NYT and ten TP sampled articles presented federal recovery housing policy as 
plagued with design and implementation problems. The sampled authors reported homeowner, 
rental, and public housing programs incorporated design flaws that made poor and African 
American residents more vulnerable. The reported design issues forced African American 
homeowners to rely on personal savings to cover large gaps between grants and rebuilding costs, 
isolated renters in temporary trailer parks with limited public transit, and increased public 
housing residents’ cost of living. The samples also indicated implementation issues existed 
within the homeowner and public housing programs. These issues included caseworkers that lost 
verification paperwork, public housing authorities that denied voucher transfer requests to New 
Orleans, and social stigmas that caused landlords to reject Section 8 tenants.  
Homeowners: “Road to anywhere but home”. The sampled articles showed several 
design and implementation issues that exacerbated the vulnerability of poor and middle class 
homeowners, particularly in African American neighborhoods. The samples reported the Road 
Home – Homeowner Assistance Program contained design flaws, including: a discriminatory 
grant formula, documentation requirements that restricted access to recovery funds, and 
requiring homeowners to hire, supervise, and compensate contractors on their own. Some 
sampled articles suggested recovery leaders designed the Road Home program to prevent fraud 
because they viewed prospective recipients as children or as criminals. The authors in the sample 
also indicated implementation issues, such as caseworkers losing verification documents and 
lenders forced loan payoffs before releasing funds for rebuilding. The samples portrayed these 
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issues as causing homeowners to default on the grant terms, which required rebuilding within 
three years or repayment of funds. The sampled papers showed officials created exemptions to 
address the design and implementation issues that caused homeowners to default; however, some 
sampled authors suggested exemption policies repeated similar design and implementation 
issues. 
To compensate homeowners for damages from the disaster, state officials created the 
Road Home – Homeowner Assistance Program with federal community development block 
grants (CDBG) from HUD. The program offered homeowners three options, which impacted the 
value of their grant; they included: rebuilding a pre-Katrina house for owner-occupancy, selling a 
pre-Katrina house and purchasing a different house within the state, and selling a pre-Katrina 
house without buying a new house in Louisiana, which included homeowners that became 
renters in Louisiana or moved out of state (Road Home Program, 2016). Both samples reported 
the grant calculation design resulted in shortages and gaps for homeowners in African American 
communities that opted to rebuild their pre-Katrina residence. In a tenth anniversary NYT 
sampled article, Rivlin (2015) used Liberty Bank president, Alden McDonald, to describe how 
the Road Home program diminished the capacity of homeowners in African American 
neighborhoods to rebuild.  
“A new federal program called Road Home had just been 
announced. Publicized as the largest housing-recovery program in 
the country’s history -- it would eventually grow to more than $10 
billion -- it promised to pay out as much as $150,000 to 
homeowners who had flood damage, depending on the size of their 
losses.  
But McDonald had already diagnosed Road Home’s racial 
bias: Compensation would be based not on the actual cost of 
rebuilding, but on the appraised value of a property. The cost of 
restoring a 2,000-square-foot house in mostly white Lakeview, just 
west of City Park, or Gentilly, a Black middle-class neighborhood 
to its east, would be the same -- but the Road Home payment would 
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differ. In Lakeview, that home was valued at a little over $300,000. 
A Lakeview couple who received a $150,000 flood insurance 
payment would receive the full $150,000 from Road Home. But in 
Gentilly, a similar home was valued at closer to $160,000. If a 
Gentilly couple received a flood insurance check of $150,000, they 
would receive only $10,000 from Road Home. It wasn’t just the 
poor, McDonald understood early on, who would have trouble 
rebuilding, but also middle-class people who didn’t have the 
savings or family wealth to make up the shortfall and fix their 
homes.  
‘If we use pre-Katrina assessments for compensating people, 
nobody in the Black community is coming out anywhere near 
whole,’ McDonald said [seven months after Katrina]. By the time 
a federal judge reached the same conclusion, nearly five years 
later, it would be largely too late. All but $148 million of the 
original $10 billion had already been spent. (The federal 
government agreed to set aside another $500 million specifically 
to help homeowners shortchanged by Road Home)” (Rivlin, 2015).  
 
Rivlin (2015) showed African American lenders recognized the Road Home grant calculation 
design perpetuated real estate racial bias years before a federal judge ruled in favor of plaintiffs 
in preliminary hearings in a federal lawsuit brought against HUD and Paul Rainwater, executive 
director of the Louisiana Recovery Authority by two civil rights organizations on behalf of 
African American homeowners. In the lawsuit, the Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action 
Center, the National Fair Housing Alliance and five African American homeowners claimed 
African Americans were more likely than white homeowners to receive grants based on pre-
storm house value instead of the cost of damages because of historically depressed housing 
values in minority communities (Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center 
(GNOFHAC), 2008). In the TP sample, Reckdahl (2008b) used a PolicyLink study to report, “In 
New Orleans, 81 percent of Road Home recipients received awards that did not cover the needed 
repairs to their homes. The average shortfall was $54,586.” This statement agrees with Rivlin’s 
(2015) assertion that the Road Home program compounded the vulnerability of poor and middle 
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class homeowners with low pre-storm house values because they had to rely on personal 
resources to cover the gap between grant disbursements and the cost to rebuild.  
 In addition to systemic discrimination grant calculations, the sampled articles reported the 
Road Home – Homeowner Assistance Program’s documentation requirements restricted the 
ability of eligible homeowners to receive compensation. In the TP sample, McClendon (2015) 
wrote:  
“Unreasonable documentation requirements and systemic 
discrimination made it impossible for thousands of homeowners to 
return to the city after Hurricane Katrina destroyed their homes, 
said leaders with the Road Home Action Network Team and the 
Lower 9th Ward Homeownership Association. Money isn’t the 
issue. There is still money in the Road Home budget… At least $30 
million or so of the $119 million in unspent Road Home money 
remains unallocated, said M. A. Sheehan, director of the 
Homeownership Association’s House the 9 Program. The problem 
is, she said, HUD’s rules are so strict that many can’t access it.” 
 
McClendon (2015) stressed ten years after the disaster the money to repair homes still existed, 
but program rules made the funds inaccessible to homeowners in need. A sampled NYT article 
showed Road Home documentation requirements caused problems for homeowners without 
succession paperwork.  
“59-year-old Michael Dupont...could not prove that his family 
owned the house in which he grew up and in which his mother 
spent her 49 years of marriage, a house that his great-grandfather 
bought in the 1920s. ‘We ain’t never been nobody sticking out our 
hand for government assistance,’ said Mr. Dupont, a former truck 
driver. ‘But now that we need a little help, they’re slapping us 
down.’ The Duponts, who were planning to demolish the house and 
rebuild in its place, received no Road Home money at all because 
of the title problem. This year, they discovered, to their surprise, 
that the city had demolished the house. Mr. Dupont, whose mother 
is living in a nursing home in a nearby city and waiting to return, 




Robertson (2010) portrayed a disconnection between the city and the federal government that 
compounded the vulnerability of homeowners who inherited their homes but never filed 
succession paperwork. The Dupont family could not prove to the federal government that they 
owned their house; however, the city held them liable for the demolition bill because it 
recognized the family as the rightful owners.  
The sampled NYT articles also described allowing homeowners to hire and supervise their 
own contractors as a mistake that lead to contractor fraud and compliance issues. Buettner and 
Chen (2014) suggested Hurricane Sandy recovery efforts used different policies based on 
outcomes from New Orleans recovery. “[New York City] would hire and oversee contractors to 
do the work, instead of writing checks to people to pay contractors themselves -- the model that 
had been the source of much of the corruption in New Orleans” (Buettner & Chen, 2014). 
Buettner and Chen (2014) singled out the decision to have homeowners hire private market 
contractors to make repairs as the factor that enabled the contractor fraud issues that prevented 
affected homeowners from rebuilding.  The samples suggested contractor fraud lead to 
compliance issues because affected homeowners could not complete repairs and return home 
within the program’s three-year deadline.  
The sampled TP articles provided justifications for the design decisions program officials 
made.  
“‘I know it’s complicated, and that it’s going slowly, ‘[Harriet 
Cortez] said. ‘I was told it was designed the way it was because of 
all the apparent waste at FEMA. Road Home is under a lot of 
scrutiny to make sure there isn’t fraud, so there are lots of checks 




Bruno (2007) quoted Cortez, a Lakeview homeowner, to depict the slow, complicated process 
and documentation requirements as fraud prevention in response to FEMA’s failures. DeBerry 
(2011) appeared more critical of government officials and Road Home bureaucracy: 
“So many people who didn’t have their homes destroyed -- 
including then-Gov. Kathleen Blanco -- had a condescending 
attitude toward those who did. Blanco said in a June 2007 phone 
interview that she was afraid some homeowners would spend their 
money in the wrong place. No wonder, then, that the program she 
created treated all applicants as children. A lawyer who was 
conducting Road Home closings in January 2008 predicted that 
most recipients would commit fraud. Or crimes. He believed the 
captain in the New Orleans Police Department who told him that 
Road Home money would fund a ‘crack war’ on our streets.” 
 
In contrast to Bruno (2007), DeBerry (2011) suggested officials made decisions based on 
stereotypes. Viewing residents as children and criminals lead to design decisions to prevent fraud 
although these measures slowed down the grant distribution process as described by Nossiter 
(2008b) in the NYT:  
 “Because of bureaucratic bungling and the high hurdles that 
Louisiana imposed on those applying for the money, thousands of 
homeowners never applied at all, and many other people moved 
away and abandoned their homes. …The program’s many arcane 
requirements for receiving the money were conceived with the 
expectation that the program would be heavily defrauded, the 
result of the state capital’s traditional suspicion of New Orleans. 
In fact, officials say relatively little fraud has occurred. But 
nonetheless, at the outset, a complicated application process 
designed to curb it was developed, including the fingerprinting and 
photographing of applicants, and punctilious checks of ownership 
documents that in many cases were hard to come by. A critical 
study by the RAND Corporation identified 12 major stages in the 
Road Home application, including paperwork, interviews and 
detailed correspondence; news reports identified more than 60 
steps, major and minor, in all. Each one slowed down the 
disbursements. By December 2007, half of the people who had 
applied a year earlier still had not received any money, according 
to the RAND study. The consequences of the delays for families 
desperate to return were onerous. …Some in Gentilly spoke of 
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elderly residents dying in the long interval between application 
and grant” (Nossiter, 2008b).  
 
Nossiter (2008b) and DeBerry (2011) indicated negative stereotypes of New Orleans and its 
residents lead to design decisions that compounded the vulnerability of homeowners by slowing 
down and complicating the process to receive compensation.  
In addition to design issues, the articles in both samples indicated problems implementing 
the Road Home - Homeowner Assistance Program as well. “‘We’d fax papers; they’d lose them,’ 
said Virginia Burnett of Gentilly. ‘We’d fax them again.’ It took 18 months to get a grant, Ms. 
Burnett said, a process she described as a ‘nightmare’” (Nossiter, 2008b). Burnett’s experience 
showed how the documentation process became more cumbersome when Road Home workers 
lost paperwork, requiring documents to be submitted again before moving to the next step of the 
process (2008b). DeBerry (2011) indicated private lending companies and the federal Small 
Business Administration created compliance issues:  
 “Others were forced by their mortgage companies to pay off that 
mortgage before starting repairs. The Small Business 
Administration, which initially appeared to be a helpful federal 
bureaucracy, became yet another hindrance when it forced 
borrowers to apply their Road Home grants to those government 
loans” (DeBerry, 2011).  
 
DeBerry (2011) argued when creditors took rebuilding grants, homeowners could not rebuild and  
violated their Road Home contract, which required homeowners to prove they returned to their 
residence within three years or to repay the grant.  
The sampled articles showed the design and implementation issues led officials to create 
exemptions for noncompliant homeowners. In the TP, McClendon (2014) wrote:  
“In July, the federal Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, which funds and oversees Road Home, approved a 
string of rule changes that provided a series of after-the-fact 
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exemptions for qualifying participants. Among other things, the 
new rules provided breaks to grant recipients who:  
• Got ripped off by contractors.  
• Were forced to pass along insurance awards to mortgage 
holders.  
• Used elevation money to repair their homes.  
Jones said all three conditions apply to her case to some extent, 
but nobody ever told her that might mean she doesn’t have to pay 
back the entire $30,000 elevation grant. She said she has shown 
Road Home officials receipts for the work done on her house as 
well as pictures of the watermarks halfway up the wall from the 
flood and subsequent repairs to the drywall. Yet, she said, they 
keep coming after her for money they say she stole” (McClendon, 
2014). 
 
Although HUD created exemptions to help homeowners overcome the issues that arose, the 
samples suggested no one knew about the policy changes. McClendon (2014) turned to City 
Council Member Cantrell to elaborate on the frustration poor implementation created.  
“New Orleans City Councilwoman LaToya Cantrell, who has 
become an advocate for many in the city struggling with the 
program, said the problem goes beyond educating the public. The 
people running the program don’t seem to know what’s going on 
either, she said. At a February meeting of the Legislature’s Select 
Hurricane Recovery Committee, Cantrell and others asked Road 
Home officials to push for a waiver from the federal government 
that would relax rules for certain Road Home participants. Despite 
lengthy conversation on the topic, she said, none of the state 
officials told her or the other meeting participants that many of 
those rule changes had already been on the books for months.’ 
They don’t know what the hell the policies are that they are 
expected to implement, yet they harass people. They don’t even 
have their own facts straight,’ she said” (McClendon, 2014).  
 
McClendon (2014) quoted Cantrell to report that Road Home problems continued to exist seven 
years after the program began disbursing grants because program administrators, not just 
workers, did not know about the rule changes and exemptions enacted to improve homeowner 
compliance. The sampled articles indicated compliance exemptions helped homeowners avoid 
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penalization for failure to rebuild or for using elevation money to rebuild instead of elevate, but 
did not bring homeowners come into compliance by helping finish their homes.  
 The samples showed state and federal officials amended the Homeowner Assistance 
Program policies as issues arose over time. In addition to the exemptions for noncompliance, 
officials created supplemental grants for homeowners that faced shortfalls due to the 
discriminatory grant formula (GNOFHAC, 2011). In the TP, McClendon (2015) reported:  
“After it became clear that contractor fraud was rife, HUD 
allowed homeowners to apply for additional money to finish 
repairs, but the agency created a rule requiring them to provide 
copies of canceled checks written to pay for the work. Grantees 
were not told from the beginning they needed to keep copies of the 
checks, so many never did.” 
 
McClendon (2015) suggested supplemental grant programs recreated documentation issues that 
restricted the ability of eligible households to access funds to rebuild. The sampled authors 
claimed supplemental grants and rule exemptions failed to fix problems that resulted from 
program design and implementation issues because the changes offered too little too late. Critical 
race theorists would suggest the problems remained because changes did not address underlying 
attitudes and assumptions informed by negative stereotypes (Crenshaw et al., 1995; Delgado & 
Stefancic, 2001).  
 Both samples framed the Road Home – Homeowner Assistance Program as 
compounding the vulnerability of homeowners due to its design and implementation. The sample 
indicated the grant formula discriminated against African American homeowners, the 
documentation requirements blocked eligible households from receiving grants, and writing 
checks to homeowners instead of supervising contractors, which lead to contractor fraud. Other 
sampled authors reported implementations issues, such as lost paperwork and forced payoffs, 
decreased the effectiveness of the program by delaying and reducing funds to rebuild, 
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respectively. The sampled articles claimed the slow, complicated process prioritized fraud 
minimization over quick disbursal of funds to homeowners. One author in each sample suggested 
fear of fraud stemmed from stereotypes of New Orleans and its residents as corrupt. The samples 
showed over time HUD created exemptions and supplemental grant programs to address the 
problems caused by design flaws, but the TP sample found new programs contained design and 
implementation issues, such as lack of awareness of policy changes among eligible participants, 
caseworkers, and program administrators and restrictive documentation requirements, that 
continued to limit the ability of homeowners to rebuild and return. The sampled articles also 
reported the design of the Road Home – Small Rental Property Program compounded the 
vulnerability of landlords, who could not rebuild, and renters, who required affordable housing. 
Renters: “On your own”. The TP and the NYT samples described three different 
programs aimed at assisting renters and creating affordable housing after Hurricane Katrina. 
These included: the Road Home – Small Rental Property Program (SRPP), FEMA travel trailer 
parks, and the Disaster Housing Assistance Program (DHAP-Katrina). The first program offered 
“…a no interest, no payment, forgivable loan” to owners of one- to four-unit rental properties 
(Road Home Program, 2012). The program “requir[es] property owners to maintain affordable 
rent levels for a certain fixed term… and, in exchange, gradually forgives the entire amount of 
the loan,” (Road Home Program, 2012). SRPP reimbursed landlords for rebuilding costs once the 
landlord proved the units had returned to the market at affordable rates (Road Home Program, 
2012). The other two programs gave renters temporary accommodations in travel trailers or 
private market apartments via housing vouchers. The sampled articles revealed all three 
programs contained design flaws that compounded the vulnerability of renters and landlords.  
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The sampled articles indicated several design flaws in the Road Home – Small Rental 
Property Program intended to replace affordable rental units. Both samples showed state officials 
prioritized homeowners over renters by allocating most of the CDBG funds to the Homeowner 
Assistance Program. For example, in the NYT, Dewan (2007) reported:  
“At the state level, officials have allocated $6.3 billion for the 
Road Home’s assistance program for homeowners, dwarfing the 
$869 million allocated to the Small Rental Property Program… 
And when the homeowner program faced a shortfall, …the 
Louisiana Recovery Authority, which controls the money, recently 
voted to transfer 5 percent of the budget for renters to the fund for 
homeowners. Walter J. Leger Jr., the chairman of the authority, 
said the 5 percent transfer was temporary to satisfy Congressional 
demands. …Mr. Leger said the state’s focus had been on 
homeowners in part because landlords were more likely to be 
insured, but he acknowledged the need to do more to replenish the 
city’s work force. ‘We’d like to get more money for the rental 
program, if Washington will help,’ he said.” 
 
Dewan (2007) argued officials left landlords and renters to rely on private market solutions, 
which compounded the vulnerability of renters by decreasing the speed at which the affordable 
housing market recovered. 
Both samples portrayed the SRPP design as problematic because the process made funds 
inaccessible. In the TP, Reckdahl (2008b) used a PolicyLink study to highlight similar design 
problems between the homeowner and small rental programs: 
“More than half of the applicants were stuck in the initial stage, 
called verification, according to [a] report [released by 
PolicyLink], a stage that also plagued the Road Home 
[Homeowner Assistance P]rogram, researchers stated. Another 
obstacle in the rental program: Because of federal requirements, it 
is a reimbursement program, so most landlords have to get private 
financing and then recoup their investment, a substantial hardship 
for those who are paying mortgages on their property without any 
rental income, according to the report. Until the slow-moving 
programs begin producing more rental units in New Orleans, rents 
are likely to stay at current levels, too steep for many of the city’s 




Reckdahl (2008b) suggested the failure to support the rebuilding of small rental properties 
compounded the vulnerability of landlords, who lost a source of pre-storm income, and low-
wage workers, who could not afford rents in the tight post-Katrina housing market.  
 To assist renters with temporary housing, FEMA created temporary travel trailer 
communities and offered housing vouchers, which covered private market rents (Buron & Locke, 
2013). The samples showed both programs contained problems that exacerbated vulnerability. In 
the NYT, Dewan (2007) suggested isolated trailer park locations with limited public 
transportation compounded the vulnerability of carless residents, who could not reach jobs or 
stores. 
“…[G]overnment solutions like the trailer parks have turned out 
to be obstacles, especially for the many evacuees like Ms. Cole, 
who has no car and lost her job at Jack in the Box when she could 
no longer get a ride to work. At Sugar Hill [a FEMA trailer park], 
18 miles from the nearest supermarket, the public bus stops only 
four times a week” (Dewan, 2007).  
 
Saulny (2007) indicated when FEMA officials decided to close temporary housing assistance 
programs renters would become more vulnerable because affordable housing had not been 
repaired.  
“The sense of an impending housing crisis grew stronger last week 
with FEMA’s announcement on Wednesday that it would close all 
the trailer camps it runs for victims of the 2005 hurricanes on 
varying schedules by the end of May [2008]. More than 900 
families are living in FEMA trailer parks around the city. The 
agency said its action was intended to hasten the move of residents 
to permanent housing from trailers. … ‘FEMA and the federal 
bureaucracy seem oblivious to the fact that virtually no new 
affordable rental housing has yet appeared in New Orleans to 
replace what was lost,’ said Martha J. Kegel, executive director of 
Unity of Greater New Orleans, a group of 60 agencies that house 
and feed the homeless. ‘It will take a long time for enough 
replacement affordable housing to be built. To withdraw housing 
assistance to the neediest people is a shirking of federal 
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responsibility for the design failure of the federal levees in New 
Orleans, which was the cause of most of the destruction of 
affordable housing here’ (Saulny, 2007).  
 
Saulny (2007) quoted Kegel, the executive director of Unity of Greater New Orleans, to place 
blame for the lack of affordable housing on the federal government, which determined levee 
design and maintenance. Saulny (2007) emphasized the disconnection between federal agencies 
and realities of the housing crisis in New Orleans. She reported FEMA officials defended the 
decision to close trailer parks by implying it would speed up recovery for those families (2007). 
Saulny (2007) challenged the response by noting that closing temporary housing forced families 
to compete in a rental market where UNITY found the lack of affordable options caused 
homelessness rates in New Orleans to double after the disaster (Jervis, 2008).  
The samples reported HUD’s temporary housing voucher program also contained design 
and implementation issues. For two years, FEMA provided housing vouchers to displaced 
residents (Buron & Locke, 2013). At the end of 2007, HUD created the Disaster Housing 
Assistance Program (DHAP-Katrina) and assumed responsibility for administering housing 
vouchers for almost 36,000 families throughout the affected region that did not receive HUD 
assistance before Hurricane Katrina (2013). Under DHAP-Katrina, HUD continued paying 
landlords directly as FEMA had done and implemented changes, such as, “declining rental 
assistance payments …intended to transition households over time to greater responsibility for 
their housing costs; and… case management services …to help [households] move toward 
greater self-sufficiency and stable, permanent housing” when the program closed in August 2009 
(Buron & Locke, 2013, p. viii). In a sampled three-year anniversary TP article, Reckdahl (2008b) 
questioned the decision to end DHAP-Katrina when the post-Katrina housing market in New 
Orleans remained unaffordable.  
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“PolicyLink used labor statistics to determine which workers could 
afford $978 per month, the average cost of a New Orleans two-
bedroom apartment. Based on the premise that up to one-third of a 
person’s monthly income should go toward rent, many of the city’s 
workers fell short: A New Orleans short-order cook can only 
afford $471 each month, a bank teller $504, a home-health aide 
$524, a New Orleans firefighter $747 and a New Orleans Police 
Department patrol officer $954. Those rents may also be 
unaffordable for many of the 14,000 families in the metro area who 
depend on rental assistance from the Disaster Housing Assistance 
Program, which is slated to end at the end of February [2009].” 
 
Reckdahl (2008b) relied on a PolicyLink report to indicate the post-Katrina housing market 
priced out working class and blue collar renters because the recovery programs did not stimulate 
the creation of affordable housing in proportion to demand.  
The NYT sampled articles framed DHAP-Katrina case management services as 
inadequate because of its design and implementation. Dewan (2009) interviewed a Baton Rouge 
homeless program psychologist to highlight a flaw in housing assistance programs that did not 
recognize households had different abilities to develop strategies to return to stable, independent 
living arrangements.  
“Social workers in the region… say the federal government has 
been slow to learn: it is not enough simply to give money, or rent 
vouchers, to people unable to strategize for themselves. …‘It’s 
easier just to throw money at people and then after a year cut them 
off,’ said Toni Bankston, a psychologist at Neighbor’s Keeper, a 
nonprofit group in Baton Rouge that works with the Capital Area 
Alliance for the Homeless to provide comprehensive assistance to 
victims of Hurricane Katrina. Neighbor’s Keeper itself was making 
little progress with many of its clients…until it added mental health 
care to its services” (Dewan, 2009).  
 
Dewan (2009) claimed the federal government “spent more than $200 million on case 
management for victims of Hurricane Katrina and Rita,” but the program did not offer sustained 
support or mental health services. Saulny (2007) and Dewan (2009) reported federal caseworkers 
did not follow-up with residents or help them find permanent housing. Saulny (2007) argued 
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residents unable to afford housing and unable to be placed in permanent federal housing 
assistance programs ended up homeless whereas two years later Dewan (2009) suggested they 
turned to nonprofits for help as federal disaster assistance ended.  
“Now, more than four years after the flood, their lives have 
achieved only a fragile equilibrium, with many of them still turning 
to private agencies for help as their government aid expires. Some 
have transferred to permanent government programs that pay for 
housing, but continue to face obstacles to self-sufficiency like 
clinical depression or declining health” (Dewan, 2009).  
 
Dewan (2009) showed that without mental health services to address the trauma caused by the 
disaster, the poorest residents continued to struggle four years later.  
The samples discussed design flaws in three recovery programs intended to temporarily 
house renters and to help replace affordable housing damaged by the disaster. The sampled 
authors showed state recovery officials prioritized homeowners at the expense of renters by 
allocating more money to programs to help rebuild owner-occupied versus tenant-occupied 
housing. Additionally the sampled articles indicated the reimbursement design reduced the 
effectiveness SRPP because landlords had to rely on private market solutions to rebuild and find 
a low-income tenant in order to receive assistance. Authors in the sample also criticized the 
isolated location of trailer parkers and the premature closure of temporary housing assistance 
before the affordable housing market recovered. Although, the New York Time sampled articles 
indicated DHAP-Katrina offered a tiered payment structure and case management services to 
help ease the transition back into independent living, Dewan (2009) and Saulny (2007) argued 
the services did not include mental health care and case workers often failed to follow up with 
residents. The samples showed renters who did not have government assistance before the storm 
became more vulnerable after the storm because recovery policies failed to produce results 
before federal housing assistance ended. Both samples indicated recovery policies for residents 
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who relied on government assistance before Hurricane Katrina compounded public housing 
residents' vulnerability as well.  
Public Housing Residents: “In Storage”. With the diverse group of residents that 
needed housing assistance after the storm, the sampled articles also showed how the design and 
implementation of post-Katrina public housing programs exacerbated the vulnerability of public 
housing residents. Federal recovery programs for public housing residents addressed rebuilding 
physical complexes as well as housing displaced public housing residents in private market 
apartments. The samples reported design issues, such as: development models required private 
market investment; no vouchers for residents until HUD declared building non-repairable; 
renting private market apartments increased resident cost of living; and the perpetuation of 
poverty and segregation. The sampled articles also described implementation problems that 
included: New Orleans landlords refused to participate in the Section 8 program; Public Housing 
Authorities denied resident requests to transfer their housing voucher to New Orleans; and new 
buildings were less sturdy than the demolished buildings. 
Rather than rebuild an outdated model, HUD chose to redevelop New Orleans public 
housing developments into mixed income communities with fewer units for low-income 
households and increase the number of federal housing vouchers in the Housing Choice Voucher 
(HCV) program, colloquially known as Section 8. The NYT and Times Picayune samples 
reported the private-public partnership required private investment to rebuild public housing. In 
the TP sample, Reckdahl (2009b) quoted Raquel Rolnik, United Nations Human Rights Council, 
special rapporteur on adequate housing, to argue redevelopment models stalled the city’s 
recovery: “The national recession and housing crisis worsened the post-Katrina [affordable 
housing] shortage, [UN official Rolnik] said, complicated by the government’s reliance on 
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privately managed, mixed-income redevelopments to replace the large public complexes” 
(Reckdahl, 2009b). Reckdahl (2009b) suggested recovery strategies exacerbated the housing 
shortage because they did not account for the status of national economy and housing market 
even though plans hinged on private investment. 
The reliance on public private partnerships to fuel recovery during a recession was not 
the only design issues the samples reported. The sample reported three primary design issues for 
residents switched from traditional public housing to Section 8 vouchers. In the TP sample, 
Reckdahl (2009b) indicated HUD rules delayed when residents could be transferred to the HCV 
program by quoting Laura Tuggle, managing attorney for Southeastern Louisiana Legal Services' 
Housing Unit and local guide for the U. N. tour: “The fate of some apartment buildings is still up 
in the air. Until HUD formally decides that a developer can’t rebuild a complex, its former 
residents can’t receive Section 8 vouchers.” The article described a complex that waited four 
years for HUD to determine it would not be rebuilt. Reckdahl (2009b) reported the delay created 
implementation issues because resident contact information became outdated, making it harder to 
notify residents of their eligibility to receive rental assistance.  
 Two sampled TP articles reported the voucher program increased residents’ cost of 
living. Both programs required residents to pay a portion of their rent; however, most private 
market landlords required tenants to pay utilities (i.e.: gas, electric, water, trash collection, etc.), 
which public housing rent included (Popkin et al., 2004). Reckdahl (2011) showed this presented 
an obstacle for residents on fixed incomes:  
“After HUD shuttered [public housing development, CJ] Peete, the 
sisters joined a group of other residents to oppose the demolition. 
They flew to Washington and spoke before Congress. They testified 
in federal court, saying they found it almost impossible on $600 
monthly disability checks to keep up with groceries, medication 
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and their share of the Section 8 voucher rent along with new bills 
for utilities and water” (Reckdahl, 2011). 
 
Reckdahl (2011) argued redevelopment compounded the vulnerability of disabled residents, who 
experienced an increase in expenses because policy, not income, changed.  
The sampled articles reported independent studies conducted by a local nonprofit found 
the HCV program failed to reduce concentrated poverty. Ten years after Hurricane Katrina, 
Webster (2015) used a Data Center study to argue recovery strategies perpetuated the social 
problems officials claimed they fixed due to poor design and implementation: 
“The idea was that vouchers would give people who lived in 
poverty-stricken communities such as Iberville, St. Bernard, B. W. 
Cooper and Magnolia a choice. Instead of being trapped in public 
housing developments for generations, they could move their 
families to areas with less poverty and crime, better schools, 
access to health care and job opportunities. ...However, instead of 
breaking up and dispersing concentrated pockets of poverty, the 
voucher program simply moved them from one area to another 
with only slight changes in population percentages... Instead of 
creating opportunity, in many cases the increase in vouchers 
perpetuated poverty and segregation, the Data Center Found. 
Housing vouchers, in theory, are better suited to help people rise 
out of poverty than public housing where low-poverty or middle-
class communities don’t exist, Seicshnaydre [co-author of the Data 
Center report] said. But the way the program is currently set up 
and administered, it is failing to fulfill that promise.”  
 
Similar to Dewan (2009), Webster (2015) reported the Data Center study recommended HUD 
offer extensive counseling to public housing residents transitioning into the HCV program for 
“low-income families to view housing choice as more than a means of short-term survival, but 
rather as a means of expanding long-term opportunity.”  
 The sampled TP articles showed the HCV program met with implementation issues 
because of local race and class prejudice. In the TP, Webster (2015) wrote: “82 percent of 
landlords in New Orleans refused to accept vouchers or placed unreasonable requirements on 
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the tenants, according to a 2009 report by the Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action 
Center” (Webster, 2015). The articled framed landlords as a significant barrier to expanding 
choice for low-income minorities because of stereotypes about Section 8 renters (Webster, 
2015). LaRose (2015) quoted Andreanecia Morris, vice president of Providence Community 
Housing, to describe the impact of “Section 8 stigma”:  
“The recovery period led some landlords not only to increase 
rents, but also to become more selective with their tenants. The end 
result, [Morris] said, is that government-subsidized renters wind 
up paying as much or more than market-rate tenants. Much of this 
is based on the false perception that Section 8 renters are more 
expensive tenants because they do not take care of their properties. 
Morris said the remedy must come from landlords, across the 
rental range, who have to become better property managers. 
‘Trifling knows no social-economic barriers,’ Morris said. ‘...The 
notion that ‘those people’ are worth a premium is also a big 
problem in this city when it comes to the subsidized market.’”  
 
In contrast to LaRose (2015), who used Morris to frame landlord distain for Section 8 tenants as 
a class-based stigma, Webster (2015) quoted a Data Center report to portray race as the 
underlying issue:  
“‘Given that over 90 percent of voucher users in the New Orleans 
metro in 2010 were Black, the existence of rental discrimination on 
the basis of race serves as a real and persistent barrier to voucher 
users’ access to housing opportunity,’ the report states. ‘When 
considering the prevalence of discrimination on the basis of 
voucher use, the barriers to opportunity for voucher holders in 
New Orleans appear particularly acute.’” 
 
These sampled authors disagreed on the cause of the negative stereotypes but reported the same 
result: the HCV program failed to increase neighborhood opportunity because landlords in 
neighborhoods with more opportunity refuse to participate in the program. The sample showed 
the design of the program did not recognize structural barriers that constrain the choices of low-
141 
 
income families. Webster (2015) reported the Data Center report suggested landlords also 
needed counseling services for the voucher program to deconcentrate poverty.  
 One sampled articled claimed displaced public housing residents could not return because 
HUD policies prevented residents from transferring their housing vouchers to New Orleans. In 
the TP, Reckdahl (2008a) wrote:  
“In theory, Section 8 vouchers are ‘portable’ -- transferable to 
anywhere in the United States. But many evacuees have had 
transfers denied or delayed because of a HUD loophole allowing 
local agencies to reject moves to ‘higher-rent’ areas like New 
Orleans. ...At the meeting… where Houston Housing Authority 
officials announced a halt on New Orleans transfers…, Clara 
Armstrong, 66, pleaded with officials. ‘They said I could go to 
somewhere else in Louisiana,’ she said. ‘I was crying. I told them 
that the storm sent me from New Orleans, not Kenner, not 
LaPlace, not Slidell. New Orleans is where I want to go.’ Her 
pleas ignored, she gave up, thinking she’d have to leave without a 
voucher or move to a suburb.”  
 
The article quoted displaced resident, Clara Armstrong, to show public housing residents wanted 
to return, but policy blocked them (Reckdahl, 2008a). Reckdahl (2008a) noted, “In April, in 
response to a news report, HUD stepped in to correct the snafu by creating a special exception 
for hurricane evacuees” that removed the “financial incentive to reject transfers,” but argued 
limiting, “[HUD’s] ‘right to return’ policy to all HUD-assisted households who were living in 
New Orleans when Hurricane Katrina hit …ignores people who first got Section 8 in other cities 
after being driven from New Orleans by the flood.” In Reckdahl's (2008a) view when HUD 
officials attempted to address the policy issue that prevented transfers, they created a new gap 
that left some displaced residents vulnerable and unable to return despite their desire to do so. 
Reckdahl (2008a) also showed local PHAs continued to deny transfers for eligible households 
after the rule change: 
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“After HUD addressed the problem, Martin resumed plans to move 
home with her two children. Yet despite phone calls, e-mail 
messages and in-person visits, ‘my paperwork never moved,’ she 
said. On May 31, when her lease ended, Houston [Housing 
Authority] still hadn’t faxed the proper forms to New Orleans. Her 
Houston landlord gave her a 14-day extension, but as the 12th day 
passed, her documents were nowhere in sight. ‘My kids and I will 
be homeless as of this weekend,’ she said. ...[Egana] faced 
immediate ouster from her place because Section 8 stopped paying 
rent to her Houston landlord after a series of inspections failed... 
But even with an eviction hanging over her head, no one could 
expedite her New Orleans paperwork, Egana said. And to move 
without Section 8 approval is considered ‘abandonment,’ a 
voucher-revoking violation that she and Martin were determined to 
avoid. ... Despite HUD’s work on the issue, some clear-cut 
requests are still denied. ...Egana and Martin are now back home, 
thanks to help from HUD’s Washington office, which stepped in to 
get them out of Houston” (Reckdahl, 2008a). 
 
Reckdahl (2008a) claimed changing federal policy failed to change local PHA practices without 
direct federal oversight.  
One sampled article in each paper indicated new construction in lieu of rehabilitating 
public housing complexes left residents more vulnerable after the disaster. In the TP, Hammer 
(2008b) reported:  
“Julie Andrews, a former resident at the Desire complex, said she 
much preferred the sturdy old brick buildings to a new stick-built 
unit she describes as thin-walled and cramped, even if it is more 
attractive on the outside. Opponents of the demolitions pointed to a 
report by John Fernandez, an architecture professor at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who inspected the four 
complexes last year. Fernandez found that the complexes feature 
heavy masonry buildings that are safer, stronger and cheaper to 
rehabilitate and bring up to code than building new stick-built 
units.” 
 
Hammer’s (2008b) used a returned resident and an architecture expert to portray exterior 
aesthetics as the primary benefit of HUD’s redevelopment plans. Based on expert opinion, 
Hammer (2008b) claimed the new developments would offer less protection against future 
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hurricanes than the brick buildings provided. Five years later in the NYT, Longman (2013) 
corroborated Hammer’s (2008b) view: 
“Mixed income housing, known as The Estates, now stands in the 
Desire neighborhood, colorful duplexes that at least ‘look much 
better,’ [New Orleans native and pro-football player, Marshall] 
Faulk said as he drove through the area. ...All 425 units in The 
Estates had water and other storm damage from Hurricane Isaac 
last August, and residents have complained of shoddy construction 
and chronic problems with leaks from rainfall, according to 
reports by thelensnola.org, an independent, nonprofit news site.”  
 
Hammer (2008b) placed responsibility for new developments poor ability to withstand future 
storms on HUD’s decision to replace the buildings. Longman (2013) shifted responsibility from 
the federal government to the contractors responsible for redevelopment. In his point of view, the 
issues residents faced (hurricane damage, flooding, and chronic leaks) resulted from poor 
construction, not poor policy decisions (Longman, 2013).  
 Both samples highlighted the different housing needs that emerged from the diverse set 
of residents living in New Orleans when the city flooded. The sampled showed design and 
implementation issues with recovery policies compounded the vulnerability of homeowners, 
renters, and public housing residents in unique ways. Housing appeared as only one arena where 
recovery policy compounded the vulnerability of New Orleans residents. The next examples 
describe policy design and implementation issues that arose from public education policy 
changes.  
Education Policy: Segregated Experiments 
 Although the sampled authors portrayed recovery as an opportunity to improve public 
education, they reported reforms implemented after the disaster did little to increase educational 
opportunities for disadvantaged families. Three NYT and two TP sampled articles portrayed 
recovery policies meant to improve public education as compounding vulnerability. In the TP, 
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Filosa (2006b) quoted resident activists and education leaders in the city to illustrate a 
fundamental flaw in the decision to privatize public education through the creation of public 
charter schools.  
“Activist and parent Ursula Markey, whose family recently 
returned to New Orleans after losing their home and spending 
seven months in Mississippi, warned that a charter school system 
won’t provide equality. ‘Segregation under any other name is still 
segregation,’ Markey said, drawing cheers [at a community forum 
on New Orleans schools]” (Filosa, 2006b).  
 
In a NYT article, Tough (2008) described the reformed school system in detail and echoed 
Filosa's (2006b) concern that the school reform measures perpetuated segregation and racial 
discrimination.  
“. . . [I]n practice, the system is inherently unequal, with each 
network administered by different rules. ...Many parents and other 
observers have charged that the city’s current structure has 
recreated and, in fact, codified the unfairness of the prestorm 
system, which was generally perceived to operate on two separate 
tiers of achievement and opportunity. According to a 2007 report 
commissioned by a coalition of civic groups, ‘Community members 
believe that in the current system, a select group of students has 
the opportunity to attend high-quality public schools, while the 
vast majority of students -- for the most part poor and minority 
students -- are stuck in low-performing schools in which they have 
little opportunity for growth and development’” (Tough, 2008).  
 
Tough (2008) depicted school enrollment policies as responsible for perpetuating systemic 
discrimination and school segregation. He argued the city’s top schools used selective enrollment 
policies to give preferential treatment to wealthier neighborhoods and to deny admission to 
students with lower scores or from poorer neighborhoods (2008). Tough (2008) and Filosa 
(2006b) presented community quotes to suggest residents saw these policies as trapping poor 
students of color in lower performing schools.  
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Two sampled NYT articles questioned the philosophy underpinning education reforms 
and its impact on the changes instituted during recovery. Tough (2008) wrote,  
“For many years now, the central debate in American education 
has been over just how much schools can do to improve the low 
rate of achievement among poor children. While it is true that for 
decades the children of New Orleans toiled in a substandard 
school system, they have also continually faced countless other 
obstacles to success -- inadequate health care, poorly educated 
parents, exposure to high rates of violent crime and a popular 
culture that often denigrates mainstream achievement. And though 
the hurricane washed away the school system, it didn’t wash away 
their other problems. In fact, for most children it compounded 
them with a whole new set of troubles: wrecked homes, frequent 
relocations, divided families, post-traumatic stress. Were public 
schools really the right vehicle to attack all of those problems? 
Were a blazer and a necktie and a lot of hard work enough to get 
Tony Petite to college? For Hardrick and Sanders and the dozens 
of other education reformers I spoke to in New Orleans since my 
first trip there in March, the answer was a firm yes. They didn’t 
deny the daunting spectrum of problems facing the children they 
were trying to educate. But they said they believed they could 
overcome them in the classroom -- and that the new educational 
terrain in New Orleans had significantly increased their chances 
of success.” 
 
Tough (2008) suggested reformers thought low educational attainment among poor and minority 
children could be corrected by the classroom alone even though they acknowledged these 
children faced multiple challenges that had little to do with school. The post-Katrina education 
landscape became an “experiment” to prove a decentralized system of governance could improve 
educational outcomes for poor, minority youth across the country (Tough, 2008). However, 
Tough (2008) showed not everyone agreed with the reformers and Paul Pastorek, Louisiana 
superintendent of education between 2007 and 2011, who stated: “fixing a public-school system 




“…Diane Ravitch, a historian of education who has spent decades 
studying and writing about the often dispiriting process of school 
reform, …was skeptical that a change in the governance model 
would solve the problems plaguing New Orleans’s schools. ‘The 
fundamental issue in American education -- I say this after 40 
years of having read and studied and written about the problems -- 
is one that is demographic[. ]’ . . . Poor children, Ravitch said, 
simply face too many problems outside the classroom. ‘If you don’t 
buttress whatever happens in school with social and economic 
changes that give kids a better chance in life and put their families 
on a more stable footing, then schools alone are not going to solve 
the problems of poor student performance. There has to be a range 
of social and economic strategies to support and enhance whatever 
happens in school’” (Tough, 2008).  
 
Tough (2008) used Ravitch to assert the classroom was only one part of the solution to 
increasing educational attainment for disadvantaged students. In his view, the education 
achievement gap between races and classes required social and economic changes for poor and 
minority families in society at large in addition to school reform.  
Five years later, Carr (2013) described how the most vulnerable students fared under the 
experimental education reforms.  
“The most challenging students -- those with severe special needs, 
a history of school expulsions or a criminal record -- can also 
suffer disproportionately from a narrow focus on school 
improvement and test score gains. These are the students the 
schools have the least incentive to enroll (during my years 
reporting on New Orleans charters, I witnessed some cases where 
school leaders forced these students into withdrawing). Yet they 
are also the ones who must be reached if the city hopes to reduce 
its unconscionably high rates of gun violence and incarceration” 
(Carr, 2013).  
 
In Carr’s (2013) account, school reforms missed the most vulnerable students because they 
emphasized standardized test scores and failed to address the diverse needs of poor minority 
students. She used the experience of one African American student to illustrate the limited focus 
and impact of school reform policy: 
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“. . . [T]his student required more than the school could give him -- 
even with a designated mentor on hand. ‘He needs and deserves a 
full-day therapy program that does not exist,’ said Ben Marcovitz, 
the school’s founder. He ended up being arrested on suspicion of 
armed robbery last year. His needs, like those of countless 
students, proved too complex for his teachers to address alone. It 
didn’t help that, in 2009, state officials closed the New Orleans 
Adolescent Hospital, significantly reducing the treatment options 
for teenagers with mental health crises” (Carr, 2013).  
 
Carr (2013) reported charter schools lacked mental health resources to address the problems that 
poor, African American students faced. In Carr’s (2013) view, state policy compounded the 
vulnerability of poor students of color by imposing educational reforms that could not meet all of 
their needs and by reducing adolescent mental health facilities. To Filosa (2006b), Tough (2008), 
and Carr (2013), school reforms exacerbated vulnerability because administrators found ways to 
exclude or push out lower performing students. The authors agreed that impoverished 
communities, and the children who live in them, need more than education reforms to improve 
life chances for disadvantaged youth. The sampled authors also argued the narrow focus on test 
score improvement to end poverty allowed recovery officials to neglect the mental health needs 
of disadvantaged children, who were traumatized by violent neighborhoods and the disaster.  
Two articles in the TP highlighted implementation issues that arose from school reform 
policies and compounded the vulnerability of poor, minority students. Longman (2013) quoted 
New Orleans native and pro football star, Marshall Faulk, to critique the decision to make New 
Orleans an open school district, meaning students can attend any school in the city – not just the 
one located in their neighborhood.  
“Even before Katrina, Faulk noted, it was challenging to convince 
kids in the impoverished neighborhood to come to school and stay 
in school and believe that an education would get them anywhere. 
The parents and alumni who fought to keep Carver open, he said, 
understood that busing students to other parts of the city would 
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only add another layer of risk and discouragement” (Longman, 
2013).  
 
Longman (2013) explained in theory an open district allows students near poorly performing 
schools to attend higher performing schools located in other neighborhoods, but suggested 
implementing the policy resulted in long commutes for students bused to schools outside of their 
neighborhood. In Longman’s (2013) view, long bus rides compounded student vulnerability 
because they discouraged at-risk students from attending school.  
The TP sample showed the implementation of school reform policies led to more issues. 
Dreilinger (2013) reported on a community forum about the state of education in New Orleans 
eight years after Hurricane Katrina. Dreilinger (2013) stated parents, residents, and activists at 
the forum, “…reiterated familiar themes: the prevalence of Teach for America, which puts young 
college graduates in classrooms; accusations of charter schools cheating to falsely inflate test 
scores; subpar facilities; and the slow pace of the $1.8 billion school building plan.” Dreilinger 
(2013) highlighted several implementation issues mentioned by both samples. First, she 
indicated the school reform movement replaced the city’s veteran teachers with recent graduates 
seeking student loan forgiveness grants in exchange for teaching in high-risk communities for a 
few years after graduating from college (2013). Secondly, she agreed with Carr (2013) that the 
emphasis on test scores to grade and fund schools created an incentive for charter school 
administrators to raise test scores by any means necessary, including giving students answers to 
standardized test questions as well as pushing out lower performing students (Dreilinger, 2013). 
Third, her article criticized the pace of replacing school buildings, which moved slowly, 
especially in poor communities of color, and resulted in students continuing to attend school in 
trailers more than seven years after the state privatized New Orleans public education 
(Dreilinger, 2013).  
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The sampled articles portrayed school reform as compounding the vulnerability of 
disadvantaged students in policy design and implementation. In both samples, the authors 
reported minority students lost experienced teachers that knew their culture and had school 
administrators that prioritized test scores over educating students. Additionally, they documented 
minority communities waited years for their neighborhood schools to be rebuilt and lost all say 
in how they operated. The NYT sampled articles suggested education reform that addressed 
school governance alone could not decrease the achievement gap. Tough (2008) and Carr (2013) 
quoted experts to argue improving life chances for disadvantaged students required social and 
economic changes in society and mental health services to deal with pre- and post-Katrina 
trauma. The next section further explores how the samples portrayed changes in healthcare as 
increasing the vulnerability of residents. 
Healthcare Policy: Limited Access for All 
 Both samples depicted post-Katrina healthcare policy as increasing the vulnerability of 
returned residents. Two TP and six NYT sampled articles discussed how healthcare policy 
compounded vulnerability after Hurricane Katrina. During recovery, city and state officials 
chose to build a new hospital instead of repairing Charity Hospital, a state-run teaching hospital 
that served the city’s poor, uninsured, and mentally ill before the disaster. It took ten years for 
the new medical complex that replaced Charity Hospital to open. The sampled authors found this 
compounded the vulnerability of returned residents, who encountered limited healthcare options 
for a decade. 
The sampled articles indicated the long delay to replace Charity Hospital decreased the 
stability and security of residents in need of medical attention. In the TP, Moran (2007) quoted a 
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation report to show how the slow decision-making process that 
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surrounded rebuilding Charity Hospital compounded the vulnerability of uninsured residents, 
who experienced limited healthcare access after the disaster. “‘As the discussion about 
rebuilding Charity Hospital continues, those who formerly relied on the hospital reported having 
significant health problems and obvious difficulty accessing care’” (Moran, 2007). Moran (2007) 
indicated that the vulnerability of uninsured residents increased because the study found 
residents reported deteriorated mental and physical health as a result of the disaster but had less 
access to care and often relied on emergency rooms as opposed to primary care physicians.   
Both samples reported the absence of Charity Hospital had negative impacts on 
psychiatric patients as well as uninsured residents.  
“Before Katrina, there were more than 400 psychiatric beds in the 
New Orleans area, many of them at Charity Hospital. Only 65 
psychiatric beds remain, and only two were available a few days 
ago, said John ‘Jack’ Finn, president of the Metropolitan Hospital 
Council of New Orleans. ‘It’s an enormous problem,’ said Dr. Jan 
Johnson, a Tulane University psychiatrist. ‘If someone needs to be 
stabilized because they’re suicidal or psychotic, they end up going 
to an emergency room, and the wait is days, not hours’” (Hunter & 
Pope, 2006).  
 
In the TP, Hunter and Pope (2006) used expert testimony to suggest the reduction in inpatient 
mental health services compounded the vulnerability of the mentally ill, who had to wait days to 
receive treatment. In the NYT, Barringer (2006) quoted Cynthia Matherne, the designated 
regional coordinator for emergency management in Orleans, Jefferson, St. Bernard, and 
Plaquemines to show how the lack of healthcare facilities impacted returned residents with 
mental or chronic disorders.  
“[L]ong-term acute care, rehabilitation [and] psychiatric 
facilities, ‘…have not reopened,’ Ms. Matherne said. ‘So all the 
psych patients end up being held in the E.R.’s. And when you’re 
trying to discharge patients, there’s no long-term care to discharge 
them to. There’s no discharge to hospice care because there’s 
none available.’ Home health aides are virtually nonexistent, she 
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added. ‘Hospitals are confronted with the question: How you are 
going to discharge these people?’ Ms. Matherne said” (Barringer, 
2006).  
 
Barringer (2006) found the post-Katrina healthcare landscape lost more than Charity Hospital. In 
her view, the slow pace of repairing long-term care facilities meant functioning hospitals had no 
place to discharge mentally or chronically ill patients, which exacerbated bed shortage issues 
because hospitals had difficulty discharging chronically ill patients to clear beds for those stuck 
in the emergency room. Hunter and Pope (2006) also suggested residents with psychological 
disorders suffered the most from slow healthcare infrastructure recovery:  
“The lack of resources is more acutely felt in the realm of mental 
health care, and patients with a history of mental illness are most 
at risk. Mental health officials and law enforcement agencies in the 
New Orleans area have reported a sharp increase in the number of 
requests to pick up mentally ill patients, a rise in the number of 
people who resist violently, or both. …Dr. Jeffrey Rouse, the 
deputy psychiatric coroner for Orleans Parish… said the rise in 
violent resistance since Katrina is a direct result of the all but total 
obliteration of the mental health system in the New Orleans area. 
‘There is no effective mental health infrastructure for the most 
severely mentally ill, the psychotic, the dangerous and the suicidal 
people who need to be hospitalized,’ he said.” 
 
In contrast to Barringer (2006), who depicted hospitals and emergency rooms as confronting 
mental health issues, Hunter and Pope (2006) reported the post-Katrina healthcare system left the 
police to deal with mentally ill residents due to the absence of in- and out-patient facilities to 
treat pre-existing and hurricane-related psychological disorders.  
Although Hunter and Pope (2006) viewed mentally ill residents as the most susceptible to 
shortages in the post-Katrina healthcare landscape, they quoted Dr. Daphne Glindmeyer, director 
of West Jefferson Medical Center’s Behavioral Medical Center, to show more people than those 
with pre-storm health issues had their vulnerability compounded by the lack of healthcare 
infrastructure in New Orleans after the disaster:  
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“Hurricane stress has become a dilemma for many more people 
than those who are chronically mentally ill or who have previously 
struggled with depression… [B]ad stress can be as debilitating as 
an illness, she said. And it can make those in poor health even 
sicker. …The indicators of stress and depression are almost 
identical because they’re so closely related, Glindmeyer said. In 
fact, residents could be plagued by Katrina stress for so long that 
it can morph into a clinical depression, anxiety or post-traumatic 
stress disorder. And in New Orleans, depression and anxiety can 
lead to other problems. ‘When we’re down and can’t sleep, what’s 
the first thing we New Orleanians do?’ Glindmeyer asked. ‘You 
might say, ‘Let me just have a drinky-poo or a cocktail or two and 
everything is going to be fine.’ But before you know it, you’ve got a 
drinking problem, too’” (Hunter & Pope, 2006).  
 
Hunter and Pope (2006) suggested the culture of the city, which provides easy access to alcohol, 
made New Orleanians more vulnerable to developing substance abuse issues than may be the 
case for other cities.  
Six years later in a NYT wellness blog article, Chen (2012), a medical doctor, portrayed 
the development of mental health disorders as a normal part of surviving disasters.  
“Most commonly and most immediately, the survivors suffered 
post-traumatic stress symptoms like recurrent nightmares, 
flashbacks, a hair-trigger temper and an emotional ‘numbing,’ 
much of which could be considered normal in the first couple of 
months after a disaster. …Over time, when those symptoms abated, 
survivors were able to move on. When they didn’t, or when other 
mood disorders like anxiety and depression appeared, mental 
health issues quickly became a leading cause of disability for 
survivors, further hampering other efforts at recovery” (Chen, 
2012).  
 
Chen (2012) echoed Glindmeyer’s assessment that long-term stress experienced after natural 
disasters can lead to mental disorders, such as depression and anxiety. Although it was common 
for survivors to develop post-traumatic stress disorder, Chen (2012) asserted that when left 




“But the research has also revealed that we can mitigate the 
psychological fallout, even after the disaster has occurred. Studies 
from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita have shown that what 
communities, governments and even elected officials do in the 
weeks, months and years that follow can have a significant effect 
on how individuals fare psychologically. For example, among 
Hurricane Katrina survivors, there were striking differences in the 
rates of mental health disorders, depending on how people felt 
about the difficulties they had finding food and shelter. Survivors 
who continued to face such adversity because of the government’s 
slow response had significantly higher rates of mental health 
problems” (Chen, 2012). 
 
In Chen’s (2012) view, the slow pace of government action and recovery exacerbated the 
vulnerability of residents unable to secure basic necessities. Chen (2012) reported difficulties 
experienced during recovery worsen psychological trauma, which makes individual recovery 
harder to attain. Chen (2012) and Hunter and Pope (2006) agreed a lack of healthcare facilities 
and medical professionals limited treatment options and created more incentive for residents to 
turn to drugs or alcohol to alleviate storm-related trauma.  
 Both samples portrayed decisions that left the city without healthcare facilities for ten 
years as compounding the vulnerability of returned residents. However, the sampled authors 
agreed healthcare shortages impacted mentally ill residents the most. The samples used expert 
opinions to highlight the negative consequences of post-Katrina healthcare shortages, which 
included: higher rates of violently resisting arrest and relying on emergency rooms rather than 
primary care physicians. increased emergency room wait times from hours to days, developing 
additional psychological issues (such as depression or anxiety), and developing substance abuse 
issues. Chen (2012) also asserted government officials could facilitate healing or sickness 
depending on the actions and policies they implement. The sampled authors showed the slow 
pace of rebuilding healthcare facilities exacerbated health issues for all residents by limiting 




 Both samples found policy design and implementation issues created disparate impacts 
along race and class lines. In the TP, Hammer (2008b) wrote:  
“A United Nations treaty committee ruled Friday [March 7, 2008] 
that the United States’ response to Hurricane Katrina has had a 
greater negative impact on displaced Black residents and called on 
the federal government to do more to guarantee that they can 
return to affordable housing in their hometowns.”  
 
Hammer (2008b) reported the U.N. committee found the federal government guilty of 
implementing racially discriminatory recovery policies that compounded the vulnerability of 
poor African Americans more so than wealthy, non-minority residents. The article emphasized 
international law defined racial discrimination by the effect of policy decisions on minorities, 
regardless of the intent of the policies. The authors suggested U.S. officials denied charges of 
racial discrimination by indicating the intent to discriminate did not exist even when disparate 
impacts were clear. 
 In the first theme, the sampled articles portrayed recovery as an opportunity to improve 
the city’s quality of life for all residents, especially low-income minorities. In the NYT, Dewan 
(2009) described what happened to the city’s most vulnerable:  
“They were among the region’s poorest people before the storm hit 
in August 2005, their lives once supported in New Orleans by a 
dense web of family ties and familiarity. Many were elderly, sick, 
addicted, mentally ill or otherwise disabled, unskilled or 
uneducated, and traumatized. Their children were behind in school 
or acting out. The storm was initially hailed as an opportunity to 
give them a better life, but as time progressed, thousands of 
families disappeared into the yawning gaps in government aid.”  
 
Dewan (2009) claimed quality of life improvements did not manifest for vulnerable populations 
because recovery policy contained design flaws and implementation issues. In a ten-year 
anniversary NYT article, Harris (2015) presented a similar view: 
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“Of course, many of the city’s pre-storm problems persist. Its 
poorest residents have received few benefits from its revived 
economy, the school makeover may not be quite as successful as 
boosters claim, and some advocates worry that a new hospital will 
cater to a rich clientele at the expense of services to the poor” 
(Harris, 2015).  
 
Both samples depicted recovery as failing to improve the lives of the city's most vulnerable 
residents, but as Harris (2015) indicated, competing narratives existed that supported opposing 
views on recovery policy.  
 Some sampled articles portrayed recovery policies as a successful. However, the samples 
showed the success was limited to certain segments of the population. Both samples also 
provided more emphasis on negative outcomes than positive outcomes. The sampled articles 
argued design and implementation issues limited the ability of recovery policies to help 
vulnerable populations. Sampled authors used the Road Home programs to show how 
stereotypes and poor assumptions created ineffective policies for poor and minority homeowners 
and landlords. They also described situations where recovery policy left gaps in assistance that 
poor and minority residents had difficulty overcoming. The next chapter explores the findings 
from the interviews, which allowed the participants to describe how recovery policy and gaps in 




Opportunity Knocks: The Pushes and Pulls of Place 
 The content analysis findings showed recovery policy contained design and 
implementation issues that created gaps in assistance. The participants framed these gaps as 
needs for which there was little or no help. From the deductive ‘influences’ code, a list of pros 
and cons about opportunities in New Orleans and in Houston emerged that influenced 
participants’ decisions about return. The interviews showed each city offered a set of 
opportunities and challenges that participants experienced differently according to their life 
circumstances at the time of the levee failure. The inductive family and mental health codes 
showed the nuanced and varied trajectories that existed within the sample. For example, some 
participants stayed in Houston but stated their family returned to New Orleans. Others 
participants returned but found their family and friends stayed displaced. Additionally, some 
participants described living in Houston prolonged their emotional trauma while others moved to 
Houston as a strategy to heal.  
 Although participants had different experiences after Hurricane Katrina, they described 
similar factors that pulled them to New Orleans. Within the deductive ‘influences’ code, these 
factors emerged from the inductive codes: place attachment, culture, and pre-Katrina 
commitments (i.e.: employment, college, property). Participants viewed New Orleans as a 'one-
of-a-kind' city with a unique culture that they missed and feared may die if residents did not 
return. Respondents also indicated the disaster interrupted long-term plans and commitments. 
Some socioeconomic investments, like retirement, proved to be too important to sacrifice by 
starting over in Houston, which pulled case 1 participants to return despite the challenging 
circumstances they encountered in New Orleans after the disaster.   
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 All participants expressed the desire to return because New Orleans was home. However, 
circumstances emerged that pushed participants to choose long-term displacement and 
permanent relocation despite desires and plans to return. Participants acknowledged the city had 
negative cultural aspects, such as violence, racism, corruption, and partying, that deterred some 
from returning because they viewed themselves as more productive and their environments as 
safer than New Orleans could offer. Participants also portrayed recovery policy decisions as 
pushing residents to stay displaced. Policies limited participant access to housing, education, 
healthcare, and employment opportunities in New Orleans. Unable to find the means to return, 
many could not fulfill their desire. 
 Situations in Houston also exerted pressures that influenced participants’ decisions. 
Comprehensive, long-term disaster assistance combined with a higher quality of life in a fully 
functioning city pulled participants to consider establishing a new life in Houston. Participants 
reported other cities did not offer the same level of disaster assistance as Houston, so many 
relocated to Houston for disaster housing vouchers. Once participants arrived in Houston, they 
found better educational and economic opportunities that pulled them to stay. Some reported 
obstacles restricted their access to jobs and schools, but participants devised strategies to 
establish life in Houston and access the opportunities they saw. 
 Life in Houston, whether permanent or temporary, included challenges that pushed some 
participants to return to New Orleans. These challenges emerged from the inductive codes: 
culture, cost of displacement, and discrimination. Participants described cultural differences 
made building life in Houston difficult. They reported the size of the city as well as the way 
Houstonians treated them caused issues. Many participants described facing discriminatory 
treatment. This included being verbally assaulted and harassed as well as being denied jobs. 
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Some participants portrayed discriminatory treatment as a result of cultural differences where 
others blamed social stereotypes perpetuated by the media. The chapter explores the cycle of 
influences that participants described in the interviews, as depicted in Figure 2 below. 
Figure 2: Pushes & Pulls of Place 
 
“There’s no place like home”: Pulled to New Orleans 
 Two factors emerged from the ‘influences on decisions’ gross code that participants 
identified as motivations to return. Attachment to culture and a desire to preserve cultural 
traditions for future generation emerged as the primary reason participants wanted to return and 
rebuild their communities. All of the participants described their attachment to their culture and 
commented they missed the food, music, people, and outdoor culture of New Orleans while 
displaced. In addition to culture, some participants returned because they could not transfer their 
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socioeconomic investments to other locations. For example, participants with decades invested in 
a retirement plan found starting over in Houston required sacrificing retirement benefits. 
Homeownership and college also emerged as pre-Katrina commitments that pulled participants 
to return after the disaster. 
 The content analysis and interviews revealed a contradiction in assumptions about who 
would return. The sampled articles suggested planners assumed residents would not return unless 
persuaded through social improvements. The interviews showed participants evacuated, 
assuming they would be back quickly to repair damages and continue their lives under similar 
social conditions. A teenager when Hurricane Katrina hit, Regina Walker stated: “We really 
thought we were going to come back to something. I mean I remember my mom… was mad 
because we didn’t clean our room and she got really, really pissed before we left. She was like, ‘I 
do not want to come back to a filthy house.’” Respondents knew Hurricane Katrina could cause 
major damages, but they assumed their life would be there to return to after the storm passed. 
Marcus Booker explained: 
“It was sort of almost like a normal weekend trip, ya know. That’s 
...how people went about leaving for the hurricane anyway. ...We 
didn’t pack everything we could’ve packed … ‘cause years in the 
past if we evacuated for something it was only for a short period of 
time. You leave, go away, come back, and nothing’s changed. 
That’s the kind of mind set we had, ya know. Wherever you ended 
up going was vacation.”  
 
After it became apparent that the levee failure would cause long-term displacement, participants 
spoke of when, not if, they would return. Jason Boissiere reunited with his parents and siblings at 
the Reliant Center in Houston. At their first breakfast in the shelter,  Jason stated “We knew we 
had to start over, but we had family. It was good. …[We talked about] going back, ya know, 
thinking about rebuilding… Where we gonna start at?” Although they evacuated after the 
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flooding,  Jason Boissiere and his extended family planned to rebuild as soon as the city allowed.  
Jason Boissiere showed the assumptions that guided recovery in the media’s perception did not 
match those held by participants. 
Culture emerged as the primary justification for participants’ attachment to New Orleans 
and desire to return. Eleven participants stated they wanted to return because of their culture. 
Steven Bell, a truck driver, described how the city’s leisure-time and outside culture influenced 
his decision to return:  
“Houston wasn’t my home. There’s no place like New Orleans, ya 
know. I’ve been all over, driving in America, and there’s no place 
like New Orleans, so Houston was nowhere near New Orleans. It 
was nice, but in New Orleans you can go to the lake; you can sit 
out. You can go to the park; you can sit out. You can listen to your 
music. You won’t be harassed.”  
 
 Marcus Booker agreed: “I’ve always wanted to come back home. There’s no place like it here, 
none whatsoever. …[Y]ou miss the way New Orleans was ...just the whole atmosphere and 
feeling down here.” Participants in each case viewed New Orleans as a one-of-a-kind city and 
stated Houston could not replace the food, music, or leisure culture with which residents 
identified. Some participants stated if residents had to start over, many wanted to start over 
where they felt comfortable.  
 Culture evoked the desire to return for another reason as well. Participants thought their 
culture would die and their history would be erased if residents stayed displaced. Joseph Johnson 
stated:  
“Oh man, it’s losing a track of culture, ya know. A preservation of 
culture and history, ya know. What happened in ‘05 with Katrina 
will be written in textbooks… By not having the people there, 
you’re losing that richness, that direct connection of people who 




Three participants said residents needed to return to preserve the city’s way of life for future 
generations. For example, Marcus Booker emphasized:  
“New Orleans had that sense and that feel and that culture 
because the way it was laid out and the people that preceded us. 
And those people can’t get out and do those things anymore. It’s 
all upon my generation ...to make sure we continue those traditions 
and those efforts to keep our city, our culture, going out here. …I 
know my parents ...can’t get out and do as much as they used to 
anymore. If they’re not able to go and be in an original Illinois 
men’s club and go to …Mardi Gras balls and stuff like that, then I 
got to make sure I do ...because we want those organizations to 
keep going...”  
 
In  Marcus Booker’s view, young professionals needed to return because they had the economic 
means and social power to sustain cultural traditions, including restaurants and social 
organizations.  Marcus Booker continued,  
“I challenge a lot of my friends that have left and gone somewhere 
else …to come back. …If I can be a voice of any kind to try and get 
certain people, movers and shakers, or people that I know just 
have some sort of energy, if I can get some of those people to come 
back, then that’s part of my goal. It’s really upon us to make this 
city what it used to be.” 
 
Similar to  Marcus Booker, three other participants admitted they wanted to help people return 
because they thought their culture would be lost if residents chose to start over elsewhere.  
Cultural ties and place attachment were not the only factors that pulled participants to 
return. The interviews revealed the disaster happened while some participants were in the middle 
of long-term plans. Pre-Katrina commitments, such as college, property, and employment, 
emerged as reasons to return when participants described they had too much invested in their 
former lives to start over in Houston. Thomas Stevens's determination to graduate from Tulane 
University influenced his decision-making process:  
“I knew ...I was coming back home like without a doubt. ...I have 
too much at stake at home. I can’t leave. ...I knew ...when I found 
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out that school was opening back up that I was coming back. I was 
really waiting on the university to tell us, to say, ‘Hey, we’re 
gonna have classes again.’ As soon as school said we’re having 
classes, I was going back because I went to school on a waiver. ...I 
was hoping that I could continue to go to school on waiver, but my 
mom lost her job. As a result of that… it wound up screwing 
everything else up. But yeah, I was coming back because I wanted 
to finish at Tulane.” 
 
Thomas Stevens did not think he could transfer his life to Houston because he went to a top 
research institution for free. He returned in January 2006 when Tulane University reopened. To a 
working class student like Thomas Stevens, graduating from Tulane represented an opportunity 
for social mobility and an end to working multiple low-wage service jobs to make ends meet.  
Owning property emerged as another pre-Katrina commitment that drew participants 
back. Eleven participants, including seven homeowners and four renters, stated homeownership 
influenced return decision-making. Paulette Watson explained: 
“I wanted to come back home and I didn’t know when we was 
gonna come back home to see about my house, to see how it was... 
I knew I had insurance, but this is my house, where I stayed at. 
And where I was, ya know, it was just something that was 
temporary for us. …When we got to Sugarland although the people 
was nice, I was ready to go to my house, ya know, get in my bed... 
It’s hard. It’s hard. People treat ya nice, but there’s nothing like 
your own house, getting in it, getting in your own bed, ya know.” 
 
 Paulette Watson wanted to return to her house because it represented a return to stability, 
independence, and familiar surroundings.  Steven Bell’s house provided a different motivation. 
He stated, “I wanted to come home because my family house, ya know. I wanted to get that back. 
…My family had property when Black folks didn’t have property, so I felt I needed to come back, 
do what I can, rebuild that house for my grandfather.”  Steven Bell highlighted the significance 
of owning land for Black families. In his view,  Steven Bell needed to repair and maintain the 
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family land in order to honor his grandfather’s sacrifice as well as the historical struggle of the 
Black community to participate in the country’s housing market.  
 In addition to housing and college, employment also emerged as a social investment that 
pulled residents to New Orleans. Seven participants indicated that pre-Katrina employment 
influenced the decisions they made after the storm.  Lisa Wilson found state licensing laws 
restricted where her husband could work as an attorney:  
“My husband is barred [licensed] there, so he had to go back. We 
had no way to make income... He’s not barred here [in Houston], 
so he kept going there because he had clients there and also...he 
helped those from Houston that had cases there and he just would 
go back and forth, but he was so tired.” 
 
Two other case 2 participants reported transferring their professional licenses in order to work 
while displaced. They worked in fields with similar requirements among states. However, Lisa 
Wilson's experience highlighted some professionals had Louisiana specific knowledge that did 
not transfer easily to other states.  
 Four participants discussed how age influenced some people's commitment to their job 
and led them to return. In 2005, Paulette Watson had invested 27 continuous years as a city 
employee, but she had borrowed from her pension years before when one of her sons faced 
criminal charges. She stated: 
“I wanted to come back home because I had a job. I tried [to stay 
in Houston], but I’m at the age that I need to retire. I can’t stay out 
here, ya know. That’s why I came back home because I knowed I 
had a job. When they sent me a letter saying if I retire how much I 
would get, I knowed I would just be another Hurricane Katrina 
victim because I wouldn’t have been able to make it off that little 
$500 a month, so I had to come back home.” 
 
The disaster interrupted people at different stages of life. Paulette Watson's experience shows 
that some residents returned because they could not transfer their investment in their careers to 
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other cities. Participants described residents close to retirement as more likely to return than 
young professionals, who they viewed as being able to start over easier.  
 For some participants, employment operated as a means to return. Respondents stated 
they had the desire to return and acted upon it when prior workplaces reopened or they found 
new jobs in New Orleans. Culture and property motivated Steven Bell to return, but employment 
in New Orleans enabled him to return in 2007. He explained:  
“I came in for the Mardi Gras. It was the final weekend of Mardi 
Gras. Ya know everybody comes to New Orleans from New 
Orleans to the Mardi Gras. I came in during that time… so what 
happened was …I was scheduled to go back to Houston the Friday, 
but Thursday I was going over to my old house in New Orleans to 
cut the grass. And I said, well let me fill out this application here at 
this company I knew of, and they hired me back. ...They called me 
that Friday. I was putting my luggage in the car to go back to 
Houston, and they called me for the job. So I was still making 
about the same as I was making in Houston, still in the same field, 
so when they gave me [a] chance to get home and do some things 
at the house, figuring I’d be [able to] fix the house up, get in it, ya 
know. So that’s how I got back here.” 
 
Participants indicated just because they wanted to return did not mean they could. They needed 
the means to live in New Orleans, such as a place to stay and a source of income.  
The interviews revealed the media and participants had conflicting assumptions about 
return. Respondents planned to return when they evacuated for several reasons. Most 
importantly, participants did not expect the levee failure. They described being attached to New 
Orleans because of their cultural traditions and because they identified the city as home. In 
addition to culture and place attachment, participants stated pre-Katrina commitments influenced 
their decisions to return. The disaster hit when some participants found themselves close to 
accomplishing long-term goals. Others found their socioeconomic investments, such as property 
or years at a job, could not be transferred to other cities. The interviews suggested this made 
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starting over in Houston more of a sacrifice for some residents than others, particularly older 
residents close to retirement or close to paying off mortgages. 
The interviews also showed fifteen participants assumed their lives would continue in 
New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina passed. Twelve participants, including six case 2 
respondents, indicated they planned to return because they identified New Orleans as home. For 
example, Cora Williams commented: “I thought I would. I thought I would because it was 
home.” Despite the intention and desire to continue life in New Orleans, only eight respondents 
found the means to move back to New Orleans, and three of the eight had left by 2010 because 
the means to survive did not last. The interviews showed case 2 participants experienced the pull 
to come home even though they chose to stay in Houston. The next section explores the factors 
participants identified as pushing them to leave New Orleans and deny their desire to return and  
continue life in New Orleans.  
“You can’t go home again”: Pushed from New Orleans 
As participants described their intention to return, their narratives turned to circumstances 
that made them postpone coming back. The government response to Hurricane Katrina and the 
levee failure emerged as the first obstacle. The second arose when the city reopened and 
participants began visiting. Seeing the destruction and living conditions pushed many to delay 
returning until conditions improved. However as time passed, participants stated recovery made 
New Orleans unrecognizable. Everything familiar was gone, and the only neighborhoods that 
seemed to improve between visits were places tourists visited. Some described recovery and the 
displacement as an intentional process designed to block the return of poor Black residents. 
Participants reported many of the city’s flaws became worse after the storm.    
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The government response to Hurricane Katrina and the levee failure deterred seven 
participants from returning. Participants thought all levels of government failed the people of 
New Orleans by offering little relief to residents in the flooded city. Edith Jones spent the storm 
in a hotel room provided by the Astor Crowne Plaza, where her mother worked as a tailor. 
Although she heard people on the street talk about help being on the way; she came to realize 
that help was not intended for her or her family. Edith stated: 
“Seven days went by, no help. …Ya heard that the military was 
coming, etc. etc. Well next door to the Astor Crowne is the Ritz 
Carlton Hotel. So the military comes in, and we think, ‘Okay, help 
is here. We’re about to get out of here.’ No, they’re there to get the 
rich people. Load ‘em up on the tanks. Load them up on the busses. 
They’re taking them to the other end of Canal Street where they 
had charter busses to get them out of the city or whatever they 
were doing to get them out of the city. …The hotel was just fed up. 
On day seven, they just put everybody out. ‘That’s it. Get out. 
You’re on your own. Don’t want you in there. That’s a wrap.' …So 
I told my mom and my daughter to stay there and I ...walked down 
Poydras to see how did it look around the Superdome. No, not a 
good look. You saw dead bodies in the wheel chairs. Saw the older 
people dehydrated, slumped over, bodies exposed from the heat; 
they kind of burst open or swelled up from being warm. So I 
decided that’s not what we’re going to do. Made friends with this 
guy [and found out] they’re sending busses to the Westbank of 
New Orleans. All we have to do is get to Oakwood Mall. That’s 
where the busses will be. Well, had to figure how you’re going to 
get over there. Word was Harry Lee [Jefferson Parish Sherriff] 
had his troops on the bridge saying, couldn’t go across. ‘Shoot to 
kill.’ So what we decided to do, everybody was counting the money 
they had in their pocket and we decided to pool our money 
together, found this one man, Mexican guy with a pickup truck. We 
told him we would give him 40 dollars to bring us across the 
bridge. He did. He was in such of a hurry he didn’t even get the 
money because he was hurrying trying to pick up this other family 
that was trying to go further down… Made it across. And stood 
there. Waited in front of Oakwood. …and two days later, three 
days later. The busses finally came. By then, you’re dehydrated. 
You’re aggravated. So you’re thinking you’re leaving the city, but 
no they’re just taking you from the Westbank to drop you off on ...a 
dry spot on I-10 to wait for more busses to come. So once they 
drop you off. You have the military there. They have military meal 
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packets. They have cots. That’s where we stayed for another four 
days, sleeping under the stars on I-10. Pitch black at night unless 
the military has their lights on, but of course you can only run so 
long on generators because you need the fuel. The busses finally 
came. They didn’t tell you where you were going, basically herding 
cattle on busses. Families were getting split up. Kids screaming 
and hollering ‘cause they can’t be with their parents because they 
just toss you on a bus, no questions asked. Ended up in Texas. 
Ended up in Kellar, Texas to be exact, some church. They didn’t 
say too much of anything. All you heard was welcome. That was 
pretty much it. Ya know, ‘Get your clean clothes. We have hot food 
waiting on ya.’ Still you don’t know where you are, so how do I 
know I can trust you?” 
 
Edith's narrative suggested the limited relief efforts privileged wealthier residents and people 
with personal transportation. She also showed participants strategized to reach help and worked 
with those around them when relief failed to arrive. When asked about returning,  Edith stated, 
“There was pretty much no conversation. [My mother] said, ‘I am not going back to that place. 
They tried to kill us, and I will not allow them to do it again.’ So that was pretty much the end of 
it. She’ll go to visit, but she doesn’t have a desire to live back in New Orleans." The slow 
response to evacuate residents after the levees failed exacerbated the historic distrust between 
African Americans and government institutions. Participants expressed they no longer trusted 
government officials to keep them safe or assist them in times of distress.  
Participants that evacuated before landfall also expressed frustration at the treatment 
residents received during the immediate response. Joseph explained: 
“Katrina hurt, but it wasn’t much of the natural disaster part. It 
was how the people got treated afterwards, during and afterwards. 
And even today, ya know, it’s just like …what’s up with people’s 
minds? How can they treat human beings like this? People who’ve 
...gotten arrested for just trying to get a ride out of town, and the 
fact they took a postal truck. I’m like, if it’s just going to sit there, 
but they ...in trouble for stealing government property.... I mean, 
come on now! Preserve life, and you worried about a damn truck!? 
I don’t get it. ...You got cops breaking into people’s stuff and 
stealing stuff outta stores... It’s okay for y’all to ...steal 
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merchandise. These people are trying to get a freaking loaf of 
bread and a bottle of water - food that’s going to go to waste 
anyway if nobody eats it, and you got all these hungry freaking 
people out here, thirsty, ya know. It’s that kind of stuff that makes 
Katrina hurt for me." 
 
Joseph framed his trauma as a result of government decisions, not the disaster. The participants 
reported officials punished residents that broke the law to save themselves when no rescue team 
arrived.  
Three of the four participants that evacuated after the levee failure described the police as 
offering no relief. When the Lafitte Projects began to flood, Jason Boissiere walked to the 
Superdome, where he stayed outside waiting for busses. He described the police as “just like 
regular civilians. They just had the guns." With his daughter, her one year old son, and some of 
her extended family, Shawn Jackson sheltered in place in a vacant third story apartment in the St. 
Bernard Publc Housing Development. Similar to Edith Jones and Jason Boissiere, he explained 
how they devised strategies to reach relief but reported the police officers he met provided no 
assistance. Shawn Jackson stated: 
“Somehow we had some boats floating like a pallet or whatever. 
Some people was on a door, ya know, floating. …My daughter’s 
auntie and her boyfriend, they got a boat, a little skiff and they was 
taking people to the bridge right there …They got helicopters 
supposed to be picking people up and transporting them to safer 
ground. So we get to the bridge, and they say no more people was 
able to evacuate there, so we came back [to the St. Bernard 
projects]. But the next day, early in the morning, got to the bridge, 
we stood on the bridge for ...about 24 hours, and eventually I 
walked from here to New Orleans airport. My daughter had left 
‘cause they was taking women and children first off the bridge by 
helicopter. So when we went down to …Causeway where it wasn’t 
flooding at, and they had busses supposedly coming…, but I was 
out there like 16 – 18 hours, waiting and waiting. I was like where 
are the busses at, so I just started walking. Me and two guys that I 
had met...  Said, ‘Man let’s leave. Let’s walk until we just get some 
assistance’, so we walk and walk. …Walking from Causeway to the 
New Orleans airport. …Early in the morning like when the sun 
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broke, we walking and walking, walking up Airline. Walking and 
walking, and once you crossed Orleans Parish line, it become 
another parish, so …police pull up. Stopped us. Stopped us, us 
three walking. Had a bottle of hot water, briefcase and whatever 
they had on their back, stopped us like, ‘How y’all gentlemen 
doing?’’We doing alright.’ ‘Where y’all coming from?’ ‘Officer, 
we coming from the storm.’ ‘Where y’all headed?’ ‘We headed to 
higher ground.’ That’s what I’m telling them. ‘Okay, y’all have a 
nice day.’ No assistance. Can I give y’all a ride? How far are y’all 
going? That was the first one that stopped us. ...It took me 4 hours 
to walk from here to the airport. Maybe about an hour later, now 
another one (mimics siren). ‘Where y’all gentlemen headed?’ 
‘We’re just walking officer, trying, ya know, to get away from this 
water.’… ‘Okay y’all have a nice day.’ (long pause) Officer of the 
law training and whatever they go through, I’m like, you don’t 
have any assistance!? You can’t ask like, ‘Okay, y’all need a ride? 
You need a lift? How far ya going?’ That was the second one. 
When the third one stopped us, …’Gentlemen, where y’all headed.’ 
(long pause) ‘We just came from the storm officer.’ My nerves had 
done got bad. I said, if I say something, they probably gonna take 
me to jail. ‘We just coming from under the Causeway Bridge from 
the water. The busses was coming or whatever.’ ‘Okay, y’all have 
a nice day.’ I’m like, (pause) you can’t give us a ride. You can’t 
offer us some water or nothing. I’m like, this don’t make any sense 
to me. I’m like, (pause) officers of the God Damn law. I’m like, so 
when he went that way. I went. I just kept walking until I got to the 
airport. . . . Well that experience there, just walking up Airline 
when police in another parish see you walking and know why 
you’re walking. You know, we ain’t just walking that early in the 
morning. We dirty, hot. …There’s not assistance from the police 
when …three different ones stopped us? And they Metairie, they 
had done left because they didn’t know how bad it was going to be, 
so we wasn’t trying to break into nobody’s houses, if they thought 
that. Rob them. Who we gonna rob? Ain’t nobody here. Whatever. 
We walking the streets. It’s like a ghost town. We getting out, 
trying to get to higher ground, find some way we could 
communicate with our family. If possible, my cell phone come back 
on. I don’t know. I got to experiment like oh boy.” 
 
In the participants' view, metro police prioritized protecting private property and maintaining law 
and order over helping residents evacuate.  
Participants attributed the lack of immediate relief and the slow federal response to the 
city’s demographics. Lemont Cummings evacuated to Houston with his family before Hurricane 
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Katrina hit. When he returned around September 7, 2005, to assess losses at his company, Edith 
Jones, Jason Boissiere, and Dwayne Edwards were still waiting to evacuate, and the National 
Guard had stopped Raymond Davis and Marcus Booker from entering New Orleans to search for 
family members and to check on personal property. Upon recalling the trip,  Lemont Cummings 
commented:  
“It brought back those stories. When I was a kid, my dad would tell 
me, ‘Do whatever you wanna do. Just don’t go into the army 
because this country doesn’t care a thing about black people.’ And 
I knew in my heart that if that had been a predominately white city 
the response would have totally been different. And it made me 
very angry. It did. It really did. It made me very angry. When I got 
back, my daughter who was ...6 years old. She (pause) She and I 
have always been very close, [ but] I really didn’t want human 
interaction because I just needed time to process all that 
destruction I saw. And it just was not something that I would ever 
have expected to see in the United States of America. It was really. 
. . (pause) I don’t have the words to explain. ...There were no 
words to describe it. It was… It was terrifying beyond the point of 
watching the towers fall, beyond the point any act of war could 
bring. This was an act of nature, but the simple callous obtuseness 
that government had toward the suffering of its own people was 
just repulsive. I remember thinking at that moment that I had 
wished that someone would actually take a shot at Bush, so maybe 
we could get some leadership in place to do something. I 
remember thinking that if something had happened to him, I 
probably would’ve said, ‘Thank God’ for it. It was that bad. That 
was right after the storm.” 
 
Lemont Cummings attributed the slow response and lack of relief to “outright blatant racism” 
and portrayed federal leaders as racist. Joseph Johnson agreed, but tied the response to class 
discrimination as well: 
“The response...if it was a rich city…it would’ve been way 
different. People would’ve been jumping, ‘Oh, are you okay?’ 
Alright. (snaps) They would’ve been on it like that, ya know. But 3, 
4, 5 days; however long people waited for help in New Orleans 
after Katrina. That was ridiculous. That was ridiculous. ...Anytime 
that I see stuff that happens with a natural disaster, and it’s a call 
for evacuation, like with the wildfires here in Texas, they just down 
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play if it’s ...poor black people... ‘We don’t need them anyway.’ 
...It’s like they want something bad to happen, so they don’t have 
to deal with us. And then …they won’t have nobody put up a fight 
because they know...black people have come a long way and... 
when we ...agree and come together we can do some damage, good 
damage, ya know. …If it was Los Angeles, Beverly Hills, or 
whatever, man, they’d a been all trying to preserve stuff. They’d be 
trying to clean it up as fast as possible, ya know. …But it’s like 
people look down on New Orleans because of the people and 
because of the crime rate and everything else but then want it to be 
on the map at the same time because it’s Queen of the South and 
they have …all the good music and food and everything else that 
they want.” 
 
Participants viewed the government response as predicated on the race and class of the 
stereotypical New Orleans resident. They stated political leaders viewed their lives as 
expendable but celebrated their culture as though they existed independently of each other. These 
thoughts exacerbated distrust that the government would provide for their wellbeing in New 
Orleans and caused some participants to stay in Houston. 
 The lack of quick government relief emerged as only one factor that participants 
described as making them reluctant to return. Nine participants described visiting New Orleans 
after the disaster as a reason to delay return. For example, Paulette Watson described her first trip 
back in October or November 2005: 
“It was just depressing to me because everything was white here. 
The cars was white. The buildings was white. The whole street was 
white. …It was just sickening because ...the smell. …It was a funny 
smell you would smell, and I would get sick every time that I came 
here…to take care of my house. . . . It used to just make me sick. I 
couldn’t eat the whole while I was here, and I’d be glad when it 
was time for me to go back ...to Texas because I just couldn’t stand 
this.  ...Everybody was depressing. Everything was down. 
…Everything was just all messed up and, like I said, no lights. 
Everything was pitch black, but everything was white. The cars 
was white. The buildings. I was just wondering was this on the 
water... Everything turned white. It was...just like another country 
we was staying in because it didn’t look like New Orleans, ya 
know, the place that you called home. …It was just awful. I don’t 
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know how else to describe it. It just was awful when I first came 
here, and it stayed awful for a long time.” 
 
Through seeing the destruction, participants stated they realized it would take years for the city 
to recover and that they could not resume their life as it existed before the disaster. At the 
beginning of his 2011 interview, Thomas Stevens remarked he should have stayed in Houston. 
When asked to elaborate, he explained: “I said that I shouldn’t’ve come back because …. I left a 
comfortable …already functioning, moving society to come back to something that was 
devastated with a spirit that was devastated.” Participants indicated the importance of 
community morale to individual recovery and expressed relief efforts, which exacerbated 
community distrust of government actions, made it harder to adjust to the changes in living 
conditions.  
In addition to poor living conditions when they visited, participants portrayed seeing who 
lived in the city as a deterrent to return. Four participants described post-Katrina New Orleans as 
a “ghost town”. Joseph Johnson attempted to return in October 2005, but described the emptiness 
and lack of people as a living nightmare: 
“If I was to be put back in New Orleans now, it would just feel like 
I’m in Houston a little bit because ...none of my family’s there. 
…The people were the life of New Orleans. You drive through New 
Orleans now ...it’s so dead... I don’t want to be here. It’s like 
torture, ya know. It’s like, yeah, I’m home. It feels good to see my 
city, but then it’s like where are my people? It’s like waking up in a 
dream [or] a nightmare, and …you’re the only person there. It’s 
like where are your people? You don’t want to be the only one. It’s 
like I am Legend, ya know. You’re the only one, and it’s so 
deserted. It’s people you don’t know and you see all these white 
people, all these Mexicans. Where they come from? They don’t 
understand what used to go on right on this corner was the start of 
something big and the start of something new. They don’t know 
what used to be right there or just, ya know what I’m saying. ...It 




Participants reported their attachment to the people and the culture of the city pulled them to 
return. They suggested visiting became a barrier to return because it revealed the community 
they missed had not recovered . Lisa Wilson described how her view of the city determined her 
decision to stay in Houston:  
“I was so connected to [New Orleans] that it hurt so bad I couldn’t 
heal. I had to step back just so that I could heal because I couldn’t 
even save myself. If everybody over there is hurt, somebody needs 
to get some strength. I couldn’t heal. People would cry when I go 
home, and I’d say stop. I can’t come back to here. I can’t see this 
every day.” 
 
Nine participants described relocating to Houston as a way to live with the trauma of their 
homes' devastation. 
 Beyond the trauma of seeing the devastation,  some participants delayed return because 
they had concerns about environmental contamination and protection. Paulette Watson stated: 
“I was scared to take a bath. They said they water wasn’t right. …I 
was just scared to do everything because I worked for Sewage and 
Water Board. They was telling us a lot of stuff was contaminated 
here, and that’s why I was scared to come back. Because ya had to 
take shots, ya know, but I didn’t stay long enough to take the shot. 
I stayed away just because I didn’t wanna come back taking shots 
because why I have to take shots? Is there something wrong here 
that y’all not telling us?” 
 
Although she worked as a city employee, Paulette Watson did not trust government officials to 
be honest about the health risks posed by the flood water. To protect her family, she delayed 
returning to her Algiers home. Eight other participants also described how distrust for the 
government pushed them to reconsider their intention to return. Edith Jones explained:  
“I am disgusted at my city. I’m disgusted to no end. …That’s 
probably my real reason why I say I probably won’t ever go back. 
I’m disgusted because who’s to say that if another hurricane 
comes out because clearly [since] Katrina they’ve come pretty 
close. All this stuff about the engineering issues with the levees, 
what have you really done to fix it? I’m sure you’re not breaking it 
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all the way down and starting from scratch, so that means what? 
You’re patching it up here and there? Anything that’s patched up 
sooner or later is going wear away, so if you’re not doing it right, 
breaking it down and building it back up, you might not even waste 
your time putting yourself back in harm’s way. It’s a waste, simple 
as that, …and I’m very upset how it all turned out." 
 
After the levee failure and governmental response, participants no longer trusted the city, state, 
or federal government to provide environmental protection systems to keep them safe.  
 Participants returned to Houston when they saw the poor living conditions and lack of 
people in New Orleans, but they continued to visit, planning to return when conditions improved. 
However, participants described returning multiple times over years and finding little progress in 
African American neighborhoods. Shawn Jackson stated:  
“I’m saying twice a year [I visited], but no because …every time I 
came back I got discouraged. I’m like, what they doing? What they 
waiting to do to the city? And I’m like, okay, I’m gonna wait. Come 
back six months to a year later, and I drive around... They still 
ain’t done shit to the city. You’re discouraged. I’m like, ain’t 
nothing here!”  
 
Participants framed the slow pace of recovery as living in limbo. A former St. Bernard public 
housing resident and single mother of three, Ella Taylor explained: 
“I was like I want to go home, and then every time I would visit, it 
was like I was in a foreign land. I didn’t know anybody, and I was 
like, I can’t bring my kids back to this. School systems was to the 
kaputz, and I was like, I’ll just stay here in Houston. But I’ll get 
homesick and want to go home, so we would travel all the time. I 
had found me another job, and when I was off, I would travel. 
Christmas, Thanksgiving, New Years, income tax time. . . I’m 
going home, ya know. I don’t care who works. I’m going home. I 
need to go see my family. …I would only go at the end of the year, 
Thanksgiving or Christmas, and then the beginning of the new 
year. I would go between January and February, and I would 
always say I want to move back home. And then when I go home, 
and I’m driving around and everything is still looking like the 
hurricane hit. You still have cars turned over. The Lower 9th 
Ward, where my middle daughter’s grandmother lived, I go over 
there, and it’s like it’s a foreign land. But then Canal Street, 
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French Quarters, all that is back to up and running, but everything 
in the outside and the surround areas is just still damaged. ... 
You’re driving by and you’re seeing all these signs on the houses 
and I was like I just can’t… I can’t do it. I can’t do it. …But every 
time I would come back to Houston, I would keep chronically 
depressed, sick to my stomach, can’t eat for a couple of days and 
stay locked up in my room in the dark and cry. I just wanted to go 
back home." 
 
Participants described experiencing long-term instability and emotional trauma while waiting to 
determine if return would ever be possible.  
 As Ella Taylor indicated, participants viewed recovery as uneven among communities. 
Dwayne Edwards suggested the uneven recovery made Houston more appealing than returning 
to New Orleans: 
“I’m just more comfortable here. When I go to New Orleans I be 
wanting to come back here because it’s so depressing. And it’s not 
like it used ta [be]. It look like a third world or something. To me, 
it hasn’t been revitalized. Only thing they care about is the French 
Quarters. (pause) It’s thrown away. It’s the French Quarter, that’s 
the most important thing. It’s the French Quarters." 
 
The participants argued recovery efforts neglected African American neighborhoods and 
prioritized rebuilding tourist areas, which became a deterrent to return. Edith Jones elaborated: 
“From what I’ve researched, the best doctors have come from 
Charity, but they won’t even take the time to get it together. 
They’re half doing anything except the stuff for the tourists. What’s 
more important, your tourists or your residents? The residents 
bring the spirit of New Orleans that the tourists thirst to get when 
they come for New Orleans, when they come for Essence, when 
they come for Jazzfest, when they come for Mardi Gras season. 
That’s who makes up the city. The people. But they’re not rolling 
out their welcome mat for me to say, okay, I want to bring my child 
back to New Orleans and raise my daughter there." 
 
Participants thought city leaders prioritized rebuilding tourist attractions over social institutions 
that African American residents needed to return. They interpreted uneven recovery as a sign 
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government officials intended to displace them permanently, which increased their distrust of 
federal and local leaders and their frustration with recovery.  
 Policy as a barrier to return. The final series of pushes emerged from policy decisions 
made during recovery. Recovery policy changed the social and physical landscape of New 
Orleans. As participants described recovery outcomes, the invivo code “not what it was” 
emerged that conveyed how participants viewed the city after the Hurricane Katrina. All of the 
participants, except the two who were teenagers in 2005, described recovery policy as a barrier 
to return to New Orleans. In addition to the priorities that set the pace of recovery, participants 
provided examples of housing, education, and assistance policies that influenced their decision-
making processes. Although the content analysis argued recovery planners aimed to improve the 
city’s quality of life via policy change, participants viewed recovery policies as exacerbating 
city's flaws and deteriorating their quality of life.  
 In the interviews, policy emerged as the first barrier to return. Participants stated they 
wanted to return, but the city remained closed for weeks. Jason Bossiere explained: "We all were 
expecting to go back, but we couldn’t just go back. They told us we had to wait a month before 
the water would drain down in order to go back and just clean our houses out and gut ‘em." 
Each participant in case three returned within 10 days of the disaster, but the National Guard 
only allowed Lemont Cummings to enter to access his company's losses. Raymond Davis stated:   
“As I got to New Orleans, I was told I couldn’t go into the city, so I 
was like, ‘Well man, can I at least go to the dome and look for my 
daughter?’ And they were like, ‘You don’t even want to do that.’ I 
was told by the authorities there, ‘Even if we let you do that, the 
chances of you finding her are very slim to nil, and you may not 
want to find her right now because it may not be something you 
want to see.’ This is what the authorities told me, the national 
guard, standing across I-10 at ...Causeway. They weren’t letting 
anybody in unless they were National Guard or FEMA workers or 
something like that. ...When those authorities told me that I 
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couldn’t go in, my initial thing was, do I just ...buck the authorities 
and go in? ...I’d heard all the stories of people being shot and stuff 
like that and I knew if that happened ...not only would I not find 
her, ya know, we may never be reunited.” 
Participants devised strategies to return but did not out of fear of violence due to media coverage 
that Raymond suggested emphasized lawlessness. However, Jason reported, outside the 
Superdome: "Everybody was sharing. It was cool. The military came around ...threw the water 
off the thing like it was about to start a riot. Good thing people had common sense. They was 
helping each other at the time." Jason described the beginning of a therapeutic community 
emerging (Fritz, 1961; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977); however, participants argued the media 
ignored this narrative in favor of perpetuating stereotypes of African American residents as 
'violent criminals' (Phillips et al., 2010). 
 Eleven participants framed housing policy as a barrier to return to New Orleans. The 
study included homeowners, renters, and public housing residents; as such, participants 
described different ways that housing policy influenced their decisions. Ella Taylor lived in 
public housing prior to Hurricane Katrina. Although she suffered chronic depression in Houston 
and wanted to return to New Orleans, Ella stated, “We couldn’t go back. We had nothing to go 
back to, ” referring to the decision to demolish the Saint Bernard Public Housing Development, 
where she had lived since her first birthday. In her interview, she described several ways that 
recovery policy failed to help her return. The first hurdle emerged from the decision on how to 
compensate and accommodate public housing residents. She described her communication with 
public housing officials: 
“They told us that it was inhabitable, so we couldn’t move back to 
that. If we wanted to move back to the city, we had to find some 
other kind of housing. …That’s all I knew. I had grew up back 
there. My mom moved back there in, I wanna say, ‘81. I had been 
living back there all that time, until I was 25, so that’s all I knew. 
They sent us a letter telling us that they was going to compensate 
178 
 
us from them being uninhabitable, so I had to go drive down there 
and pick up my check, which was nine hundred dollars. It was 
three hundred dollars per person that lived in your home, so it was 
just me and my two kids, so that was 900 dollars. So I was like, 
compensate me? This is change. I was like, this is not a 
compensation. I was like, this is crazy. It was like, ya know, we’re 
going to give you this money, and you need to find you somewhere 
else to live. They were like, if you would come back, you have to be 
on a waiting list, and the waiting list was… (pause) a lot of people, 
so I was like, I’ll just stay where I’m at… (pause) til, ya know, 
everything dies down. People get settled in." 
 
Ella showed a disconnect between how she understood her loss and how HUD defined adequate 
compensation. She indicated three issues with HUD's compensation policy: it did not replace the 
stability public housing provided low-income households; it did not help displaced residents find 
new housing in New Orleans; and it did not acknowledge or address hardships caused by the loss 
of support networks.  
As federal officials chose to replace the old model of large public housing developments 
with mixed income communities, Ella encountered more factors that deterred her from returning 
with her family. She described how public housing redevelopment became an obstacle for her to 
return:  
“They tore down the apartment complex I lived in and built this 
new complex, and they have all these rules. …You can’t sit with 
your neighbors on the porch and congregate, ya know. I was used 
to that. Ya know, your friends come over and sit on the porch, and 
we talk, and we drink and be merry. Now, if it’s not you and your 
kids, you got the police showing up at your door like you’re having 
a party or something. So mom’s like, ‘You need to move back to 
Columbine.’ They call it Columbine Park [Columbia Parc at the 
Bayou District] or something. I was like, I’m not moving back 
there. My last little girl’s daddy is a convicted felon. He can’t even 
come visit me if he’s a convicted felon. I was like, I can’t move 
there. All these rules. People can’t sleep over at your house. They 
have to have a pass. ...I’m not used to that. I’m used to coming 
home if I wanna have 10 people sleep over at my house, I can do 
that without having to have clearance from the front office. They 
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got to do a background check on you and see if you’re a convicted 
felon or pedophile, and it’s like, I can’t move back to that."  
 
In addition to changes in the built environment, Ella found redevelopment policies implemented 
changes in social environments by enforcing rules that: limited resident autonomy; increased 
state policing of how low-income households live; and did not respect local culture.  
 Public housing residents were not the only participants in the study who reported issues 
with housing recovery. Participants described housing conditions and rental prices as another 
hurdle to return to after the disaster. Marcus Booker and his fiancée chose to sell their flood 
damaged home because they were uncertain their neighborhood would recover. In December 
2005, his fiancée returned to her job, and they began navigating the post-Katrina housing market 
as renters. Marcus described how living conditions led them to move multiple times: 
“December of 05, we started living in what was one of the only 
places to live …the American Can Apartments and… stayed there 
for maybe a month and a half, two months before we couldn’t take 
it because the place was infested with rats; and there was nothing 
they could do about it. Nothing anybody could do about it, but ya 
know, we just couldn’t take it anymore. …So we left there and 
ended up finding a place to rent on General Taylor uptown. 
…When we moved uptown, it was just not having your own 
[home]. We were accustomed to not renting anymore. So now 
paying what we were paying for rent was what anybody’s 
mortgage would be, and [it] didn’t really matter what kind of 
house you get. The rent was so high you could buy any house and 
have a smaller mortgage. [For a] two bedroom apartment, we was 
paying 1600 dollars a month and that’s outrageous! Pre-Katrina, 
that’s 7, 800 dollar property, maybe a thousand at the most, 
depending on the quality of it. But 16, 1800 dollars? Naw. I mean, 
everybody was getting robbed, but you had to have a place to live. 
You have to if you were working here. And then wanting to be in 
certain areas that you were familiar with that played a lot into it. 
And being in areas that were populated... We almost moved into a 
house that was quickly refurbished in the Gentilly area, …but there 
was no lights on the street after evening time, and we were like the 
only people on the two block area, and it was just really 
uncomfortable, Really uncomfortable... so that kinda made you 




With housing in short supply, rent prices doubled. As  Marcus found, the higher prices did not 
mean returning residents received a higher quality of housing. On the contrary, respondents 
reported living conditions deteriorated as rents increased.  
 Participants framed the post-Katrina housing market as one where individual households 
could not survive alone. Edith Jones discussed a strategy to secure affordable housing in New 
Orleans after the disaster: 
“I go back home as often as I can. I just went back home in August. 
When I go home, I wish I could stay, but the housing is so (pause) 
oh my God and fluctuating! You have to probably have like seven 
or eight people living with you just to split the bills because the 
cost is ridiculous. I mean the congestion that has come. I have 
never known the Westbank to be so congested, and I’ve lived on 
the Westbank the majority of my life. It is congested. You don’t 
have anywhere to stay. I mean, you still have people trying to get 
on housing programs. It’s like, if you’re not on housing you can’t 
get back in the city, simple as that. You’re not on housing; you 
won’t have anywhere to stay. Nobody wants to raise their family in 
a house full of people. I mean after so long you get burned out 
being on top of each other. It’s crazy. Like right now I’m in a 
temporary situation because we’re in the process of buying a 
home, but this alone, staying here two weeks, being on top of each 
other is nerve wracking. Imagine going back home to a city, living 
like this for the rest of your life because the economy is just so 
shaken up and that greed that’s still in the hearts of the city that 
they can’t build housing where people can actually come back to 
go home." 
 
Edith suggested residents had to sacrifice living conditions in order to afford the post-Katrina 
housing surcharge discussed in the content analysis. Six participants framed greed and corruption 
as preventing officials from creating policy to help low-income families return.  
 Seven participants also depicted FEMA trailer living conditions as a reason to stay in 
Houston. For instance, Lisa Wilson stated:  
“Yes, we thought we were going home. We did until things started 
unfolding like you have to live in a formaldehyde trailer with a 
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baby with asthma and eczema, and the schools are not ready for 
you. My job was like, ‘You just won an award for all this great 
work you’ve done, and you’re coming back.’ And I’m like, ‘I don’t 
care about the money. I’m safe. I’m alive. I’m not going to put 
myself in a situation to live in a formaldehyde trailer just to come 
back. These are the conditions you provide. It’s not happening. I 
am healthy and I have help, real help, and I’m safe. Why would I 
put myself at risk? Really? So no.’” 
Lisa showed how recovery policies influenced her family to make decisions that contradicted 
their plan to return and encouraged them to continue building a new life in Houston. Shawn 
Jackson, Ella Taylor, and Lemont Cummings also framed staying displaced as a better option 
than returning to claustrophobic and carcinogenic trailers because Houston provided better 
temporary housing assistance.  
 The interviews showed returned and displaced residents evaluated housing assistance 
programs in New Orleans differently. When Thomas Stevens returned to college in January 
2006, he lived on campus because his pre-Katrina apartment flooded and his landlord sold the 
house instead of repairing it. In May, Tulane University kicked him out for nonpayment because 
he lost his tuition waiver when his mother lost her job and he could not afford tuition. He ended 
up living in a FEMA trailer with his mother and his girlfriend for two years because it was better 
than sleeping in his car. The FEMA trailer was intended for his mother’s friend. In contrast to 
other participants,  Thomas raised issues with eligibility requirements to participate in the 
program: 
“We didn’t own a house, so we wasn’t able to get a trailer... 
Trailers was provided to homeowners, but we were renters, so we 
didn’t have the benefit of being able to, well I don’t want to say 
benefit ‘cause it really wasn’t a benefit, but I mean if you wasn’t 
able to get temporary housing like some other folks were able to 
do, so we had to fend for a place to live." 
The different perspectives  indicate participants judged assistance programs based on their 
current housing options.  Participants struggling with homelessness in New Orleans wanted 
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access to trailers despite the health risks. However, displaced residents saw the trailers as a step 
down from the housing vouchers they had in Houston and interpreted the policy as an insult.  
 Respondents indicated problems with the homeowner programs as well. Participants 
depicted the Road Home - Homeowner Assistance Program as ineffective. For example, 
Raymond Davis remarked: “The Road Home was not a road home. The Road Home was a road 
to anywhere but home.” Of the seven homeowners interviewed, only one participated in the Road 
Home program. Paulette Wilson received $11,000 from Road Home and $18,000 from her 
insurance to fix her home, which did not flood but had part of the roof cave in. She stated: 
“I had got my apartment [in Houston] by that time that I had to 
meet with the insurance people in New Orleans. I came down here, 
and I met with them. They gave me the check to fix my house, but I 
still couldn’t fix my house because I didn’t know nobody who was 
going to fix it, ya know. …Everybody was charging [a lot]. It 
wasn’t like they give me a whole lot of money, so I had to be 
careful who I trusted with my money down here. …Most of it [was] 
money that I had saved, and I got it on my owns to really fix my 
house. They really didn’t do a whole lot.” 
 Paulette experienced the long wait to receive financial assistance as described in the content 
analysis. To rebuild, she reported homeowners needed: larger grants, trustworthy contractors, 
and the means to commute between Houston and New Orleans. Edith Jones suggested how the 
city could do better:  
“Someone [needs to] take better control of the funds. Actually 
make an effort because like with that Road Home program…down 
the line you start seeing how many people were getting shammed 
with that. The city needs to get a better rein on who’s delegating 
the funds [and] what are they truly doing with those funds. They 
need to have someone ...to make sure that they’re doing what they 
say they’re going to do because they were letting all these bootleg 
contractors come in and take advantage of the people. I mean 
really, if I’m giving you all my thousands of dollars? This is all 
that I have. It’s not even replacing a portion of what I lost, and all 
I’m trying to do is rebuild my life as I knew it before Katrina. It’s 
like the city’s just washing their hands clean of it. …I feel they put 
together a portfolio of actual certified contractors that are doing 
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work. ...Make the contractors work for the city. Make them go 
down to City Hall and fill out proper paperwork, where y’all can 
verify their skill set, their licensures, to make sure that they are 
who they say they are, and give that to the people. How hard is 
that? You do homework on everything else. It’s not that hard to 
have a bunch of contractors fill out a bunch of applications and, ya 
know, work for your people. It’s not that hard. It’s not. And that 
way you won’t have your people ...tying up City Hall with lawsuits 
because I’m sure you probably don’t have enough judges to handle 
it anyway. You’re letting the contractors get away with it ‘cause 
you don’t want to deal with it. You’re sweeping it under the rug. 
It’s a waste of time." 
Edith provided a solution to address the gap homeowners like Paulette experienced, who needed 
help finding contractors on top of grants to rebuild. Participants stated the city had an obligation 
to protect the recipients of federal grants from contractor fraud.  
 Six of the seven homeowners in the study found the Road Home - Homeowner 
Assistance Program failed to address their needs. Cora Williams and Lemont Cummings 
described being ineligible because their houses did not receive much damage. Lisa Wilson and 
Marcus Booker sold their houses in 2005, almost two years before the program started 
distributing checks. Steven Bell stated another family member used his mother's name to claim 
Road Home funds, which left her ineligible to receive federal aid to rebuild the family home. The 
flooding left Raymond Davis’s New Orleans East home uninhabitable, but he chose not to apply 
for Road Home funds. He explained:  
“I think a lot of people went after the assistance programs, the 
Road Home type programs. I never did, you know, I never did. I 
just went back to work. A lot of people I guess looked at it as an 
opportunity to get a fresh start... We all know the fraud stories... I 
just never wanted to be caught up in that kinda thing. My dad and 
my mom have always instilled in me that ‘the best way to get on 
your feet is to get off your butt’ …so that’s kinda the approach I 
always take. And I never did get into …the Road Home type 
programs, the government assistance programs, and fighting for 
different forms of assistance that were available. I never did."  
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Participants portrayed the Road Home - Homeowner Assistance Program as ineffective because 
it took too long to give grants that were too small to rebuild. Some participants stated in the 
midst of crisis they did not have the time or energy to fight or to wait for assistance.  
A few participants suggested politicians designed programs that failed to rebuild African 
American neighborhoods to keep African Americans from returning to New Orleans. Lemont 
Cummings stated: 
“If you ride through New Orleans East and the Ninth Ward, it still 
looks the same. There’s nothing that’s been done and basically 
that’s because tourists don’t go there. If tourists went there, they’d 
make it look better. …I think that a big reason why they haven’t 
done what they could’ve done – because 7 billion dollars is a lot of 
money to rebuild. They still haven’t accounted for where that 
money is or what’s been done with it, ...and no one’s there 
demanding that they give account. ...They just trying to 
conveniently put it all aside until it dies down enough for 
everybody to stick their hand in it. That’s really all they’re doing, 
and I feel that they are doing it because they don’t want the Black 
population back. They don’t want them to come back, and they 
know if they rebuild that area they would come back. ...They don’t 
want them there. I think it’s all government driven to keep those 
people from coming back.  
The whole Road Home program is nothing but an elaborate land 
sweep device. To get the Road Home money, you have to sign over 
a voluntary lean on your land or your property, which means it’s 
basically a loan. ...A lot of those people that took that money and 
bought a car or did something else with it, they lost that land. Now 
they didn’t have any immediate plans on fixing that land to begin 
with, but it’s still their land.  
If you’re going to say, ‘We’re going to give you a grant to fix your 
land, but we’re going to put a lean on your property, so we can 
take it,’ what’s the purpose of that except you want the property? 
It’s a land grab. It’s an old style western railroad land grab buy. 
That’s all it is. That’s all Sante Fe Railroad did when they came 
through the west. ‘Look we’ll help you build your ranch. We’ll 
loan you the money to build your ranch. You gonna sign the lean 
over to us. Oh by the way, now we coming through ‘cause we own 
the land. We moving you off.’ It’s a land grab. That’s all it is. 
That’s how they got the land to build the railroad. That’s how they 
gonna take the land from all those people that had homes: Road 
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Home money. All those people are gonna find themselves homeless 
and the government gonna be the people putting them out, period.  
Participants framed recovery as an intentional process to remove African Americans from their 
land that operated on multiple levels. First, they suggested uneven recovery prevented Black 
households from returning because their communities remained damaged. Second, participants 
claimed the Road Home program operated like a Trojan horse, a trap disguised as a gift, to take 
African American land. Third, they described documentation requirements and arbitrary rules 
that limited the ability of some residents to qualify for assistance. Five participants viewed these 
actions as deliberate moves to keep them displaced. 
 With assistance programs in New Orleans primarily focused on housing needs, 
participants reported recovery policy created barriers by the needs it failed to address, such as 
chronic unemployment.  Lemont Cummings stated:  
“At the time the only assistance to anyone was ...the Road Home..., 
and I didn’t have a home that was grossly affected by the storm. 
...We really didn’t qualify for any of the assistance that they had 
that we did know was available. That was pretty much it. We were 
on our own.”  
Each case 3 participant experienced long-term unemployment after he returned and described 
how few job prospects in his industry led him to relocate to Houston. Three case 2 participants 
chose not to return because the city lacked job opportunities for them. When asked what he 
needed to return to New Orleans, Raymond Davis responded:  
“Work, ya know, the ability to pay for my transactional life. That’s 
it. That’s it. ...I’m sure if I was a carpenter or brick layer, or 
mason, I’d be there, but I’m not that. I am not that. I’m a 
technically inclined person, not a build a house person. That 
industry isn’t there. That’s it. If it were there, I’d be there. …I 
hung on. I hung on for five years. I fought it. I fought it, and I 
fought it. But like I said, I hit a wall economically. I hit the wall to 
the point I couldn’t understand. I couldn’t see my next move. And I 
knew my family wasn’t [here]. I was the only one left. [Before] we 
had brothers, sisters, daddy, everybody living in New Orleans. 
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Then all of a sudden, I realize I’m by myself here. There’s no 
immediate family for me here. Everybody’s gone. Nobody’s at 
home, ya know. There are friends that have made it home, a couple 
of cousins, but it wasn’t my immediate circle of family that ...when 
I really needed somebody I knew where I could go. If I knew I 
needed 20 bucks for gas and I was broke, I could jump in the car 
and go over to my dad and grab it. That wasn’t here no more. That 
support system, the neighborhood support system wasn’t there, and 
it’s not there now.” 
Participants found they needed financial assistance to cover living expenses while the economy 
recovered because displacement scattered the friends and family in their pre-storm social 
networks around the country. Raymond showed some participants needed assistance more than 
five years after the disaster because some industries required a decade to rebound. 
 The final policy change that deterred participants from returning involved changes to the 
educational landscape. Eight participants described the post-Katrina school system as a reason to 
stay displaced. Edith Jones stated: 
“My niece just called me the other day and said how the schools 
are so swollen that they have to do a lottery for kids to go to 
school. A lottery? You mean to tell me my child may not have the 
potential to ...get a quality education because they don’t have 
enough schools to go around? That is ridiculous. They already talk 
about how behind southern kids are. What is this really doing to 
them? They’re crippling them. And then you have people that don’t 
know any other way of life but New Orleans. They’re crippled, too, 
especially if they’re other places or if they’re so stuck on the spirit 
of New Orleans that their children can’t leave. ‘My mama don’t 
want to leave, so I can’t go anywhere.’ So they’re stuck to live...[a] 
mediocre life because that’s all their parents know. But now it’s 
even worse because I can’t even get a decent education. I don’t get 
it.” 
 Edith showed participants viewed education policy changes as a reason to stay displaced 
because only a limited number of students received a quality education. Cora Williams indicated 
staffing choices caused issues as well:  
“They’re trying to get these veteran teachers to just move them out, 
and they’re bringing all these young teachers in. I mean, it’s stuff 
187 
 
like that, you know. When is it going to stop? And you think I’m 
going to go there? I don’t think so. I’m serious. I don’t think so. I 
hear all these negative things. One of my prayer partners, her 
daughter is a teacher, and she talks about how bad it is and how 
they’re just trying to get rid of a lot of these teachers that really 
care and know our children. And then they’re bringing in these 
young people that don’t really care.” 
Participants echoed the complaints found in the content analysis concerning the influx of young, 
white Teach for America teachers in a predominately African American public school system. In 
contrast to the sampled articles, participants framed staffing choices as an intentional and 
conscious effort to remove experienced African American teachers from the post-Katrina 
educational landscape. By indicating the importance of hiring experienced teachers invested in 
the community, Cora and other participants argued state officials did not change New Orleans 
school system to help the pre-Katrina African American community but to further disenfranchise 
it.  
Participants described many factors that pushed them to reconsider returning to New 
Orleans. They indicated government treatment of residents that sheltered-in-place exacerbated 
their distrust in all levels of government to protect people and communities of color from 
environmental threats. They also described multiple ways that visiting New Orleans revealed 
returning to their pre-storm routine would never be possible because the people that made the 
city home could not return due to policies that spatially stratified  recovery. In addition, some 
participants feared returning to contaminated environments while others stated they had to leave 
New Orleans to heal because of community morale. Participants also framed housing, education, 
and disaster assistance policies as barriers to return because they did not address all of the needs 
participants had.   
As structural forces pushed participants to rethink living in New Orleans, opportunities in 
Houston pulled them to consider long-term and, for some, permanent displacement. The next 
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section discusses factors that encouraged participants to settle in Houston until New Orleans 
became recognizable again. These structural factors included disaster housing assistance and 
employment and education opportunities in Houston, which participants viewed as exceeding the 
opportunities available in New Orleans, particularly for low-income minorities.  
The Land of Opportunity: Pulled to Settle in Houston 
Recognizing that returning home would take longer than anticipated, participants sought 
temporary shelter. Of the thirteen participants that left before Hurricane Katrina, only two from 
each case evacuated to Houston. The others went to Baton Rouge, LA, Atlanta, GA, and small 
towns in Mississippi. Ten of the seventeen participants in the study made their way to Houston at 
different points after the disaster. Several factors pulled participants to settle in Houston. These 
factors included disaster assistance as well as employment and educational opportunities. The 
interviews showed federal assistance pulled participants to Houston, but the employment and 
educational opportunities they found enticed them to build new lives in the city and abandon 
plans to return.  
Disaster assistance pulled nine participants to Houston. Of the four participants that 
evacuated via government assistance after New Orleans flooded, only Jason Boissiere went to a 
Houston shelter. Dwayne Edwards and Shawn Jackson went to Atlanta while  Edith Jones found 
her family in Kellar, Texas. Dwayne explained how federal assistance pulled him to Houston:   
“The church that we was boarded at they gave us some tickets to 
come on the Greyhound bus to come back to Houston…’cause they 
didn’t have no more finances. We were ...there for less than 2 or 3 
days. But they only had so much money that FEMA had given 
them, so the process had speeded up, so that’s when they had said 
come down to Houston.”  
 Dwayne’s experience showed not all cities received the same amount of federal aid to 
temporarily house displaced residents. Participants suggested the federal government influenced 
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where New Orleans residents settled by how much money they provided to localities. Jason 
stated:  
“There’s a lot of things they changed. It’s like they made it the way 
they wanted it to be. They forced it. …They didn’t use the slave 
ships; they used the greyhounds, ya feel me? Forced the migration 
where they wanted you to be. So Houston was the only safe haven 
that could take in all those people at one time. All the apartment 
complexes …were empty. They had to be for ‘em to just move all 
them people in there like that. So we helped Houston’s economy. 
President, Texas, ya know what I’m saying. He helped his state.” 
Participants viewed the location of temporary housing assistance as a political decision to benefit 
the Texas economy as opposed to a humanitarian decision to help displaced residents find 
temporary housing.  
 Government aid was not the only assistance available in Houston. Nongovernmental and 
faith-based organizations as well as individual citizens also provided help to displaced residents. 
6 month pregnant at the time of the disaster, Lisa Wilson stated:  
“I had a book of money, and I had money in the bank, and I said, 
‘Wow! Everybody from New Orleans if you get here to Texas these 
people are blessing you, and you don’t even know who these 
people are.’ But, it wasn’t everyone. It was about your spirit. You 
were recognized and treated accordingly.” 
Participants reported private assistance was not distributed evenly. Participants who evacuated 
directly to Houston and stayed in shelters or hotels reported receiving more private assistance 
than participants that arrived in Houston later or those that stayed in private residences.  
Displaced residents helped each other connect to assistance as well. Lisa Wilson stated:  
“When there was time for food, I was pregnant. They’d give it to 
me first. But if I saw someone who was not going to be favored, 
…I’d move because there was always going to be something for 
me. …I was almost letting people: ‘Hurry up. You go because if 
I’m the last one, they’ll make room for me. Let me be last because 
they will find a way for me.’ Maybe it was because I was pregnant. 
Maybe it was because of my demeanor. I don’t know. I felt blessed. 
I felt like I was going to be okay, and so did my husband.” 
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The interviews showed participants attempted to help each other access different opportunities 
for assistance around Houston. They described creating phone trees, where residents that met in 
line for government aid at the Reliant Center notified each other as they came across private 
organizations, such as churches, giving out gift cards and other forms of assistance. 
The interviews indicated households that matched social ideas of the deserving poor 
received more private aid than other participants. Katz (1989), Gordon (2002), and Moffitt 
(2015) suggest social ideas limit the deserving poor to those who experience hardship outside of 
their control, particularly women and children. Three participants reported individuals selected 
them over other residents at their shelter or hotel because of their children. Describing his 
experiences with a faith-based organization, Steven Bell stated: 
“They were sponsoring the clothes give away at the hotel we was 
at. That’s how I found them. The ladies…took to my grandkids 
because my grandkids was well-mannered, ya know. They spoke 
well… They was obedient. They didn’t come downstairs when they 
was issuing things acting ugly, acting like some Black folks do, ya 
know. They wasn’t like that, so folks they took a liking to them, and 
that’s how we got to know them. They helped us out.”  
Respondents reported private assistance helped them find long-term temporary housing, furnish 
apartments, purchase cars, and place children in exclusive private schools.  
In contrast, Ella Taylor was pregnant at the time of the disaster, but she did not report 
receiving additional assistance from private individuals upon arriving in Houston. Lisa Wilson, 
who was also pregnant but evacuated to Houston before the storm, expressed: “Everywhere I 
went I was first lady Michelle Obama or somebody, but she wasn’t first lady then. But I just was 
like, Is this what favor feels like? Because I couldn’t stop it even when I wanted to,” whereas Ella 
commented:  
“We went to this place off of Wayside and 610, and we had to 
stand in these looonnng lines to get housing. But we had no go to 
person like, ya know, to help us settle with. That was it. We give 
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you housing. You go find somewhere to live. That’s it. We didn’t 
have like [an] advocate for us. Well, I didn’t have. No one 
advocated for me, ya know. I didn’t get assistance. I lived off my 
FEMA money for a very long time.” 
Ella evacuated with her children and her extended family to family land in Mississippi. At the 
end of November 2005, she relocated to Houston pulled by housing assistance, which 
Mississippi failed to provide. She missed the window of visibility when Houstonians sought out 
displaced New Orleanians. As such, she did not receive the private assistance that others found.  
 Long-term disaster housing assistance pulled participants to relocate to Houston, but the 
opportunities they found enticed them to stay long-term. Eleven participants indicated that 
employment opportunities in Houston exceeded those available in New Orleans. Cora Williams 
explained, “I had gotten a job. It was paying more than I was making in New Orleans, but I was 
kind of far from where I lived. So when I found a job in the medical center, my salary jumped up 
like another probably $20,000. I guess I’ll stay here." Participants of all education levels found 
wages in Houston to be higher than in New Orleans, which led many to stay because they could 
access a higher quality of life. When asked about his decision to stay in Houston although all of 
his family members returned to New Orleans, Dwayne Edwards commented:  
“When I came to Houston after Katrina, I seen a better 
opportunity. A lot of people ask me, ‘Well, why not come back to 
New Orleans?’ I have no problem not going back to New Orleans. 
I have a better opportunity here in Houston. I have furthered my 
education in the construction field. ...I’ve been with this 
construction company for 5 years. I moved up from a laborer to a 
foreman. I’ve learned how to read blueprints. I got with city 
officials with the city of Houston, the inspectors... I got a good job. 
$900 a week. Do the math. High school education. Do the math. 
$900 a week. You can further your education up in the 
construction field. They got some people that’s going to school 
physical therapy, paralegal, starting salary at 40, which is mine. 
You gotta pay that back. I don’t have to pay shit back, but my 
income taxes. Now how you love that? You can say what you want: 
‘Oh, he out there working in that hot ass sun’ or whatever. I know 
one thing. I don’t have to pay no tuition back. Nowadays it doesn’t 
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matter if you have a degree or not. You better have a job to pay 
your bills because a degree ain’t shit no more.”  
Dwayne viewed corrupt politicians as responsible for the lack of trade schools and employment 
opportunities for Black men in New Orleans and chose to stay where he could earn better wages 
on jobs that also offered career advancement opportunities.  
 The participants in case 3 relocated to Houston after returning because of they found 
limited employment opportunities in New Orleans after the disaster. Lemont Cummings 
explained: 
“My decision to come back to Houston was simply what’s best for 
my family situation. …Houston wasn’t my first choice of cities to 
go to. …First choice was Atlanta. I like Atlanta. I have a lot of 
friends in Atlanta, but the economy in Atlanta was pretty much a 
mirror image of what was happening in New Orleans. And that 
would be like jumping from one pot on fire to another one. Next 
choice was actually Hawaii because that’s my favorite part of the 
country. But let’s be real. I’m not going on vacation, so that’s out. 
I did a lot of study and analysis, and Houston did have the biggest 
job growth, and in this economy that’s really what you have to 
look at: where the opportunities are. They had the best overall 
economy out of the states as far as how the economy is rated. The 
health of the city itself was in better condition than the other 
locations I was looking at, so I made it purely based on physical 
responsibility. My mother and my parents being here and having a 
support base to help me with my kids was also a factor, but it 
wasn’t a deciding factor. Deciding factor was having the 
opportunities to get my family back to a level of what they’re used 
to, a level of comfortability because I didn’t want them to 
sacrifice.” 
After struggling for years to find steady employment in New Orleans, Lemont relocated to 
Houston in order to provide his children with the middle class lifestyle they enjoyed before 
Hurricane Katrina. Indicating his lack of children enabled him to move around easier, Marcus 
Booker also chose to relocate to Houston when his relationship ended:  
“My story is that for two years, three years after Katrina and 
maybe even more, maybe four years. I don’t think I’ve lived in one 
place longer than 6 or 7 months. I was constantly constantly 
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moving. And I have a dog, so my dog was always constantly 
moving with me, too. Just trying to find a situation to be at peace, 
ya know, that’s kinda why I moved to Houston. Let me go over 
here and see. I know I’ll find a place to live. I know I’ll find some 
work, and I know I can just be in one place for an extended period 
of time. Even if I didn’t like it, I can just relax, ya know.” 
Houston offered stability that a devastated New Orleans could not because industries like 
marketing that relied on having people in the city could not bounce back until the population 
returned. Some participants suggested it would be seven to ten years before some professional 
industries rebounded, which caused some New Orleans companies to relocate to Houston.  
 Individuals in case 3 often moved back and forth pushed and pulled, buffered by the need 
for stability. Raymond Davis relocated to Houston in 2010, five years after he returned to New 
Orleans to work as a FEMA inspector. The previous section described the economic situation 
that pushed him to leave New Orleans. In 2011, he described the mental anguish he experienced 
having to leave the city he loved and called home. In 2016, he described the importance of the 
job he found in Houston to his personal recovery: 
“By getting with Verizon …it kinda took the financial burdens 
away. Not so much the mental scars, but the financial scars, and 
the financial burden. . . . Knowing that I could pay some bills, 
knowing that I could buy myself a new pair of jeans, ya know, 
when I felt like it, I guess that allows you to kinda heal mentally, 
too, ‘cause it puts some type of normalcy back into your life.” 
These quotes illustrated the importance of employment opportunities for individuals and families 
to be able to maintain living in New Orleans after they returned. Employment emerged as 
important to make ends meet but also for mental health. In 2016, each participant indicated many 
displaced New Orleanians living in Houston still wanted to return but could not because the city 
continued to lack unaffordable housing and livable wages for them,  
 Participants showed they made decisions about where to live based on where they could 
find stability, not always where they wanted to live. As Steven Bell said it: “They’re where 
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they’re at where they can live." Barbara Davis did not want to stay in the Houston suburb where 
she reunited with her children after they became separated during evacuation. She explained how 
educational opportunities changed her mind: 
“I stayed in Katy because of my children. Mainly because I wanted 
some senses of normalcy for them and to return to that city in the 
condition that it was in would’ve been a bad decision I thought 
because they wouldn’t’ve been able to get an education. That I will 
say hands down. The educational system in Texas is so much more 
superior than New Orleans, and it afforded them the opportunity to 
have a good education. So I wanted that for them, and I wanted 
them to have a good education and to be able to have, ya know, to 
make some decisions that would kinda be a foot stool to their life 
and that was not possible in New Orleans.” 
Participants realized their children would be grown before New Orleans recovered. They 
described how some displaced residents delayed moving back because they wanted to create a 
stable foundation for their children. Participants thought their children would have better 
opportunities in life if they graduated from Houstonian schools because of the education as well 
as the stability and routine, which would enable them to heal.    
 To families with children, educational opportunities were just as important as economic 
opportunities in determining where they settled. Twelve participants discussed the influence of 
Houstonian educational opportunities on their decision making process. Cora Williams stated: 
“Until I left and went somewhere else and just kind of saw that the economy is better. The school 
systems were better. Productivity is better. …My eyes were open to just how bad conditions were 
– meaning the school systems." Participants indicated a relationship between economic and 
educational opportunities. In their view, good wages allowed Houston residents to invest in their 
schools. More money in schools increased the resources available to students, such as individual 
textbooks and computer labs. The good schools enabled children to find good wages, buy nice 
houses, and reinvest in schools through property taxes.   
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Participants highlighted several differences between the education systems in Houston 
and New Orleans, as Lemont Cummings stated: “Well, compared to New Orleans, it’s not a 
comparison. That’s like apples and oranges. The only thing that they have in common are that 
they’re both fruit. The same thing here. The only thing that they have in common is that they’re 
both schools or called schools." Participants identified differences between the systems that 
included: policies on absences, built environments and amenities, as well as curriculum and 
instruction practices. Ella Taylor described her acceptance of Houston in terms of the educational 
opportunities it offered her children: 
“Education. Education. That’s the best thing they got for my kids. 
Their education school system is very, very, very good. That’s 
probably the only reason that I am still here because the school 
system in New Orleans is not what it used to be and then it’s 
worser than what it used to be. Then they got all these charter 
schools. …The public school system has gone down. Ya got to 
either pay for education or put your kids on a waiting list to get 
into a charter school. Here their public school system is excellent. 
The schools are bigger. The teachers are more lenient with your 
kids. They want to teach your kids here. They want them to 
succeed. …Coming from New Orleans if your kid is slow, you’re 
just slow and considered a dummy. The teacher doesn’t take the 
time out to know that my kid is dyslexic and sees things backwards. 
…They don’t take their time with your kids. But here they are 
adequate. They even got a phone system. If your kid doesn’t show 
up to school, they are going to call you. And then you get 
...progress reports. Every week they send them home with this 
paper that you have to sign off that you recognize that they did 
their homework, their attendance in school, and what they did for 
the week. If they got a smiley face or they got stars or if [my child] 
was acting up in school, I would know that. But in New Orleans, it 
was like you send your kids to school, and you’re getting no 
feedback. ...Everything is a charter school down there now. ...I like 
it here for my kids. ...When everyone’s finished with school, I’ll 
probably move back. But for right now, I can’t take them from 
what they’re familiar with and move them back there [when] it’s 
not what it was. The school system is not what it was, so I like it 
here for them. They got the right amount of books, and they got 
computer labs and a lot of technology here for them. In New 
Orleans it’s not like that. You might get a classroom book, but you 
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don’t get a book to come home with. Here ...their books are like 
...little biddy test packets. Everybody brings a book home, and they 
write in that book, so it’s better. They have material they can go 
back to and read. In New Orleans, they give you a ditto sheet, and 
you have to figure it out. So I’m grateful for that. I’m grateful for 
that.”  
Ella highlighted that as the education system in New Orleans pushed participants away the 
opportunities they found in Houstonian schools pulled them to stay until their children graduated.  
 Plans to return after children finished school did not always work out. Paulette Watson 
showed how once established some displaced residents, like her daughter, found it difficult to 
leave. She stated: “She never did like it, but she got a good job. I said, you cannot come here and 
make that kind of money in New Orleans." Her daughter originally planned to return after her son 
graduated from high school in 2012. However, Paulette encouraged her to stay in Houston to 
secure retirement benefits because she had already invested over ten years with her company. 
Paulette stressed to her daughter that at 50-years-old she did not have the work years left to start 
over.   
 For three participants, securing a better education for their children led to family 
separation. Paulette Watson returned with her son because she did not have anyone to raise him 
in Houston. After dealing with the post-Katrina school system, she sent him to live with his 
brother until he graduated, “because he couldn’t never finish down here, because it was just a 
mess. So he went to California and he finished school in California." When Steven Bell returned 
to rebuild the family home, his family stayed in Houston. He stated:  
“The education system was much better than it was in New 
Orleans, so it gave my granddaughter a chance to really excel 
where she can be somebody. Down here the school system was 
…horrible, …so I’m glad she’s in Houston. I really am. I miss her, 
but I’m glad she’s in Houston, so she can succeed. Here she 
wouldn’t succeed. She wouldn’t.” 
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The narratives showed families had to split up in order to meet everyone's needs after the disaster 
because opportunities varied by location. Participants also indicated that the opportunities in 
Houston did not apply to everyone. Although some participants found better opportunities in 
Houston, not every participant did, as Marcus described: "My situation in Houston hasn’t been, 
‘Oh, I’ve found the pot of gold. I’ma stay here.'"  
 Houston appeared as the land of opportunity for many displaced New Orleanians. The 
federal assistance coupled with the booming job market and the superior educational 
opportunities led participants to stay for longer than some originally desired. Although these 
factors pulled participants to establish new lives in Houston, other factors pushed participants to 
leave Houston. Just as culture was a big pull to New Orleans it was a huge push from Houston. 
Participants described cultural differences and discrimination as reasons to leave despite the 
better opportunities they perceived existed in the Houston. These will be discussed in the last 
section. 
Culture Shock: Pushed from Houston  
 Participants found structural forces encouraged them to settle in Houston, but many 
encountered obstacles that made it difficult to establish new lives. Although opportunities for 
disaster assistance, employment, and education pulled participants to stay, participants stated 
some aspects of life in Houston pushed them to return to New Orleans. Fifteen participants 
reported cultural differences between New Orleans and Houston pushed displaced residents to 
leave Texas. Respondents portrayed cultural differences between the cities as increasing the 
difficulty of starting over in Houston. These differences included the size as well as the work and 
leisure culture of Houston. They also described encountering discriminatory attitudes and 
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treatment in Houston, which made them want to leave. In their perspective, some Houston 
residents treated displaced survivors poorly because of social stereotypes.  
 The size of Houston emerged as the first cultural barrier that encouraged some 
participants to return to New Orleans. Six participants found size differences between New 
Orleans and Houston made acclimating difficult and reported getting lost frequently. Jason 
Boissiere explained: 
“To me it wasn’t really that bad ‘cause, ya know, I’m young. I can 
start over, but [my parents] it was hard. They had to get back 
because …they just wasn’t going nowhere, ya know. That’s not 
normal, ya know what I’m saying. They normally get out. It was 
just the part of it being so big out here versus the size of New 
Orleans, ya know. It take 30 minutes to drive to the store out here. 
In New Orleans you can walk to the store and it be that easy.” 
 Participants stated living in Houston required owning a car in contrast to New Orleans, which 
they portrayed as having a walking culture. Respondents reported Houston drivers had a different 
driving style, which made it harder for some older residents, who stopped driving in Houston, to 
maintain their independence while displaced.  
Participants reported the Houston school system had different requirements, which 
emerged as a second cultural barrier. Some participants found Houston schools did not accept all 
of the credits students earned in New Orleans. Paulette Watson and Ella Taylor had their children 
held back two grade levels. Ms. Taylor stated: 
“My oldest daughter, she had to repeat kindergarten, and she had 
to repeat first grade because she wasn’t reading on their level. 
She’s in the fifth grade now, and she’s doing better, but she’s 
supposed to be in the 7th grade… I think that’s kinda like taking a 
toll on her because she’s older than the majority of her 5th grade 
class.” 
Ella acknowledged being held back was better for her daughter’s education, but it had a negative 
impact on her emotionally and mentally. In her follow-up interview, Ella stated that her oldest 
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daughter had a mental breakdown in 2014 when she was fourteen, and doctors diagnosed her as 
bi-polar. She framed the breakdown as the culmination of all the stress displacement placed on 
her daughter, which included raising her younger sisters.  
Paulette found her son held back by technicalities rather than performance issues. Before 
the storm, her son attended a private school that did not require students to take standardized 
tests for grade advancement. She stated: 
“It was a mess just trying to get him in school. . . . Whatever that 
test they was giving you like in 9th grade and 10th grade, you 
didn’t take it in private school, but you had to take it there. 
…Although he was in 11th grade, they wanted to put him back in 
9th grade. Even when I came back here [to New Orleans], they 
wanted to put him in 9th grade, so he didn’t finish school here. He 
went to California and finished school up there where they put him 
in 11th grade.” 
This example showed for some participants returning to New Orleans did not fix their problems. 
Instead, they had to devise new strategies and living arrangements to meet their needs. 
 One participant described similar difficulties transferring college credits to Houston. 
Edith Jones attended Delgado Community College for nursing before Hurricane Katrina. She 
attempted to continue her education in Houston but found her credits would not transfer:  
“I was going to school for nursing. The college would not accept 
my credits. ...They changed the course work by maybe one or two 
codings, where the number didn’t match up. It’s the exact same 
course, but you wouldn’t accept my credits, and I’ve already taken 
these courses, so had to start all over. So what I wind up doing was 
going to ...a school right over here on Forum Place called 
Sanfaron College. Went there just to do something in the medical 
field because I felt like my credits were being wasted. I recently, 
...two years ago, went back to college and I have my associate’s in 
communications because again some kind of [way] they accepted 
my credits. There was no issue of ‘they are not valid credits. This 
doesn’t matter. It’s not the same,’ so hopefully by next year I’ll 
have my bachelor’s in technology.” 
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Edith's experience showed participants found some barriers that existed immediately after the 
disaster dissipated a few years later with no explanation. However, she lost time and switched 
career paths as a result. During her follow-up interview, she stated she returned to school after 
completing a bachelor’s in business communication because it wasn’t what she wanted to do. 
She earned a degree in mortuary science in June 2015 and planned to open her own funeral home 
after becoming state licensed.  
In addition the size of Houston educational differences, participants indicated their leisure 
culture caused friction with Houston police. Shawn Jackson stated:  
“New Orleans people love to be outside. Love to be outside. On 
your porch, on your balcony, sitting outside the gate, or whatever, 
and I guess they wasn’t used to that… too many thousand people 
down there, standing outside, hanging out, drinking beers, smoking 
cigarettes, just congregate or whatever. Oh, they used to roll up 
like (whoo) ‘All y’all, hands on the gate. Let me see your ID. Oh, 
you’re from New Orleans. Oh, you’re from New Orleans.’ Well, 
everybody out here from New Orleans. Okay. ‘Anything on you?’ 
‘No.’ But that happened constantly, constantly. All the time 
because they wasn’t never used to seeing that many [people]. We 
already invaded they city. They say, ‘Y’all invaded our city. Now 
y’all wanna be outside all the time.’ Well, we have secondlines, 
parades. We outside people. …After maybe a couple of years pass, 
they kinda slowed down maybe because the people left …but yeah 
they police used to harass us all the time.” 
Shawn suggested cultural differences made displaced residents targets for police harassment in 
Houston. In contrast, some participants suggested stereotypes that portrayed African Americans 
as criminals caused Houston police officers to target displaced residents. For example, Joseph 
Johnson described how police profiling caused his mother and grandfather to return to Louisiana 
despite relocating to Houston for temporary housing assistance: 
 “They didn’t want to be [in] all the madness with, ya know, police 
profiling people. Just because you’re riding around town after a 
certain time of night and you have a Louisiana license plate, you 
getting pulled over and harassed. [The police] trying to bust 
criminals and everything else. …They didn’t want to be in the 
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middle of all that, ya know. My grandfather’s old, and he was a lot 
slower than he had been moving before [Hurricane Katrina], so 
eventually she moved back to Lafayette and stayed there. That’s 
where she’s at today.” 
Participants reported Houston police and news outlets blamed displaced residents in any dispute 
regardless of what happened. Both Shawn and Joseph portrayed Houston police as targeting 
displaced residents, but they made sense of it differently. Shawn depicted the Houston police as 
overwhelmed by cultural preferences. Joseph argued police targeted displaced residents because 
of racial stereotypes, which made it difficult for some residents to take advantage of long-term 
housing assistance in Houston.  
Participants also framed the work culture in Houston as a reason for unskilled workers to 
return to New Orleans. Lemont Cummings stated: “In Louisiana, all you need is a high school 
diploma. …[In Houston,] you really need a college degree. You can’t just have your high school 
diploma. The only work you gonna get with a high school diploma here is at a restaurant [or] 
carwash.” Participants framed the Houston job market as more technical than New Orleans and 
suggested unskilled displaced residents could not compete in a labor market that required 
credentials. Raymond Davis added:  
“18 months later, ya know, the reality slaps them in the face. The 
gravy train is over. You’re going to pay your own rent now. You’re 
going to pay your own car. You have to pay for your own food. All 
of a sudden now you have a person who doesn’t have skills out 
here trying to deal in a city where most people need skills to get 
some type of job. The people at that point who couldn’t deal with 
that those are the ones that went home…” 
This view contradicts the perspective that displacement created more opportunity for low-income 
residents. Some participants suggested low-income residents needed more than living in Houston 
to access better economic opportunities. They claimed they also needed the skills and credentials 
the new labor market required.   
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Several participants provided examples that contradicted the view that low-income 
residents did not have the educational requirements or wherewithal to access better opportunities 
in Houston. The last section showed Dwayne Edwards found more economic opportunity in 
Houston although he does not have a college degree. However, he indicated he struggled to find 
work: “My first few months in Houston, I was job searching. …Like I said when the construction 
came I got blessed, but I filled out applications all over.” Dwayne had to demonstrate his 
commitment to the job before he could access the economic opportunity he saw in the Houston:  
“At like 4 or 5 o’clock in the morning ...I would get with the 
superintendent of the company and the city inspector who runs the 
project. I would get with them and say, ‘Hey man, is there any 
hiring?’ and they would tell me wait. So at the present time I had 
my daughter with me. …I would bring her to school and …I would 
come back after 7:30. …When they take lunch, I’d go to my 
apartment to take my lunch. They get off 8 or 9. I would go in at 8 
or 9, but between 2 and 2:30 I would go get my daughter, so they 
see that I was interested.” 
After they hired him,  Dwayne stated he had to be a “go-getter” in order to set himself apart from 
stereotypes of Black men as lazy, especially in a work environment where he indicated: “I’m the 
only African American on this construction job. I work with 400 Hispanics.” His experience 
showed participants developed strategies to enter the Houston economy. The participants 
revealed some residents successfully integrated into Houston, but several reported problems that 
they had trouble overcoming.  
Houston appeared as a land of economic opportunity, but participants encountered 
gatekeepers who refused to hire displaced residents. Five case 2 participants described 
discrimination increased the difficulty of finding a job in Houston. For example, Barbara Davis 
stated:  
“It took me two years to find a job in Katy. …When I interviewed 
for jobs if they saw New Orleans. . . I knew I’m qualified for the 
job. You just didn’t give me the job. One person that I interviewed 
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with had the courage to tell me, ‘It’s going to be hard for you to 
find a job because they’ve already told us not to hire people from 
New Orleans’, and that was at a temp agency. …They felt like we 
were going to go back to New Orleans, and they were going to be 
in a position where they would have to find more workers anyway. 
That we were not going to stay in these jobs. That we were only 
transitional until we decided to go back to New Orleans or go 
elsewhere, so basically they were told not to hire people from New 
Orleans, and I just felt like violated. I just felt like I was judged. 
You didn’t even give me a chance to tell you whether I decided to 
stay here or even interview me really with the long term view of 
hiring me if I was qualified. You interviewed me only because you 
had to is how I felt.” 
In contrast to the view that displaced residents did not have the educational requirements to take 
advantage of Houston’s economy,  Barbara found employers chose not to invest in workers they 
viewed as transient. She also described the emotional toll being kept out of the Houston job 
market had on displaced residents: 
“I’ve always been a person that worked. I’m not a person that 
lived off of the government or wanted to take advantage of the 
government like a whole lot of people were doing. I wanted to 
work. I wanted to be able. I’m an independent person, and I felt 
like I wanted my independence back, and people weren’t allowing 
me the opportunity to get that back.” 
She suggested discrimination that blocked residents from finding jobs while displaced prolonged 
the disaster and increased the emotional and mental trauma they experienced, which supports 
Chen’s (2014) assertions in the NYT sample. To pay expenses not covered by disaster housing 
assistance and food stamps, participants reported they used their savings, social security, and the 
FEMA money they received to replace their material possessions when they could not find jobs. 
 Nine participants reported facing class discrimination and hearing disparaging comments 
about displaced residents. For example, Paulette Watson found waiting in line for disaster 
assistance she encountered negative treatment from Houston residents:  
“People would say ugly things to us like, …(higher pitched, 
offended tone) ‘we refugees’. I don’t stay in no third world 
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country. This is the south of the United States, ya know. It 
was…puzzling to me how people was so ignorant to that fact and 
[acted] like it couldn’t happen to them, like: ‘we taking care of 
y’all’. I said ‘taking care of?’ I mean I worked all my life… I 
wasn’t on no food stamps and welfare. I been working all my life. 
My tax money paid for my own stuff, ya know. So it was kinda hard 
to hear people say the ugly things about you, but I didn’t worry 
about it ‘cause I knew I wasn’t going to be there long and I was 
coming back home.” 
Participants stated they resented labels and comments that insinuated they were taking advantage 
of tax dollars without contributing to society. Marcus Booker framed the judgmental attitudes as 
a cultural barrier to acclimating to Houston: 
“My fiancée hates Houston. She just has just just distain for it 
because… the feedback we would get from certain people out there 
wasn’t really always welcoming, and that’s completely not how it 
is down here. We welcome anybody in New Orleans, so that whole 
thing just really turned her off to it.” 
Respondents framed negative attitudes and employer bias as a barrier to stay in Houston because 
they compounded the difficulty of starting over by denying displaced residents stable 
employment. 
The participants framed the cause of discrimination differently. Barbara Davis portrayed 
Houston employers as biased against high turnover rates, which led them to discriminate against 
displaced residents who intended to stay in Houston permanently. In contrast, Raymond Davis, 
her brother, argued media representations reinforced negative stereotypes, which led to 
discriminatory treatment: 
“[General Honore] came down and these guys were holding guns 
on these people at the convention center. They were feeding them 
at gun point. How do you expect a person to feel when I gotta get 
food from you at gun point? We’re on a rescue mission…This isn’t 
Beirut, ya know, or some war zone you’re in. You’re rescuing 
people. Put your damn guns down. Ya know, the thing is that’s all 
people saw around the country. So even people who got out ahead 
of Katrina and were trying to do whatever they could do here, they 
still had that stigmatism stuck on them. ‘Oh you’re from New 
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Orleans. You’re from that murder capital. …You’re some of those 
wild people we saw on TV looting and running in the streets and 
fighting with police and shooting.’ That’s what we dealt with, and 
to say…, ya know, ‘Well just go home’, ya can’t. Ya can’t. That 
takes money. Ya have to have money to do that.” 
Raymond Davis framed discrimination as a consequence of racial stereotypes perpetuated by 
media outlets that portray African Americans as poor, violent criminals. Participants indicated 
regardless of their class Houston stereotyped displaced residents the same way. 
Participants found negative stereotypes affected their experiences with educational 
opportunities while displaced as well. Nine participants reported difficulty attending school 
while displaced because of discrimination. A teenager when the disaster happened, Regina 
Walker stated:  
“I went to bigger places, bigger schools, and that was scary too 
because even those kids judged, ya know. Because you came from 
a certain place you had to be a certain way. …That you were poor. 
That you weren’t smart. You obviously came from a horrible 
background if you lived in Louisiana. You suffered. And they tell 
you like really stupid jokes like, ‘Oh was that you I saw on the 
house on the news?’ And I’m like, ‘No, obviously not. I’m right 
here, but thank you.’ And they’re like, ‘You talk funny’, and I’m 
like, ‘I don’t talk funny. I talk just like you. I use the same words.’” 
Respondents emphasized children faced the same stereotypes as adults, which increased the 
difficulty students had adjusting to life in Houston. Barbara Davis described the problems the 
negative treatment caused for her teenage daughters:  
“A lot of times, they were stereotyped at school. A lot of times, they 
were made fun of. My youngest daughter, she got in a fight at 
school. She got in lots of fights. …She told me it was because of 
people saying mean things and treating them differently because 
they’re from New Orleans, ya know. They called them ‘refugees’. 
…They would call them bad names and they would shushu about 
them.” 
As a result, some participants turned to homeschooling, so their children could complete school 
without experiencing daily harassment. Homeschooling emerged as a strategy that enabled 
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participants to take advantage of the more advanced curriculum they found in Houston without 
subjecting children to name-calling and judgmental attitudes. However, they did not benefit from 
the educational resources, such as computer labs, that pulled participants to settle in Texas in 
2005.  
Homeschooling was not a strategy that worked for every household in the study. Three 
participants described removing children from Houston schools and sending them back to 
Louisiana. By his 2016 interview, Steven Bell’s granddaughter had left her mother and siblings 
in Houston and moved in with him in New Orleans. Although he still thought Houston had a 
better education system, Steven stated Houston teachers and students treated New Orleans 
students poorly, so displaced students did not receive the full benefits from access to better 
schools. In 2007, Josephine Davis left her aunt’s house and the Houston schools behind when her 
mother became established in Slidell. Her father, Raymond Davis, stated: “When I told her she 
was going back, ...she was happy even though it was Slidell because it was still Louisiana. It was 
people that she felt she had something in common with. Even though it might’ve been tough, 
…she felt I’ve got my people.” Although returning to New Orleans was out of reach for some 
participants, they stated returning to Louisiana brought a sense of familiarity and an end to the 
stigmatization they experienced in other states.  
 This chapter explored the forces that influenced the decision-making processes of the 
African American participants in the study. They stated New Orleans culture and pre-Katrina 
commitments to property, jobs, and college pulled them to return while disaster recovery policy 
decisions pushed them to settle in Houston. These decisions included the privatization of public 
housing and public education in New Orleans as well as the federal decision to provide vouchers 




 The interviews showed cultural and structural forces in New Orleans and in Houston 
influenced the decisions participants made after Hurricane Katrina. Cultural forces pulled 
participants to return to New Orleans while structural forces pushed participants to start over in 
Houston. At first, structural forces, such as disaster assistance, pulled participants to settle in 
Houston until New Orleans reopened. While displaced, participants found Houston offered better 
education and economic opportunities than New Orleans did, pre- or post-Katrina. However, 
respondents also encountered cultural differences and discrimination in Houston that made it 
difficult for them to access the opportunities needed to build a new life. Although culture fueled 
the desire to return, participants indicated they needed the means to survive, i.e. housing, 
schools, jobs, healthcare, and social networks, in order to return, but most participants found 
New Orleans recovery did not repair the social institutions in their communities, which impaired 
their ability to return. 
 Participants acknowledged the affect of cultural forces on the decisions they made after 
Hurricane Katrina. However, they portrayed structural forces as determining where they found 
the means to survive displacement, which determined where they settled. The next chapter 
compares the content analysis findings and the interview findings to understand similarities and 
differences in the way the media portrayed recovery and the way participants experienced it. It 
also seeks to answer the research questions while contextualizing the findings in relation to the 




 This chapter analyzes how the content analysis and interviews portrayed recovery and the 
process of return. The media and participants viewed recovery similarly in that it failed to rebuild 
African American neighborhoods and became a barrier to return for African Americans 
households. Both papers portrayed recovery efforts as creating gaps in assistance that 
compounded vulnerability and perpetuated racial and class inequalities that existed pre-Katrina. 
In contrast to the media, which depicted negative outcomes and the perpetuation of systemic 
inequality as accidental and unintentional, several participants described recovery policy as 
deliberately reshaping the city's demographics. After the cross-case analysis, the discussion 
moves to connect the findings to theoretical and scholarly literature before addressing the 
secondary research questions.  
Figure 3: Relationship Between Content Analysis Deductive Codes 
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 The study used thirteen deductive codes that emerged as themes in the literature review. 
Of the thirteen used, a relationship emerged from eight codes that formed the content analysis 
recovery narrative reported in the findings. The deductive codes were: recovery planning, 
recovery policies, assistance, barriers to rebuild, uneven recovery, barriers to return, continued 
vulnerability, and recovery outcomes. Error! Reference source not found. on page 208 
illustrates the relationship between the codes, with the arrows representing the recovery 
outcomes code. The content analysis showed recovery planning led to recovery policies that led 
to the creation of assistance programs to enable return. However, the sampled articles indicated 
recovery planning, policy, and assistance design and implementation issues created barriers to 
rebuild that led to uneven recovery and barriers to return, which led to continued vulnerability.  
 The arrow colors in Error! Reference source not found. indicate the influence of race 
and class on recovery trajectories that the samples framed as competing narratives of recovery. 
Represented by the white and green arrows, the content analysis data suggested wealthier 
residents and white communities had more resources to respond to the disaster and received 
more federal aid to rebuild than poor residents or African American communities. The red and 
black arrows show the sampled articles claimed African Americans and poor residents ran into 
obstacles because of unanticipated consequences of recovery planning, policy, and assistance 
programs that created barriers to rebuilding African American communities. The sampled 
authors claimed barriers led to uneven recovery among and within communities, which operated 
as a barrier to return for those in neighborhoods not prioritized by recovery. The sampled articles 
argued the gaps in recovery planning, policy, and assistance compounded poor and African 
American resident vulnerability because the disaster added new problems to pre-existing issues.  
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Cross Case Analysis: Race, Class, and the Absence of Gender in Recovery 
 This section explores similarities and differences in how each perspective portrayed the 
influence of race and class in recovery. The TP sample attempted to mask racial disparities in 
recovery planning as a natural consequence of the disaster. In contrast, the NYT sample depicted 
racial disparities in planning as a result of local politics and power struggles. Both samples 
blamed federal and state policy decisions for race and class disparities in recovery. The NYT 
sample also showed the interconnectedness of government policy decisions. Although federal 
and state actors created the policies with discriminatory impacts, the NYT sample highlighted 
local decisions that supported and enabled federal and state plans.  
 In contrast to both media samples, the participants viewed race and class discrimination 
as intentional to keep the poor, African American households from returning. They indicated 
stereotypes fueled discrimination that operated on two levels: structural and interpersonal. 
Participants also provided unique examples of discrimination that neither newspaper sample 
mentioned. It should be noted that during the analysis, the participants stood out as a single 
group, as opposed to three distinct cases, in how they viewed recovery. The analysis showed 
participants made different choices about returning and continued displacement based on 
differences in pre-Katrina material conditions and post-Katrina needs and responsibilities.  
Both sampled newspapers acknowledged race and class disparities in recovery, but each 
framed the narrative differently. The TP sample holds to the normative view that racial 
disparities in recovery resulted from the storm (Philips et al., 2010). The sampled articles 
presented the impact of the storm without its social context. The narrative went: Hurricane 
Katrina and the flooding damaged Black communities more so than white communities, and 
Black people were displaced to further areas than white people. The most damaged areas had the 
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slowest recovery time, which limited the ability of African Americans to return because housing 
in their communities remained damaged. This perspective shifted blame for damages to nature, 
ignoring the context of environmental racism, which places vulnerable social groups in the most 
environmentally risky areas (Bullard & Wright, 2012; Philips et al., 2010; Quarantelli, 2000; 
Wisner et al., 2004). Although one TP sampled article indicated conflicting desires existed 
between returned and displaced residents, the article framed the conflict as class based and did 
not mention the racial dimension of displacement.  
Only one sampled TP article mentioned racial discrimination in the recovery planning 
code. The article announced the United Nations found planning to be discriminatory because of 
its unintentional impact and limited resident participation. By highlighting federal plans, such as 
public housing redevelopment, the author faulted federal decisions for racial disparities in 
recovery, which the author framed as unintentional. This matched the narrative that formed in the 
recovery policy code. In the TP sample recovery policy code, several examples of racial 
disparities in recovery emerged, such as: the Road Home program design, the public school 
takeover, and public housing redevelopment. The local perspective framed racial issues as the 
result of federal and state policy decisions. This both absolved local officials of guilt and 
explained racial disparities in recovery as unintended consequences.  
The NYT sample presented a different narrative of recovery planning. It addressed racism 
and classism in recovery by framing it in the context of local politics and power. The narrative 
shifted over time from only discussing class tensions to including racial tensions as well. The 
NYT sample narrative portrayed recovery planners, the white business elite, and middle class 
homeowners as working together to prevent some residents from returning. The 2006 articles 
framed the effort as a class dispute to block the return of poor residents. One example illustrated 
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how homeowners petitioned the city council to deny affordable housing proposals slated for their 
communities. The example indicated both white and African American neighborhoods used the 
planning process to further NIMBY-ism and their self-interest. This masked the influence and 
context of race in the United States, where race and class are linked (Crenshaw et al., 1995; 
Delgado & Stefancic, 2001).  
Over time the class-only narrative expanded to include a racial context. The five year 
anniversary marked the first time racial motivations entered the planning narrative in the NYT 
sample. Articles in 2010 and 2012 framed the civic engagement New Orleans celebrates as a 
direct result of proposals to turn African American neighborhoods into green space and deny 
residents the opportunity to rebuild their pre-Katrina communities. These articles argued the lack 
of displaced African American resident participation during the creation of these plans caused 
African Americans to become politically active to save their communities. However, the authors 
also depicted the decision to rebuild the pre-storm footprint as an error, given the large quantity 
of abandoned and blighted property that continued to exist years later.  
By the ten year anniversary, three articles framed recovery planning as a concerted effort 
to keep poor, Black residents from returning. This narrative claimed the white business elite 
viewed recovery as the opportunity to re-establish their political power and land holdings by 
preventing poor and African American residents from returning to New Orleans. Although the 
narrative shifted overtime to include a racial analysis, it consistently framed local actors as the 
source of discriminatory intent to reshape the city’s demographic characteristics. It should be 
noted the authors presented the perspective as a local narrative and framed it as a conspiracy 
theory by quoting local activist 'moles'. In contrast, the TP sample attempted to mask class and 
racial disparities in return and recovery as natural.  
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Although the NYT narrative gave voice to a local perspective that accused local actors of 
blocking the return of poor African American residents, the recovery policy code showed the 
sampled NYT authors placed blame for racial disparities in recovery on federal and state policy 
decisions and to a lesser degree local policy decisions. The NYT sample covered the same issues 
as the TP sample. Federal decisions that had discriminatory impacts included redeveloping 
public housing into mixed income communities with fewer units for government subsidized 
families. State decisions included the takeover of public education as well as closing Charity 
Hospital to create the University Medical Center complex. The sample indicated both state and 
federal decisions led to the discriminatory design and impact of the Road Home - Homeowner 
Assistance Program. 
The NYT perspective also illustrated the interconnectedness of the policy decisions that 
had discriminatory impacts on recovery. Authors indicated the state made the decision to take 
over public education and create a new medical center to spur economic development and 
employment opportunities within the city, but the federal government funded the proposals. 
Additionally, local officials chose to lay off all school personnel, which disproportionately 
affected the African American middle class, particularly Black women, who made up the 
majority of public school teachers in Orleans parish before Hurricane Katrina. The federal 
government also funded the Road Home program, but according to the NYT sample, state leaders 
designed the discriminatory grant formula while local officials chose to prioritize homeowners 
over landlords. These decisions caused race and class disparities in rates of return because they 
delayed the creation of affordable housing for renters and low-income residents and awarded 
smaller rebuilding grants to homeowners in African American neighborhoods. In public housing 
redevelopment, the NYT recognized the importance of the federal shift in public housing policy, 
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which fueled the idea. However, the mayor and the city council supported and enabled the 
decision by granting permits to demolish the brick buildings in the face of local protests and 
demonstrations. One article in the TP sample also indicated the role local authorities played in 
public housing redevelopment. However, the overarching local narrative focused on the 
unsuccessful attempts of local officials to block federal and state rebuilding plans. 
The participants presented a different understanding of race and class in the context of 
recovery than the media samples. The participants did not mention recovery planning processes. 
They discussed policy decisions that affected access to housing, education, employment, and 
healthcare in New Orleans as well as in displacement. Participants framed race and class 
discrimination as the root of their struggle. In their perspective, the initial response, the 
inequitable distribution of aid, and the slow, uneven recovery across neighborhoods happened 
because New Orleans was a majority African American city before the storm and government 
officials do not value African American lives. In the narrative that emerged from the interviews, 
officials chose to close public schools, public housing, and Charity Hospital to keep Black, 
particularly poor Black, residents from returning, and their neighborhoods continue to sit 
unrepaired eleven years later because officials know African Americans will return if given 
access to quality housing, schools, jobs, and healthcare facilities.  
This narrative illustrates that participants viewed the racial and class disparities that 
emerged during recovery as resulting from deliberate and intentional choices by officials at all 
levels of government. The participant perspective is different from the media because the TP 
sample deflected blame from local to higher levels of government and framed disparities as 
unintended, rather than deliberate, outcomes. Similar to the participants, the NYT sample 
acknowledged the involvement of all levels of government in making decisions that hurt poor 
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African Americans more so than other social groups and limited their access to the decision-
making table. However, the NYT sample shied away from participant claims that the outcomes 
were intentional to prevent African American communities from returning. The NYT sample 
gave voice to a local narrative of deliberate intent to keep poor residents from returning, which 
evolved over time to recognize those poor were specifically African American, but the sampled 
authors framed the perspective as more of a conspiracy theory than as the tangible reality that 
confronted participants after the storm.  
The participants found race and class discrimination operated on two levels to compound 
their recovery. First, individual people acted as gatekeepers. These gatekeepers chose to close 
ranks and block African American residents from economic opportunities in Houston and New 
Orleans. This made recovery harder because displaced participants lived off the FEMA aid they 
received to replace their material investments (Litt et al, 2012). Although many received housing 
vouchers to pay their rent while displaced, the participants indicated the vouchers did not cover 
utility costs and the disaster food stamps did not cover their monthly food costs. The participants 
found they needed jobs to survive while displaced; however, gatekeepers in Houston denied 
them access to the job market due to racial stereotypes and fears displaced residents would return 
to New Orleans quickly. Three participants blamed the media for presenting negative 
representations of African American residents, which influenced how Houston residents received 
them.  
In contrast to the interviews, neither newspaper sample discussed racial discrimination in 
the job market. The sampled articles used housing decisions to portray racial bias at the 
individual level. Both samples framed the debate to block affordable housing as racially 
motivated but highlighted how perpetrators hid behind class rhetoric, which is not a federally 
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protected class. The sampled articles acknowledged some residents faced financial problems 
because of gaps in assistance but framed financial hardship as a result of poor policy and 
unaffordable housing. Both media samples failed to discuss the role gatekeepers played in 
preventing residents from reestablishing independence through gainful employment. 
All three perspectives recognized racism also operated on a systemic level to compound 
the vulnerability of African Americans and that return required money. The media samples and 
the participants viewed recovery policies as barriers to return for African American residents. 
The three perspectives viewed the Road Home program as marred with the same design and 
implementation issues. These issues resulted in racial disparities in grant awards and contributed 
to uneven neighborhood recovery. The participants also criticized the post-Katrina school system 
as privileging rich, white residents with quality schools while confining poor and minority 
students to the subpar Recovery School District schools. The participant narrative did not include 
any positive statements about post-Katrina education in New Orleans while both media samples 
presented competing narratives of recovery. One narrative matched the participant perspective, 
that the charter school movement disenfranchised African American communities and did not 
produce results for African American students. The other attributed improvements in educational 
outcomes among all demographics to the charter school movement.  
 The content analysis revealed little mention of gender differences or the inclusion of 
gender in framing the impact of the disaster and recovery. One NYT sampled article stated: 
“Black residents, and in particular Black women, report a harder 
time returning and rebuilding their lives after the storm. This is in 
part because of a couple of hard facts: African-Americans were far 
more likely to have lived in a flooded part of the city, and places 
that were worse-hit by the flooding, such as the Lower Ninth Ward, 
have taken much longer to recover” (Robertson, 2015).  
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Robertson (2015) masked disparities as natural by not including the context of how Black 
women had a harder time returning. No articles framed the destruction of public housing as a 
women’s issue although female-headed households are the largest recipients of government 
housing assistance. Low return rates among public housing residents after redevelopment means 
80 to 90 percent of residents cannot return, which disproportionately affected Black women 
because they were disproportionately represented in the former residents. Coupled with pay 
disparities, increasing living costs for low-income families has a greater impact on female-
headed households because on average they make less money than their white and/or male 
counterparts do.  
 In the interviews, the participants did not make many distinctions based on gender. Both 
men and women discussed the stress that resulted from caring for elderly parents and/or children 
with limited help. More men reported long-term separation from their children than women did. 
Several men framed being separated from their children as difficult but necessary because they 
did not want to separate their children from their mothers, who returned to New Orleans. They 
recognized Houston offered Black men better economic opportunities, so they accepted long-
term displacement at the expense of being close to their children. Relying on women for shelter, 
emotional support, and income did emerge as a strategy that enabled some male and female 
participants to survive in New Orleans and in displacement. For example when Raymond, 
Lemont, Marcus, Thomas, Paulette, and Edith reported long periods of unstable employment, 
housing, or childcare they reported they survived via their wife's, girlfriend's, mother's, sister's, 
or aunt's assistance.  
 The mothers in Houston appeared more critical of the school system than the men, whose 
children returned to New Orleans with their mothers, but no participants framed school reform or 
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any of the recovery measures as creating gender disparities. Although, Marcus and Raymond 
indicated not having children, or having someone else care for his child in Raymond's case, 
enabled residents more flexibility in moving and choosing where to live. Raymond could not 
have returned for the FEMA inspector job with his daughter because he did not have stable 
housing in New Orleans in October 2005. Instead, the men from the club made a makeshift dorm 
in the third floor of their building. Raymond stated their strategy only worked because they were 
all men and did not need privacy.  
 In a public lecture in New Orleans on September 24, 2017, Crenshaw used 
intersectionality to reframe current social issues, and argued not framing problems that 
disproportionately impact women as women's issues is a systemic issue in our society. She 
indicated issues such as school disciplinary and push-out rates disproportionately impact Black 
girls more so than their white or male counterparts and that police brutality if framed as a 
women's issue would not only include killing innocent, unarmed people but also the high rates of 
sexual assault committed against women by police officers (K. Crenshaw, personal 
communication, 2017). In coding the articles and interviews, the gender code had the fewest 
statements within it. It is possible the researcher was not sensitive enough to pick up on all the 
ways gender emerged or was masked by the samples; however, Crenshaw (2017) suggests the 
absence of gender is a result of how the media and mainstream society frame social issues, which 
indicates the researcher’s initial interpretation may be correct. Recoding may help make this 
issue clearer as well as conducting more research on alternative ways to frame social issues, 
which would make the researcher more sensitive to masked gender differences. The next section 
continues the discussion by highlighting how the study findings connected to the theoretical 




The findings tie back to the theoretical perspectives in several ways. First, as a method to 
critique society, critical theorists start from contradictions in society to analyze how structural 
forces create different outcomes and experiences for different social groups (Bronner, 2011). The 
content analysis and the interviews showed a contradiction in planning for return. In the media's 
perspective, planners assumed a significant portion (20 to 40 percent) of the population would 
not return and those that did would have to be lured back by quality of life improvements. This 
served as one of the justifications to restructure public housing and public schools and to plan for 
a smaller city. The interviews offered a different perspective. Participants who evacuated prior to 
the flooding wanted to return and rebuild after the flooding. The findings show that culture and 
place attachment created a strong desire among residents to return to New Orleans. The 
interviews showed that participants weighed the pros and cons of returning or staying displaced, 
but where they could live determined where they settled. Living required housing, jobs, and 
schools for those with children. Things many participants found hard to come by in post-Katrina 
New Orleans.  
Second, critical theorists are concerned with the false worldview that perpetuates the 
status quo (Bronner, 2011). Participants described how leaving the city shattered their pre-
Katrina perspective of acceptable living standards. In Houston, they found higher wages, better 
schools, safer environments, more economic opportunities, and less political corruption. 
Although many reported chances to leave New Orleans prior to the storm, some participants 
described they had to be forced out of the city to understand the quality of life that existed for 
African Americans elsewhere. This suggests the city needed quality of life improvements. 
However, the changes implemented after the storm did not improve wages, educational or 
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economic opportunities, or provide safer environments for poor, minority residents in the 
perspective of the NYT sampled articles and the participants. They portrayed the policies as 
perpetuating structural inequalities and compounding vulnerability. 
Third, critical theories also recognize the different perspectives individuals possess 
within a social group. Feminist standpoint theory assumes differences in material conditions 
create different perceptions of reality (Donovan, 2000; Hartsock, 1983; Hekman, 1997). The 
study included African American participants with different material conditions at the time of the 
storm, including homeowners, renters, and public housing residents. Participants also varied in 
their education and employment experience from service sector to professional jobs requiring 
advanced degrees. The different opinions on the ability to return to New Orleans reflect the class 
differences between respondents. Participants that rented or lived in public housing spoke of an 
inability to return because no housing existed for them while homeowners spoke with an 
assumption of return because they had to tend to their property. Renters and public housing 
residents, aware that they did not own their pre-Katrina residence, viewed return as outside of 
their control. They had to wait for landlords, college campuses, and government entities to 
rebuild housing for them to return. Over time, they found themselves priced out of the New 
Orleans rental market, which caused several participants to choose long-term displacement. 
Fourth, the content analysis findings support the methodological decisions informed by 
feminist standpoint theory. Feminist standpoint theory views knowledge as partial and coming 
from different sources for the oppressor and the oppressed (Donovan, 2000; Hartsock, 1983; 
Hekman, 1997). The vantage point of the oppressor is limited whereas that of the oppressed is a 
better depiction of true social relations because they can see the contradictions between the 
mainstream social narrative and their experiences living in oppressed bodies (Donovan, 2000; 
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Hartsock, 1983; Hekman, 1997). The content analysis framed African Americans as the most 
impacted social group by the storm as well as by a recovery process characterized as slow and 
spatially uneven. The media also depicted poor residents as receiving the least benefit from 
policy changes implemented during recovery. This supports the methodological decision to begin 
examining contradictions in recovery from the African American perspective because the media 
portrayed African Americans as having the most obstacles to return to post-Katrina New 
Orleans. The media also showed the gaps in assistance that emerged for poor, minority residents 
that did not arise for wealthier white residents. Beginning social investigation of recovery from 
the perspective of African Americans may have revealed more than if the study had been 
conducted with white residents who did not experience the same gaps in assistance during 
recovery. 
The Road Home program is a good example of the disparate impact recovery policy had 
on African American communities. The findings showed that the Road Home design and 
implementation created disparate impacts among Black and white communities. Officials created 
the discriminatory design based on the ideology that giving homeowners their house value would 
compensate them and return them to their pre-Katrina status. The money came with the 
stipulation that the residences had to be finished and lived in by the homeowner within three 
years. If the homeowner did not comply, the money had to be returned. The content analysis 
illustrated the gap this created in African American communities. Controlling for the extent of 
damage, residents in these communities received less aid than residents in white communities, 
but the officials still held African Americans responsible for rebuilding within three years 
although their Road Home grants alone did not provide enough money to rebuild a house. 
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The issues with the Road Home program tie back to critical race theory and feminist 
standpoint theory. The problems stemmed from the program’s ahistorical and ideological nature. 
Officials did not ground the policy in the concrete experiences of poor communities of color. By 
being ahistorical, the program failed to account for the influence of racial discrimination in real 
estate, which depresses housing values in minority communities. Home values were too low to 
pay for replacing the structure without additional resources. The content analysis revealed poor 
homeowners did not qualify for private market loans to cover shortfalls, which averaged more 
than $54,000 according to Reckdahl (2008). Rivlin (2015) showed from his experience lending 
to the African American community in New Orleans, Liberty Bank president, Alden McDonald 
recognized the design flaw long before federal judges found the program discriminated against 
homeowners in Black neighborhoods. This illustrated that McDonald had a better vantage point 
to understand the needs of his community as well as how policy decisions would affect his 
clientele. He foresaw the gaps that would exist in African American communities and understood 
that the private market would be unable to meet the needs of poor homeowners because their low 
wages and home values do not meet bank lending requirements. 
Critical perspectives emphasize the importance of history and context. The Road Home 
program is an example of a top down policy decision made without considering the historical 
context of the housing market and without considering the experiences of those at the bottom of 
the social hierarchy (Bronner, 2011; Calmore, 1992/1995; Cook, 1990/1995; Crenshaw, 
1988/1995; Crenshaw et al., 1995; Delgado & Stefancic, 2001; Matsuda, 1987/1995). By failing 
to account for systemic discrimination in real estate, the program exacerbated housing inequality 
along racial lines. Critical race theorists advocate for addressing race in order to change 
structural racism (Crenshaw et al., 1995; Delgado & Stefancic, 2001). Young (1990) contended 
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that differences between social groups needed to be recognized and that policy needed to treat 
them differently according to their differences. Similar to critical race theorists, Young (1990) 
attacked colorblind ideology as perpetuating racial discrimination and the status quo of 
inequality. The Road Home program attempted to treat all homeowners the same without 
recognizing their differences in material conditions before the storm. Critical race theorists 
suggest policy must explicitly address race in order to stop perpetuating structural racism and 
must be grounded in the lived experiences of oppressed communities (Calmore, 1992/1995; 
Cook, 1990/1995; Crenshaw, 1988/1995; Crenshaw et al., 1995; Delgado & Stefancic, 2001; 
Matsuda, 1987/1995). Recognizing differences may have led to policy decisions that provided 
the difference between one’s personal resources (i.e. insurance payouts, savings) and the cost to 
rebuild a house of similar size. Recognizing differences may also have helped alleviate 
contractor fraud issues by providing additional assistance to elderly or women homeowners who 
reported finding reliable contractors became problematic.  
The findings showed the importance of social stereotypes and representations, which is a 
focus of representational intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1991). Crenshaw (1991) described 
representational intersectionality as concerned with the influence of stereotypes on policy and 
social institutions. The content analysis revealed the media viewed the Road Home program’s 
complicated design as a reaction to stereotypical representations of poor, Black people. Officials 
viewed the recipients of the program as lazy criminals and created multiple steps to minimize 
fraud. The cumbersome process prioritized fraud reduction over quick and efficient distribution 
of rebuilding grants. Participants also described stereotypes as an obstacle while displaced. 
Employers judged participants based on stereotypes and refused to hire them. This made 
surviving in Houston more difficult because aid did not cover all household living expenses. As 
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such, participants described needing jobs while displaced in order to afford monthly living 
expenses, mortgage payments for New Orleans property, and car notes until they could return. 
These experiences illustrate the harmful impact stereotypes have on policy as well as on 
individuals.  
 Phillips et al. (2010) support utilizing a social vulnerability framework to understand the 
cause and impact of natural and technological disasters. They indicate that although scientific 
evidence supports the relevance of the social vulnerability framework the normative view of 
disasters as freak occurrences that create chaos continues to remain prevalent in mainstream 
media representations (2010). The findings revealed the TP applied the normative framework to 
make sense of Hurricane Katrina and the levee failure. The narrative that emerged from the TP 
sample shifted blame from local officials and planners to Hurricane Katrina, an uncontrollable 
weather event, which damaged some neighborhoods more so than others as discussed in the 
previous section.  
Literature Connections & Answers to the Research Questions 
This project intended to explore how African American evacuees framed obstacles to 
return to post-Katrina New Orleans. It sought to answer: How do these obstacles affect the 
decision-making process? How are these obstacles overcome? What is needed to facilitate 
return? How do participants frame race, class, and gender in the context of return? This section 
will answer these questions and situate the findings within the context of the scholarly literature 
on disasters and recovery.  
Participants and the media identified many obstacles to return. These obstacles included 
recovery policies and priorities; a lack of community, housing, employment, and educational 
opportunities; distrust of government to protect, compensate, and treat African Americans with 
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respect; and racial and class discrimination. Participants framed policy and priority issues as 
intentionally and deliberately created by government officials to block poor, African Americans 
from returning to the city. Pais and Elliot (2008) described post-disaster recovery as a 
continuation of local development, which is subject to power struggles between unequal forces. 
The local growth machine transforms into the recovery machine and maintains pre-existing 
power relations throughout recovery (2008). In this process, the local elite use their power to 
ensure recovery serves their interests (2008). This is similar to the perspective of the participants 
and the NYT, which depicted local politics as a barrier to recovery planning. The participants 
framed the uneven recovery as the result of race and class discrimination at all levels of 
government (Bullard & Wright, 2012). The slow response, disparities in compensation, and 
changes in public housing, education, and healthcare heightened participants’ distrust of the 
government to be honest and fair (2012). 
The findings also matched the literature concerning the impact of disaster recovery policy 
on vulnerable communities. The media framed recovery policy as compounding the vulnerability 
of African Americans, and the participants reported being more vulnerable after the storm, which 
would be expected based on the literature (Bullard & Wright, 2012; Christopolos et al., 2010; 
Ingram et al., 2006; Kamel & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004; Le Masson, 2015; Pais & Elliot, 2008). 
The findings agree that a framework of continued vulnerability would better suit understanding 
the lives of the participants (Chhotray & Few, 2012). Kamel & Loukaitou-Sideris (2004) found 
disparities in funding to minority communities diminished the ability of those neighborhoods to 
rebuild housing, which caused population loss. Participants and the media described African 
American communities as receiving less assistance to rebuild housing and longer wait times for 
schools and stores to be replaced than more affluent and whiter neighborhoods. They also 
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connected the lack of assistance to the blight and emptiness that continue to characterize the 
Lower 9th Ward and New Orleans East. The findings agree with Kamel & Loukaitou-Sideris 
(2004) that the lack of government assistance to rebuild minority communities reduces 
population because there is no housing to return to. 
In addition to disruptions in housing, education, and employment, participants described 
themselves as more vulnerable because displacement reduced their social networks (Litt et al., 
2012; Stack, 1974). Friends and family did not always end up in the same location. Those with 
less damage, more resources, and stable employment returned to New Orleans while those 
without housing, schools, or jobs after the storm lacked the means to return. Although Fussell 
(2012) contends that the people within a network tend to be in similar situations, Litt et al. 
(2012) provided examples of different networks, some with similar resources among all 
members and some with different resources and skills within the network. The participants 
showed the differences within their networks. Differences in age, housing tenure, employment 
opportunities, and educational needs caused some family members to return to New Orleans 
while others chose long-term displacement. Participants described their networks as having 
fewer resources and having to cover more distance to get help. They also drew attention to the 
depression they experienced after the storm and depicted being separated from family and 
friends as exacerbating their distress. 
Another barrier to return that emerged from the interviews was the lack of community. 
The lack of community negatively affected mental health. Participants described New Orleans as 
the people. Without the people, the city was just a structure. To Joseph Johnson being in the city 
knowing all of his immediate family and most of his close friends had not returned was a 
nightmare akin to the movie I Am Legend that featured Will Smith. To Raymond Davis, it was 
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the last straw that caused him to relocate to Houston after living in post-Katrina New Orleans for 
five years. Without reliable employment, Raymond became aware he was alone in the city 
without the security of his family network that would have helped him through hard times had 
they returned. This perspective agrees with Erikson (1976), who found the loss of community 
prevented respondents from healing after the Buffalo Creek dam failure.  
The media framed the destruction of New Orleans as a natural disaster, but it manifested 
more like a technological disaster. Comparing the findings to disaster literature, recovery 
followed the trajectory of a technological or man-made disaster. In natural disasters, community 
solidarity emerges to help residents heal psychologically. In technological disasters, a corrosive 
community develops that prevents healing. Instead, blame and the fight of compensation prolong 
the disaster. Picou (2009) framed Hurricane Katrina as a na-tech disaster, a hybrid disaster where 
a natural event causes technological failures. The findings support his perspective.  
The next question asked how the obstacles affected the decision-making process of the 
participants. As Dynes (1974) described, participants made thoughtful/thought-out, rational 
decisions concerning displacement and return. The participants weighed the pros and cons of 
returning, staying displaced, and relocating to Houston. Case one participants returned because 
of pre-Katrina commitments, i.e. retirement, college, family property, or family responsibility. 
The middle and working class participants in case 2 and 3 chose not to return or relocated, 
respectively, for different reasons. Those with housing in New Orleans did not have jobs to 
return to. Those with jobs needed housing. Others found higher wages and better living 
conditions (i.e. safer environments, better schools) in Houston while recovery floundered in their 
communities and housing priced them out. Several participants acknowledge that residents in the 
Diaspora long to return, but as Regina Walker described it is a dream that they know will not 
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come true because that life does not exist anymore. The decision to return was not based on blind 
emotion. Respondents explained they lived where they could – where they could find jobs; 
where they could find housing; where they could find quality schools; where they could find 
healthcare. Participants returned when they had jobs and left when they did not. Housing was a 
necessity, but as Thomas Stevens stated, his car became a house once he returned to New 
Orleans.  
Although participants described wanting to return to New Orleans, the majority in the 
study did not return because of the obstacles they encountered. At first, the city was closed, and 
participants could not return. This forced them to find accommodations elsewhere. The federal 
government and city of Houston worked together to provide long-term temporary housing for 
displaced residents. Disaster housing assistance pulled participants to settle in Houston. The aid 
did not cover all living expenses (i.e. utilities, car payment, New Orleans mortgage), so many 
participants relied on their personal savings, and NGO, employer, and/or private assistance as 
they searched for work and began building their lives again. As they built in Houston, they saw 
more obstacles emerge to life in New Orleans. The obstacles made them choose to delay 
returning until conditions improved. For some participants this meant an improvement in 
personal conditions (i.e. after graduation or retirement). Others needed changes in city conditions 
(i.e. contamination, affordable rents, quality schools, and employment opportunities) to return.  
The findings indicated that participants choose where to live based on the intersection of 
their pre-Katrina commitments or situation and their post-Katrina opportunities. Opportunities 
varied by the industries participants worked in before the storm. For example, those with trades 
easy to transfer (i.e. truck driver or nurse) had an easier time finding jobs in Houston than those 
searching for service sector employment or those with trades that relied on an established 
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clientele (i.e. lawyer or barber). Opportunities also varied by the people participants met in 
Houston. The aid from private citizens, employers, and organizations was unequal in size and 
distribution. Participants who received private aid described being selected or “favored” because 
they met social ideas of the deserving poor (i.e. well-mannered children, pregnant, helping 
others, set back outside of their control, musicians) (Gordon, 2002; Katz, 1989; Moffitt, 2015). A 
pre-condition of this type of aid was visibility during the time Houston residents gave freely. 
Participants who arrived in Houston after three or four months or those who stayed with family 
and friends instead of hotels or shelters received assistance through their network and reported 
receiving less private aid.  
Participants initially looked at Hurricane Katrina and the flooding as a setback, not an 
ending. They intended to rebuild, so life could return to normal. Over time they came to 
understand recovery prevented returning to what was. The built environment looked different. 
Different people walked the streets and called the city home. The recovery process even changed 
the names of schools, housing developments, and neighborhoods as leaders and developers 
rebranded aspects of the city, which Brash (2011) described as an important tenant of neoliberal 
policy. 
The third question asked how participants overcame the obstacles they encountered. 
Social networks helped in a number of ways. They provided emotional and financial support as 
well as housing and childcare. Participants relied on their social networks to help them after 
Hurricane Katrina, but their networks had different capacities to meet the needs that arose (Elliot 
et al., 2010; Fussell, 2012; Litt et al., 2012). Participants expanded their networks to include 
strangers, nonprofits, and faith-based organizations (Desmond, 2012; Domínguez & Watkins, 
2003). They made this choice because they found themselves separated from their pre-Katrina 
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network of friends and family. Adding Houston residents and organizations to their social 
networks also increased their access to resources because participants described everyone in their 
New Orleans network as in a similar or worse situation. Participants that did not receive private 
assistance in Houston struggled more to start over because federal disaster assistance programs 
produced gaps. Not all participants received enough private aid to cover the gaps they 
encountered, such as utility bills, living expenses, transportation, furniture, or employment.  
Participants also used moving to overcome obstacles. In case 1, two of the five 
participants moved to the metro area instead of returning to Orleans Parish due to the increase in 
rents and the decrease in affordable housing (Kamel & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004; Myers et al., 
2008). In case 3, each participant moved to Houston as a strategy to find jobs after they 
experienced long-term unemployment in New Orleans. Marcus Booker and Ella Taylor 
described moving frequently as a strategy to deal with the emotional trauma of losing home. 
Moving frequently meant different things to those in different situations. Those on disaster 
housing assistance in Houston had yearly leases and made moves when their leases expired. In 
contrast, some participants in New Orleans moved every few weeks or months due to poor 
housing conditions and changes in employment or relationship status. In case 2, the participants 
moved around the Houston metro to be closer to jobs, social networks, and schools.  
The participants devised strategies to overcome many of the hurdles they encountered. 
However, the findings revealed that not all obstacles were overcome. Some were accepted. For 
example, participants that returned accepted that many of their friends and family members 
would never return because of social conditions in the city (i.e. high rents, crime, violence, and 
low wages) or trauma from the storm and government response. Others, like Steven Bell, 
231 
 
Thomas Stevens, and Raymond Davis, continue to search for ways to rebuild their homes and 
their lives in New Orleans.  
Participants framed life as pre- and post-Katrina. In the 2016 follow up interviews, the 
participants continued to live in a post-Katrina perspective. Recovery continued because things 
were still broken and in need of recovery. Hurricane Katrina was not a thing of the past. It was a 
catalytic event that still affects participants’ emotional and mental health because they could not 
recover their pre-Katrina communities or reunite their social networks. 
The final question explored what residents need to return to New Orleans. Participants 
offered different policy ideas that could have reduced contractor fraud or encouraged small 
businesses to reopen. The interviews showed the needs remained consistent between 2011 and 
2016. Participants described residents need places to live, good schools for their children, livable 
wages, access to mental and physical healthcare, and their social networks in order to return to 
live in New Orleans. 
The two rounds of interviews showed that in participants' view what residents needed to 
return stayed the same. This supports the view from the content analysis, which suggested policy 
compounded vulnerability. The content analysis suggested recovery policies created gaps in 
assistance that increased the difficulty for African Americans to return. After signs of uneven 
recovery emerged and activist organizations filed lawsuits, officials initiated new policies to 
address gaps in assistance that recreated issues instead of eliminating them.  
The analysis showed similar views of recovery emerged from the content analysis and the 
interviews. Both portrayed recovery as uneven across and within communities due to the 
priorities selected by recovery leaders. Rather than improving the quality of life for low-income 
minorities, both perspectives viewed recovery policy as a barrier to return that compounded the 
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vulnerability of African American residents displaced by the disaster. Situating the findings in 
the context of the literature showed the findings are consistent with previous research. This 
suggests that although scholars are aware of the tendency for recovery policy to exacerbate social 
vulnerabilities the mainstream media continues to mask the impact of disasters as natural and 
recovery leaders continue to enact policy measures that compound vulnerability because policy 
design and implementation does not address or account for the influence structural oppression 





In the wake of the 2017 hurricane season in which three major hurricanes hit the United 
States in less than four weeks, the significance of Hurricane Katrina and the lessons learned from 
New Orleans recovery appear more important than ever. This chapter reviews the findings and 
analysis before discussing policy implications of the study. The section concludes by indicating 
study limitations and ideas to build upon in future research.  
Media and African American Frameworks of Recovery 
The sampled articles depicted recovery planning as a barrier to recovery in several ways. 
First, both samples suggested officials used flawed planning processes that limited citizen 
participation and allowed personal interests to influence decision-making processes. These issues 
led to multiple planning processes, which delayed the creation of a recovery plan. Some sampled 
authors suggested the slow pace of recovery planning exacerbated uncertainty and prevented 
private actors from investing in recovery efforts (Kroll-Smith, Baxter, & Jenkins, 2015). Second, 
the sampled articles showed recovery leaders shifted the goal of recovery from repairing 
damages to improving the city’s quality of life because they assumed residents had to be lured 
back. The samples argued planning to improve the city overshadowed resident desires to rebuild 
the life they lived before the disaster as well as the need to create plans to help residents return 
and rebuild their communities. Third, the sampled articles provided justifications for recovery 
planning process failures. The authors indicated five issues that compounded the difficulty of 
creating a recovery plan. These justifications included uncertainty around how many residents 
would return; opposing resident desires over rebuilding; displacement limited resident 
participation in planning processes; plans depended on federal funding; and that no action 
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resulted after officials announced plans. The sampled articles showed the errors in the planning 
process led to policy decisions that increased the difficulty of returning from displacement.  
Both media samples portrayed recovery policy as compounding vulnerability after the 
disaster. Although some authors portrayed recovery policies as successful, the samples showed 
policy decisions limited that success to certain segments of the population. The sampled authors 
provided examples that showed how design and implementation problems in housing, education, 
and healthcare policy affected the ability of residents to return. The sampled articles reported 
recovery policy produced gaps in assistance that perpetuated racial discrimination and poverty 
and failed to improve pre-storm conditions for poor and minority residents. The samples argued 
housing policies: prioritized homeowners; gave disproportional assistance to white communities; 
isolated renters; and increased living expenses for public housing residents. The sampled authors 
depicted education reform as perpetuating racial inequality by allowing the highest performing 
charter schools to use selective enrollment policies that privilege middle class families and white 
neighborhoods. The sampled articles used healthcare policy to suggest the slow pace of recovery 
left residents more vulnerable for years after the disaster. Together, the samples showed residents 
faced multiple challenges to rebuilding their lives in New Orleans, which made them more 
susceptible to instability and mental health issues.   
 The content analysis showed recovery policy contained design and implementation issues 
that created gaps in assistance. The participants framed these gaps as needs for which there was 
little or no help. The interviews showed each city offered a set of opportunities and challenges 
that participants experienced differently according to their life circumstances at the time of the 
levee failure. Culture, place attachment, and pre-Katrina socioeconomic investments pulled 
participants to return to New Orleans while the government response and relief to the disaster, 
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uneven recovery, recovery policy, and gaps in assistance pushed them to build lives elsewhere. 
Participants described the opposite situation existed in Houston. Federal disaster housing 
assistance, employment opportunities, and educational opportunities pulled participants to settle 
in Houston while cultural differences and discrimination pushed them to return to New Orleans. 
Participants reported they wanted to return but recovery glossed over providing the means to 
return, such as housing, employment, transportation, healthcare, and educational opportunities. 
The study showed the participants and the newspaper samples had similar perspectives on 
recovery although respondents said they did not trust the media. Both presented recovery as 
uneven across neighborhoods. They also framed the design and implementation of recovery 
policy as a barrier to return for displaced residents. The sampled articles and the interviews 
framed uneven recovery as a result of recovery policy and priorities. They suggested leaders 
prioritized homeowners, tourists, and less damaged neighborhoods, which tended to be whiter 
and wealthier than heavily damaged communities. They also argued  that recovery policy 
compounded the vulnerability of African Americans. In their view, this happened because 
political leaders failed to anticipate ways recovery policy would interact with race and class 
differences to manifest gaps and disparities in assistance. 
Although both samples expressed similar views about recovery, participants recognized 
the influence of race and class on recovery before the media. In the sampled articles, race and 
class disparities emerged overtime as unintended consequences of policy decisions when authors 
reflected on recovery outcomes on anniversaries of Hurricane Katrina. In contrast, participants 
described race and class as influencing the initial response and long-term recovery. They thought 
government relief would arrive faster to rescue residents in an affluent city or one with fewer 
minority residents. They also described how being stereotyped by the media as criminals and 
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killers affected the way Houston residents treated them, which made adjusting to displacement 
more difficult for many. Rather than viewing race and class disparities as unintended as the 
media portrayed, many participants viewed them as deliberate strategies to keep African 
Americans from returning to New Orleans.  
Participants understood the gaps in assistance prevented residents from rebuilding. 
Participants offered solutions to issues that arose, such as connecting residents to verified 
contractors to avoid contractor fraud. Their ability to see solutions to enable return made 
participants think their politicians knew what African American residents needed to return but 
chose not to address their needs. This disconnection between policy makers and the participants 
exacerbated the historic distrust between African American communities and all levels of 
government.  
The findings showed participants needed more than housing assistance in New Orleans 
and in Houston. Many reported they also needed sustained financial support to cover gaps in 
assistance (Popkin, Turner, & Burt, 2006). Participants discussed receiving FEMA and Red 
Cross checks to replace their material possessions but stated that they used the money for unmet 
needs while displaced (Litt et al., 2012). These unmet needs included food costs, utility bills, and 
expenses associated with commuting between Houston and New Orleans. Participants suggested 
stable employment would have also alleviated these unmet needs, but many experienced 
protracted periods of unemployment. Some participants discussed unemployment as a result of 
racial discrimination in both cities. Others framed their experiences with long-term 
unemployment in New Orleans as a consequence of businesses and industries that needed several 
years to recover.  
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Time, Place, & Human Agency in Recovery 
The study also showed that policy decisions made before and during the disaster affected 
recovery outcomes. The mandatory evacuation required all residents to leave New Orleans. After 
the flooding, officials closed the city and stopped residents from returning to find relatives or to 
check on property. Additionally, city leaders kept some neighborhoods closed for months, which 
participants described as the first barrier to return that they encountered.  
A NYT article presented six months as the time when displaced residents would decide if 
they would return to New Orleans or build new lives elsewhere. The interviews showed that 
participants had to make decisions long before the six-month point. In fact, there was never a 
time when they were not making decisions. Decisions started before the disaster arrived. 
Networks mobilized to evacuate; those that stayed also planned and prepared (Litt, 2008; 2012). 
They gathered with their family in the strongest buildings to which they had access and devised 
strategies to reach relief when it failed to reach them. Participants could not wait six months to 
decide where they would live because their need for stable housing could not wait. Because they 
could not wait and they could not return, they had to start building lives outside of New Orleans 
in order to care for their families.  
In exile, no participant stayed in one place for the first six months after the storm (Kroll-
Smith et al., 2015). They stayed in a series of places for various lengths of times. For example, 
Paulette Watson stayed in a stranger’s house in Mississippi for a week. Then her family traveled 
to Houston to stay at a friend's house with seventeen other displaced residents. She stayed for a 
week or so before giving her spot to her daughter and grandson and moving herself, her mother, 
and her 16-year-old son in with a family from her friend's church. They stayed there for three 
months. In January 2006, she received a disaster-housing voucher and moved into an apartment 
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in Houston for a year before she returned to New Orleans, where she stayed with a friend for two 
months until her house was finished. Additionally, all of the case three participants returned 
before December 2005, which was four months after the disaster. This shows they made their 
decision to return much sooner than the six month point. In fact, the interviews revealed 
participants left with the intention to return. That framework meant participants watched 
recovery searching for the time when return would be possible. They did not wait until March 1, 
2006, to think about going home. By then it was apparent to participants that home was gone and 
may never return.  
The study showed recovery leaders, as portrayed by the media, and participants held 
different assumptions after Hurricane Katrina. The sampled articles indicated planners assumed 
residents needed encouragement to return in the form of quality of life improvements. However, 
the content analysis and interviews showed residents wanted to resume the life they lived before 
the storm. The differences in assumptions led planners to create a self-fulfilling prophecy. The 
policies the media claimed leaders enacted to entice residents to return became the policies that 
participants identified as compounding their difficulty to return. The next section explores how 
competing narratives framed recovery as both a success and a failure. 
Competing Narratives of Recovery 
 In both the content analysis and the interviews, competing narratives of recovery 
emerged, which showed a clear indicator of success did not emerge to evaluate recovery. This 
was not an oversight due to viewing recovery as a process that continues rather than as a fixed 
point in time. Even as a process, recovery set goals and implemented policies whose outcomes 
could be evaluated overtime. The findings showed contradictory narratives emerged that 
presented New Orleans’s recovery as a success and as a failure.  
239 
 
The findings showed a clear way to evaluate the success of recovery efforts did not exist 
after Hurricane Katrina. In the NYT, Nossiter (2007) wrote, “What the reports seem to suggest, 
taken together, is that there is no useful yardstick, and no clear indicator of whether the arrow 
points down or up. Signs of progress and hope in latter-day New Orleans are always 
accompanied by their opposites.” Instead, the media presented two narratives of recovery. One 
suggested policy changes resulted in positive impacts and depicted recovery efforts as 
successful. The other perspective portrayed efforts as a failing to achieve their goals by 
indicating how recovery policy caused gaps in assistance and disparate impacts.  
Each perspective provided examples to support their view of recovery. Articles pushing 
the success narrative provided statistics to back up their perspective, such as decreases in 
neighborhood poverty rates and in the number of failing schools and increases in student test 
scores and in racial and class diversity in redeveloped public housing complexes. The articles 
that viewed recovery as failing to meet its goal to improve the city’s quality of life showed the 
disparities that recovery boosters overlooked to create the success narrative. For example, to 
counter the claim that schools are better, some critics point out the lack of autonomy and loss of 
local control that accompanied the shift from public schools to charter schools. Other sampled 
articles reported that the poorest families, whose kids are typically the hardest to educate, did not 
return. They used this fact to argue displacement, not charter schools, raised test scores because 
hard to educate students that pulled averages down did not return. Still others indicated that the 
new school system incentivized pushing out children that could not pass standardized tests. 
Together, the articles showed the success narrative did not apply to all residents. 
The effectiveness of post-Katrina policy changes is important because the content 
analysis suggested social reformers viewed New Orleans as a test case for social experiments to 
240 
 
improve educational attainment and life outcomes for impoverished minority students and their 
communities across the country. The philanthropic organizations that support charter schools 
hold up the city’s “achievements” as proof that charter schools are better at educating 
disadvantaged children than traditional public schools. This fuels the move toward dismantling 
and privatizing public education nationwide. However, the counter narrative suggested charter 
schools only work for affluent, white children and systematically disenfranchise communities of 
color, which indicates a national shift could exacerbate, instead of decrease, poverty rates among 
people of color.  
The media portrayed the recovery of New Orleans as an example of how to reform public 
institutions from housing to schools and healthcare in order to alleviate and counteract 
generational poverty. If these programs and policies did not work for poor and minority 
residents, implementing them in other communities could worsen social conditions rather than 
improve individual outcomes. The emphasis on New Orleans as a test case for national policy 
change increases the importance of understanding recovery’s successes and failures. The 
sampled articles suggested the success of recovery depended on the vantage point of the 
evaluator. They reported families that received sufficient aid, either public or private, to rebuild 
their lives viewed recovery as successful, but residents that continue to struggle more than a 
decade after the disaster described recovery as a failure. One article indicated race affected how 
residents viewed recovery with Black residents more likely than white residents to view recovery 
as a failure instead of as a success. Understanding how recovery influenced different populations 
can help future planners and policy makers design programs capable of improving living 
conditions and life chances for impoverished communities of color. The next section expands the 
discussion of the policy implications of the research findings. 
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Policy Implications for Disaster Recovery in Urban Areas 
The study showed the assumptions of officials that guided recovery in the content 
analysis did not match the desires of participants that emerged from the interviews. First, the 
sampled articles suggested recovery leaders assumed up to forty percent of the population would 
never return. They also assumed pre-storm socio-structural problems, such as concentrated 
poverty and poor public education outcomes, had to be addressed in order to attract residents to 
New Orleans. The media samples argued officials prioritized quality of life improvements over 
facilitating the return of displaced residents. The data showed the planners created a self-
fulfilling prophecy. They assumed people would not return because they underestimated the pull 
of culture and home. Recovery planners did not understand the importance of cultural 
attachments to African Americans in New Orleans, so they could not understand why they would 
choose to return to a place that remained environmentally vulnerable due to federal reluctance to 
change environmental policy and to fund large-scale coastal redevelopment projects. The 
expectation that New Orleans would have difficulty repopulating led to decisions that 
participants identified as creating difficulties to return. Outcomes may have been different if 
planners had planned for everyone to return, which would have required addressing housing, 
income, education, and healthcare needs for a diverse populous. 
Although one NYT article suggested policy makers had six months before residents would 
determine if they would return or stay displaced permanently, the interviews showed participants 
made several decisions about where they would live immediately after New Orleans flooded. 
They did not have six months to wait; they had to sleep, eat, and regain independence today. 
Participants stated they moved around to where they thought they could meet their household 
needs until the city reopened and they could rebuild. They had to begin rebuilding their lives 
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immediately after the storm even if they could not return to New Orleans to check on property. 
They needed bank accounts to cash FEMA and Red Cross checks. They needed jobs to meet 
mortgage payments that tended to only be deferred for two to three months. Their kids needed to 
be in school. Survival required participants to establish a new life in a new city because policy 
decisions kept New Orleans closed, in some areas for months. 
The study revealed important implications for what disaster recovery should look like in 
urban areas. First, recovery planning should prioritize allowing all residents to return as soon as 
possible. This means improvements to the built environment or social infrastructure should not 
lengthen the time that residents are displaced. Second, residents need to be included in planning 
processes and should have power to influence policy design and decision-making processes, 
especially disadvantaged, marginalized, and/or minority residents. Policy must account for 
differential impacts caused by social identities linked to race, class, gender, and age in order to 
ensure recovery does not perpetuate pre-existing systemic inequalities.  
Recovery policy must also address multiple needs simultaneously, which will require 
quick and adequate federal funding and support. Cities contain a diverse set of residents and each 
resident has a set of factors that contribute to household stability and a sense of independence. 
Equitable recovery requires planners to devise strategies with residents that enable all groups to 
rebuild at the same time. The findings suggested planners after Hurricane Katrina worked 
sequentially, investing first in less damaged areas. This became a barrier because participants 
continue to wait for investment in African American communities that experienced the worst 
flooding. To ensure an equitable recovery, federal dollars are required to address needs the 
private market cannot. This means recovery planners need to recognize the limitations of policies 
that rely on private market investments or loans for recovery, such as the Road Home programs 
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and public housing redevelopment. The study showed private market solutions are inadequate to 
address the needs of low-income households because they fail to qualify for private market loans 
based on income requirements.   
Limitations 
The study had several limitations that arose from design choices. First, the interview 
findings cannot be generalized to the larger population of displaced residents. This is in part due 
to the nature of qualitative work. It is also due to sampling choices. Sampling did not rely on a 
randomized selection, which is necessary for scientific studies to be representative of larger 
populations (Babbie, 2004; Creswell, 2007). In addition, the sample only included participants 
that self-identified as Black or African American that had an annual household income of less 
than $200,000 before the disaster. This means the findings cannot speak to the experiences of 
other races or classes. To understand how the findings apply to the larger population of all 
residents displaced from New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina, a new study would need to be 
designed that included a larger sample size, applied quantitative methods, and applied random 
sampling techniques. Although the findings only apply to the sampled participants, they can be 
used as a starting point to develop a quantitative survey to test the applicability of the findings to 
the larger displaced population. 
Time and resource constraints also caused limitations. The content analysis originally 
included three papers to examine a nation paper in comparison to local newspapers in New 
Orleans and in Houston. However, time constraints during the data analysis phase caused the 
articles from the Houston Chronicle to be dropped from the study before the third round of 
coding could be complete. Additionally, the articles from the TP and NYT could not be accessed 
from the same database. This caused differences in determining the population of articles that 
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could be chosen to form each sample. The TP search resulted in over 100,000 articles, which 
made selecting only 50 difficult. As such, the research included a few additional articles, but the 
project would have benefited from a larger sample size. However, the researcher did not have the 
time to analyze a larger sample. Time and financial constraints also forced the researcher to 
conduct follow-up interviews with displaced residents over the phone and to rely on a 
transcription service to transcribe the 2016 interviews. Phone interviews caused errors in 
transcripts because some calls experienced reception issues that made it difficult to decipher 
participant responses.   
The researcher also created limitations. Due to space and time constraints, the researcher 
chose to limit the discussion of ways New Orleans culture operated as barriers, which included 
neighborhood violence and crime, party culture, and interpersonal racism. The researcher may 
also have not included gender issues due to a lack of sensitivity and awareness. After attending a 
lecture on intersectional by critical race scholar, Kimberle Crenshaw, the researcher began to 
wonder if the lack of gender quotes in the gross gender code represented a lack of awareness on 
the part of the researcher or if the samples overlooked the influence of gender in disaster 
recovery. With more time, another round of coding would strengthen the findings by allowing 
the researcher to double check gender differences. Changing the framework to compare female 
respondents to male respondents may also reveal new insights into how gender emerged in the 
interviews that the researcher overlooked initially.  
The final limitation comes from the sensitive nature of the interviews. Some prospective 
participants did not want to revisit their experiences after the disaster. Participants stated many of 
their friends and family cannot talk about the storm due to the trauma they experienced. Some 
participants also informed the researcher they did not feel comfortable discussing some painful 
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moments. These moments included trauma caused when family members stole recovery funds, 
deaths in the family, the state of New Orleans ten years after the disaster, and disruptions in 
parent-child relationships due to displacement. The researcher honored requests to stop 
interviews as well as to move to a different line of questioning.  
Future Research 
 Future research can expand upon the findings of this study and address limitations 
discussed in the previous section. The Houston Chronicle articles could be coded and analyzed 
in comparison with the existing data. All data sources could be recoded for the influence of 
gender. Published interviews could also be coded to see if they identify similar or additional 
barriers and problems as the participants. The sample could be expanded to include more 
interviews, articles, and media sources to further investigate how residents and the media framed 
challenges to return. To see how experiences vary according to social vulnerabilities, such as 
race, gender, class, age, ability, the sample could consist of a diverse population. In addition, the 
findings could be used to form a quantitative survey to test the applicability of the findings to the 
larger population of displaced residents. 
 In light of the 2017 hurricane season, future research could also compare and contrast 
disaster management between hurricanes: Katrina, Harvey, Irma, & Maria. Each of these storms 
represents unprecedented levels of damage to the communities affected. It would be interesting 
to see what differences existed between initial response and long-term recovery policies and to 
explore how residents viewed recovery in their location. The impact of Hurricane Harvey on 
New Orleans residents displaced to Houston would also reveal insights into similarities and 
differences in preparedness, relief, response, and recovery. Conducting a comparative analysis of 
recovery between New Orleans, Houston, the Florida Keys, and Puerto Rico may also reveal 
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new insights into the influence of race and class on disaster recovery, which could prove or 
disprove the opinions expressed by participants that suggested disaster relief and recovery would 
have been different if New Orleans had a richer, whiter population.  
In addition, Hurricane Harvey hitting Houston almost twelve years after Hurricane 
Katrina raised issues of long-term vulnerability and the effectiveness of relocation strategies. The 
study could expand by conducting follow up interviews to understand how displaced participants 
understand their vulnerability in Houston after Hurricane Harvey, especially since the findings 
indicated the continued environmental vulnerability of New Orleans dissuaded some participants 
from returning. Housing displaced residents in Houston did not originate as an intentional 
relocation strategy; however the participants framed long-term disaster housing assistance as a 
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Informed Consent Agreement 
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2000 Lakeshore Drive 
New Orleans, LA 70148 
504-280-6000 | 888-514-4275 
 
Informed Consent Agreement  
 
Purpose of the Study 
I am studying low-income African Americans’ return to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.  
To do this, I am interviewing residents who have returned and are living in New Orleans, as well 
as residents who are still living in Houston, TX, but want to return to New Orleans.  The purpose 
of the interview is to understand what evacuees have experienced.  
 
What to Expect 
If you choose to participate, we will arrange a time and place that works best for you for a face-
to-face interview that will last between 60 and 90 minutes.  In the interview, I will ask you to 
talk about the your efforts to return to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. You will not have to 
answer any question that makes you feel uncomfortable or that you do not wish to answer.  After 
the first interview if you are willing, we may arrange another interview if we were unable to 
finish going through the questions. With your permission, the interviews will be recorded with an 
audio digital recorder as well as a video camera. You will be mailed your own DVD of all of 
your recordings and interview transcripts when your interviews are complete.  
 
Compensation 
You will be paid $20 for each interview at the beginning of the interview.  In the event you 
become uncomfortable and wish to stop the interview early or if there are questions you choose 
not to answer, you will still be allowed to keep the $20. 
 
Benefits of the Study 
There is no direct benefit to you for participating in this study.  However, this study may be very 
beneficial for policy makers and service organizations, who will be able to use the knowledge 
learned from this study to make future decisions on rebuilding after disasters.  
 
Risks  
It is possible that topics may come up that may make you feel uncomfortable or that you will not 
wish to discuss. You will never have to discuss any topic you do not want to talk about. You can 
stop the interview at anytime.  
 
Confidentiality 
All recordings of you will be kept confidential.  They will be stored on a password-protected 
hard drive.  Typed transcripts of the interviews will be stored in a locked file cabinet.  The 
researcher will be the only person to review the video footage. You can choose to be identified 





If you have any questions about the study, your participation in the study, your rights as a 
participant in the study, or any injury that is a result of your participation in the study, please feel 
free to contact the researcher at any time. If you have questions about your rights as a research 




_____ I know my participation in this project is voluntary. I know that I can stop at any time I 
want to stop. I know that I would not be penalized in any way if I decided not to participate or 
continue. 
 
_____ I give permission to be audio recorded as long as the following guidelines are followed: 
(1) the recordings will be used only for the purpose of this project; (2) copies of the recordings 
will not be available to anyone outside of the project; (3) the recordings will be destroyed when 
the information is no longer needed for the project. 
 
_____ I give permission to be video recorded as long as the following guidelines are followed: 
(1) the recordings will be used only for the purpose of this project; (2) the recordings will be 




By signing my name, I agree that the statements have been read to me, and I understand them. 
 
Name (Printed) _____________________________________ Date______________________  
 
Signature _________________________________________  Date______________________  
 




University of New Orleans 
2000 Lakeshore Drive 
New Orleans, LA 70148 








You will be paid $20 for this interview at the beginning of the interview.  In the event you 
become uncomfortable and wish to stop the interview early or if there are questions you choose 
not to answer, you will still keep the $20.  
 
 
Please sign and date to verify that you received compensation for this interview. 
 
Name (Printed) _____________________________________ Date______________________  
 
Signature _________________________________________  Date______________________  
 
Researcher _________________________________________ Date______________________  
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2011-2012 Interview Schedules 
 
Case 1: Returned to New Orleans 
 
Background 
 Talk about your life before the storm. 
 Tell me about your family. 
 Tell me about where you lived before Katrina. 
 Tell me about your job. 
 Tell me about your biggest problems before the storm. 
 
Evacuee 
 Tell me about the week before Hurricane Katrina. 
 How did you find out about the storm? 
 Tell me about leaving New Orleans.  
 Where did you go and how did you get there? 
 
Life in Houston 
 Tell me about your first few months in Houston. 
 Tell me about any problems you had to deal with in Houston. 
 Explain how you were able to solve those issues. 
 Tell me about someone or some agency that helped you get settled in Houston. 
   
Life in New Orleans 
 Tell me about the first time you returned to New Orleans. 
 Tell me about your decision to return to New Orleans. 
 Explain to me what made it hard for you to return to New Orleans. 
 Talk to me about what would have made your return to New Orleans easier. 
 Tell me about someone or some agency that helped you return to New Orleans. 




Case 2: Displaced in Houston 
 
Background 
 Talk about your life before the storm. 
 Tell me about your family. 
 Tell me about where you lived before Katrina. 
 Tell me about how your job. 
 Tell me about your biggest problems before the storm. 
 
Evacuee 
 Tell me about the week before Hurricane Katrina. 
 How did you find out about the storm? 
 Tell me about leaving New Orleans.  
 Tell me where you went and how you got there. 
 
Life in Houston 
 Tell me about your first few months in Houston. 
 Tell me about any problems you had to deal with in Houston. 
 Explain how you were able to solve those issues. 
 Tell me about someone or some agency that helped you get settled in Houston. 
   
Return in New Orleans 
 Tell me about the first time you returned to New Orleans. 
 Explain to me what is stopping you from returning to New Orleans. 
 Talk to me about what you need to be able to return to New Orleans. 
 Tell me about where you can go to get help to return to New Orleans. 
 Tell me about your plan to return to New Orleans. 






Case 3: Returned to Houston 
 
Background 
 Talk about your life before the storm. 
 Tell me about your family. 
 Tell me about where you lived before Katrina. 
 Tell me about your job. 
 Tell me about your biggest problems before the storm. 
 
Evacuee 
 Tell me about the week before Hurricane Katrina. 
 How did you find out about the storm? 
 Tell me about leaving New Orleans.  
 Where did you go and how did you get there? 
 
Life in Houston the First Time 
 Tell me about your first few months in Houston. 
 Tell me about any problems you had to deal with in Houston. 
 Explain how you were able to solve those issues. 
 Tell me about someone or some agency that helped you get settled in Houston. 
   
Life in New Orleans 
 Tell me about the first time you returned to New Orleans. 
 Tell me about your decision to return to New Orleans. 
 Explain to me what made it hard for you to return to New Orleans. 
 Talk to me about what would have made your return to New Orleans easier. 
 Tell me about someone or some agency that helped you return to New Orleans. 
 Tell me about your biggest problems after you returned to New Orleans. 
 
Life in Houston Again 
 Tell me about your decision to return to Houston. 
 Tell me about how you ended up moving back to Houston. 
 Tell me about the problems in New Orleans that made you leave. 
 Tell me about your life in Houston since you returned. 
 Tell me about which move was easier: to New Orleans or back to Houston. 




Follow-up Interview Schedule 
Housing 
The last time we spoke you were living…. Can you tell me about where you live now?  
 
How long have you been living there? Do you think you’ll continue to stay there for the next few 
years or do you think you’ll be moving again soon?  
 
I want to understand how you think of living in Houston 10 years after Hurricane Katrina. Do 
you still think of yourself as displaced or have your thoughts changed? 
 
Employment 
When we spoke last, you were working…. Can you tell me about where you work now? 
 
How long have you been working there? Do you think you’ll continue to stay there for the next 
few years or do you think you’ll be looking for a new job or career in the next few years? 
 
How much money do you make per year in this job? Is it enough to make ends meet or do you 
have troubles meeting your financial responsibilities each month? How do you make ends meet 
if you have troubles? 
 
How does this compare to when we spoke 5 years ago? How much did you make? Was it enough 
to get by? How did you make ends meet if you had troubles? 
 
How does this compare to when you lived in New Orleans? How much did you make per year? 
Was it enough to get by? How did you make ends meet if you had troubles? 
 
Health 
Can you tell me about your current mental and physical health?  
 
How does this compare to your health 5 years ago? 
 
How does this compare to your health before the storm when you lived in New Orleans? 
 
Can you talk about any issues with depression or anxiety as a result of your experiences after 
Hurricane Katrina?  
 
Can you talk about any physical health issues like high blood pressure or any other chronic 
illnesses you developed or that got worse as a result of your experiences after Hurricane Katrina?  
 
Can you tell me about any addictions that you developed or that got worse as a result of your 








The last time we spoke you or your children were in school.  Are you or your children still in 
school? What grades are they in? When do you expect to graduate?  
 
Can you tell me about any difficulties you or your children may have with completing your 
education? 
 
How does this compare to 5 years ago? 
 
How does this compare to when you lived in New Orleans? 
 
Additional 
Have there been any major changes in your life since we spoke in 2011/2012? 
 
Can you tell me about your biggest issues or most pressing concerns today? 
 
New Orleans  
Can you tell me about the last time you visited New Orleans? When was your visit? How did you 
get there? How long did you stay? Can you tell me about what you did during your visit? 
 
Tell me about your impression of the city and the progress of recovery. How does your 
impression from visiting compare to the impression presented in the news? 
 
Tell me about your thoughts on the city’s recovery now that we are 10 years after the storm. 
 
Can you tell me about issues you think city leaders need to address to improve the current 
conditions of the city? 
 
In my study, I am focused on how city, state, and federal policy decisions created barriers or 
obstacles for African Americans to return. Can you tell me about any decisions government 
leaders made that made it difficult for people you know to return?  
 
Can you give any examples of policy decisions or programs that would have helped the people 
you know return?  
 
Can you think of any policies or programs government leaders could make today that would help 
people return? 
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